State v. Frost, 97-KA-1771.
| Decision Date | 01 December 1998 |
| Docket Number | No. 97-KA-1771.,97-KA-1771. |
| Citation | 727 So.2d 417 |
| Parties | STATE of Louisiana v. Jeffrey L. FROST. |
| Court | Louisiana Supreme Court |
James Edgar Boren, J. Rodney Baum, Baton Rouge, for Applicant.
Richard P. Ieyoub, Atty. Gen., Douglas P. Moreau, Dist. Atty., John W. Sinquefield, Monisa L. Thompson, Baton Rouge, for Respondent.
On February 3, 1996, an East Baton Rouge Parish grand jury indicted the defendant, Jeffrey L. Frost, for the first degree murder of Regina Slonim in violation of LSA-RS 14:30. After a trial by jury, the defendant was found guilty as charged. After a sentencing hearing, the same jury charged with determining the defendant's guilt unanimously returned a verdict of death. The jury found two aggravating circumstances: (1) the murder was committed during the commission of an armed robbery; and (2) it was committed in an especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel manner.
This matter comes before us on direct appeal under Article V, Section 5(D) of the Louisiana State Constitution. Defendant raises 112 assignments of error. None of the errors is meritorious. Therefore, we affirm the defendant's conviction and sentence.
In the early morning of June 21, 1995, the defendant, Jeffrey L. Frost, killed the victim, Regina Slonim, by stabbing her 29 times. Ms. Slonim worked as a night auditor and desk clerk at the East Baton Rouge Howard Johnson's, where the defendant rented a room at a reduced rate and was employed as a part-time maintenance worker. During the course of his employment, the defendant had become familiar with the hotel's system of storing reserve cash funds in safe deposit boxes located behind the front desk. Approximately two weeks prior to the crime, the defendant decided to rob the hotel by removing money from these safety deposit boxes. He specifically selected Ms. Slonim as the victim because she was the night clerk that he liked the least.
It is the defendant's contention that, on the morning of the murder, he lured the victim away from the front desk and into an adjacent hallway, where she would not be seen by passers-by, under the guise of effectuating a previously arranged meeting to sell the victim marijuana. Carrying a knapsack with a change of clothes, wearing latex rubber gloves, and armed with a steak knife he had previously purloined from the hotel kitchen, the defendant approached the victim and asked her to follow him into the hallway. He asked her if she was "ready." When she answered that she was, the defendant immediately stabbed her with the steak knife in the throat, severing her larynx and rendering her unable to scream. A violent struggle ensued in which the defendant proceeded to repeatedly stab the victim about the face, head, and chest, until she died of massive blood loss. The defendant then obtained the keys to the safe deposit boxes, which he knew to be kept behind the front desk, and took approximately 800 dollars. Before leaving the crime scene, and in an effort to ensure that Ms. Slonim was indeed dead, the defendant "stomped" on her head several times, leaving a bloody imprint of his tennis shoe on her face. The defendant also left bloody footprints on the carpet. He then took the money and traveled to Houston, Texas where he attempted to purchase marijuana with the intention of selling it for a profit back in Baton Rouge.2
Two days after the murder, while staying with friends in Houston, the defendant called the Howard Johnson's hotel and explained that he heard about the murder on the news. During this phone call, he expressed particular interest in the police investigation. This phone call, in conjunction with his sudden absence from the hotel, arose suspicion. Based on this information, police obtained a search warrant for defendant's hotel room at Howard Johnson's, wherein they found a Nike Air Max shoe box, marijuana, and bloodied bandages in the bathroom. Police went to the store named on the shoe box and purchased the same type and size of shoe indicated on the box. Subsequent analysis revealed that the tread on the shoes purchased by the police matched the bloody footprints left by the defendant in the hotel.
Police later obtained an arrest warrant which was executed at the home of the defendant's friends with whom he was staying in Houston. After entering the home, police found the defendant apparently hiding on the floor next to a bed. He was handcuffed and arrested. During the arrest, the defendant asked the police to give his friends some money from his pocket. Police responded by removing 197 dollars from the defendant's pocket, explaining that the money would be kept as evidence.3 Defendant subsequently confessed to his involvement in the murder.
At trial, the jury found the defendant guilty of first degree murder and returned a death verdict. Defendant now appeals his conviction and sentence, raising 112 assignments of error.4
In assignments of error 48 and 12, defendant argues for reversal of his conviction and sentence claiming the trial court erred in granting the State's challenges for cause as to two venirepersons based on their attitudes regarding the death penalty.5 Specifically, the defendant alleges that the trial court erroneously applied Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 798(2) when it excused prospective jurors Derek Ward and Valerie White when their attitudes on the death penalty did not prevent them from sitting fairly on the case.
In defining the standard for the exclusion of potential jurors from a capital case based on their views on capital punishment, the United States Supreme Court in Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985) held that the determination to be made is whether the juror's views would "prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath." Notably, the Witt court stated that "unmistakable clarity" is not required when determining whether this standard has in fact been met. Id. at 424, 105 S.Ct. at 852. The Supreme Court has also held, however, that a capital defendant's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to an impartial jury prohibits the exclusion of prospective jurors "simply because they voiced general objections to the death penalty or expressed conscientious or religious scruples against its infliction." Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968). Those veniremen who "firmly believe that [the death penalty] is unjust may nevertheless serve ... so long as they state clearly that they are willing to temporarily set aside their own beliefs in deference to the rule of law." Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 176, 106 S.Ct. 1758, 1766, 90 L.Ed.2d 137 (1986). Nevertheless, even where a prospective juror has declared his ability to remain impartial, a challenge for cause will be upheld if his responses as a whole "reveal facts from which bias, prejudice, or inability to render judgment according to the law may be reasonably implied." State v. Gradley, 97-0641 p. 6 (La.5/19/98), ___ So.2d ___.
It is reversible error for a trial court to improperly excuse such a venireman despite the fact that the State could have used a peremptory challenge to strike the juror. Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648, 107 S.Ct. 2045, 95 L.Ed.2d 622 (1987). This Court has held that the trial court has great discretion in determining a potential juror's fitness for service and that a trial judge's determination in this regard is owed much deference where it is fairly supported by the record. Gradley, supra, 97-0641 at 6. Such a determination will not be disturbed by this Court on review unless a review of the voir dire as a whole indicates an abuse of discretion. Id. at 7; State v. Tart, 93-0772 (La.2/9/96), 672 So.2d 116, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 934, 117 S.Ct. 310, 136 L.Ed.2d 227 (1996).
In assignment of error number 48, the defendant argues that venireman Derek Ward was improperly excused for cause. Ward was excused because his testimony indicated that his attitude towards the mitigating circumstance of "no significant prior criminal history" would have prevented him from rendering an impartial verdict. See La.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 905.5(a) (West 1997). Defendant asserts however, that Ward merely expressed a willingness to consider this mitigating circumstance in light of all other relevant factors in the case and that he could render an impartial verdict. The relevant testimony is the following:
When questioned by the trial court on this issue, Ward stated the following:
Potential jurors in Louisiana are required by law to possess a willingness to consider certain enumerated mitigating circumstances. See La.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 905.5 (West 1997). However, when a potential juror indicates during voir dire...
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State v. Taylor
... ... The amendment has unquestionably superceded this court's decisions in State v. Frost, 97-1771 (La.12/1/98), 727 So.2d 417 and State v. Wessinger, 98-1234 (La.5/28/99), 736 So.2d 162, with regard to those persons entitled to ... ...
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State v. Odenbaugh
... ... Jones, 474 So.2d 919, 929 (La. 1985); See State v. Frost, 97-1771, p. 4 (La. 12/1/98), 727 So.2d 417, 423; Maxie, 93-2158 at 16-17, 653 So.2d at 535; State v. Hallal, 557 So.2d 1388, Page 28 1389-1390 ... ...
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State Of La. v. Bordelon
... ... State v. Frost, 97-1771, p. 27 (La.12/1/98), 727 So.2d 417, 438 (“[A]lthough counsel argues correctly in his Sentence Review Memorandum that proportionality ... ...
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State v. Holmes
... ... State v. Frost, 97-1771 (La.12/1/98), 727 So.2d 417, cert. denied, 528 U.S. 831, 120 S.Ct. 87, 145 L.Ed.2d 74 (1999) (jurors properly dismissed for cause when ... ...