State v. Fuentes
| Decision Date | 25 June 2020 |
| Docket Number | 36223-0-III |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
| Parties | STATE OF WASHINGTON, Respondent, v. STAFONE NICHOLAS FUENTES, Appellant. |
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Stafone Fuentes appeals his convictions for attempted first degree murder and first degree assault. We affirm the convictions but remand with instructions to strike the $200 criminal filing fee from the judgment and sentence.
In February 2013, Titus Davis and Lamont O'Neal were shot several times while seated in a car outside of Spokane's Knitting Factory, an event venue. Both Mr. Davis and Mr O'Neal survived, but neither was able to identify the shooter. Mr. Davis saw the shooter from behind as he ran down an alleyway. Mr. Davis sensed the shooter was someone familiar, but there was nothing specific.
No strong leads developed until the federal government brought charges against a Spokane-area drug trafficking ring. One of the defendants named in the federal case was Stafone Fuentes. The informant in the federal case reported that during his undercover work, Mr. Fuentes had confessed to the Knitting Factory shooting.
While the federal case was pending resolution, several indicted co-conspirators came forward with information about the shooting. Deandre Gaither told law enforcement that Mr Fuentes had not only confessed to the shooting but that he had also swapped the firearm used in the shooting for a clean gun owned by an individual named Jason Jones. Mr. Jones confirmed this information. Mr. Jones was present during Mr Fuentes's confession as well as the gun swap. Mr. Jones told law enforcement he still had the gun provided to him by Mr. Fuentes. Law enforcement was able to recover the gun and testing revealed it was the one used in the shooting.
Both Mr. Gaither and Mr. Jones provided information regarding Mr Fuentes's motive for the shooting. They claimed Mr. Fuentes was angry with Mr. Davis because Mr. Davis had interactions with Mr. Fuentes's girlfriend that Mr. Fuentes found suspicious.
Mr. Gaither and Mr. Jones pleaded guilty in the federal drug case pursuant to cooperation agreements. The agreements required Mr. Gaither and Mr. Jones to provide truthful testimony regarding the shooting. In return, Mr. Gaither and Mr. Jones received substantially reduced prison sentences.
An additional co-conspirator in the federal drug case was Mr. Fuentes's girlfriend, Cierra White. Ms. White talked to the authorities two times before finally implicating Mr. Fuentes in the Knitting Factory shooting. Ms. White explained she had not originally come forward with information against Mr. Fuentes because she was acting under Mr. Fuentes's direction. Prior to her arrest, Ms. White worked for Mr. Fuentes as a prostitute and she described him as physically abusive.
According to Ms. White's final explanation, she was with Mr. Fuentes at the Knitting Factory on the night of the shooting. The two were in a car together and got into an argument. Things became physical and Mr. Fuentes hit Ms. White with a gun. Mr. Fuentes then left the car and walked down the alley toward an apparent fight. Shortly thereafter, Ms. White heard gun shots and then saw Mr. Fuentes running back to the car. Ms. White was with Mr. Fuentes the next morning during a news report of the shooting. Upon seeing the report, Mr. Fuentes commented Mr. Davis should have been dead.
The State charged Mr. Fuentes with one count of conspiracy to commit murder in the first degree and two counts of attempted murder in the first degree with firearm enhancements and alternatives of first degree assault. After the first trial ended in a hung jury, the State dismissed the conspiracy charge. Mr. Fuentes then went to trial and was convicted of attempted murder on the charge involving Mr. Davis and assault in the first degree on the charge pertaining to Mr. O'Neal. Mr. Fuentes was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. The court also imposed several legal financial obligations.
Mr. Fuentes appeals.
Other suspect evidence
Mr Fuentes contends the trial court violated his constitutional right to present a defense by preventing him from presenting "other suspect" evidence at trial. Other suspect evidence should generally be admitted if relevant and not overly prejudicial. State v. Franklin, 180 Wn.2d 371, 378-79, 325 P.3d 159 (2014). Relevance is established if proffered evidence tends to connect someone other than the defendant with the crime. Id. Mere speculation does not meet this standard. State v. Thomas, 150 Wn.2d 821, 857, 83 P.3d 970 (2004). A trial court's decision to exclude other suspect evidence is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Id. at 856.
Prior to trial, Mr. Fuentes proffered the following other suspect evidence: He claimed an individual named Kenneth Budik had a motive to harm Mr. Davis, given Mr. Davis had previously been acquitted of crimes against Mr. Budik and his associates. Although Mr. Fuentes lacked evidence that Mr. Budik ever threatened Mr. Davis or that Mr. Budik was actually present at the Knitting Factory on the night of the shooting, Mr. Fuentes claims there was evidence Mr. Budik could have been present and therefore might have been the shooter. Mr. Fuentes proffered that Mr. Budik matched the description of the shooter, as a light-skinned black male. In addition, on the night of the shooting, a car similar to one associated with Mr. Budik was observed at the Knitting Factory, members of Mr. Budik's gang (the "8-Trey") were seen at the venue, and Mr. Davis was seen interacting with one of the gang members. Clerk's Papers at 186-87, 192. Prior to the shooting, Mr. Davis received a text message from an individual who was associated with one of the victims from the criminal case involving Mr. Budik. The individual asked Mr. Davis if he was at the Knitting Factory. Although it was not unusual for Mr. Davis to be in contact with this individual, he thought the text was unusual because he had never mentioned his plans to go to the Knitting Factory.
We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's conclusion that the aforementioned proffer was overly speculative. While Mr. Fuentes presented evidence of motive, there was nothing else. There was no evidence indicating Mr. Budik harbored ill-will against Mr. Davis. Nor was there any evidence Mr. Budik knew or associated with any of the individuals in contact with Mr. Davis on the night of the shooting. Although Mr. Budik may have matched the description of a light-skinned black male, the description was too general to point to Mr. Budik. Mr. Fuentes's theory that Mr. Budik was the shooter is based on nothing more than a series of speculative inferences. As such, it did not merit presentation to the jury.
ER 404(b) evidence
Mr. Fuentes contends the trial court abused its discretion by allowing Ms. White's testimony about her abusive relationship with Mr. Fuentes and her characterization of Mr. Fuentes as her pimp. The trial court did not perform an explicit ER 404(b) analysis as required by our case law. State v. Jackson, 102 Wn.2d 689, 694, 689 P.2d 76 (1984). Nevertheless, the record is sufficient to permit an independent analysis and affirm the trial court's decision. See State v. Barragan, 102 Wn.App. 754, 759, 9 P.3d 942 (2000) ().
The admission of other act evidence under ER 404(b) turns on four steps: (1) finding by a preponderance of the evidence that the act occurred, (2) identification of a proper noncharacter purpose for the evidence, (3) determination that the evidence is relevant to prove an element of the crime charged, and (4) an assessment that the probative value of the evidence outweighs its potential prejudice. State v. Vy Thang, 145 Wn.2d 630, 642, 41 P.3d 1159 (2002).
The other act evidence at issue here readily meets all four components. Ms. White's testimony provided sufficient evidence that Mr. Fuentes served as Ms. White's pimp and subjected her to abuse. The evidence was relevant for the noncharacter purpose of explaining why Ms. White initially lied to police. Establishing Ms. White's credibility was important because she was a percipient witness to the events immediately prior to and after the shooting. And given the brevity of the testimony regarding prostitution and abuse, [1] admission of Ms. White's testimony was not overly prejudicial.
Mr. Fuentes also complains the trial court did not provide a limiting instruction regarding Ms. White's testimony. However, he did not request a limiting instruction. We will not fault the trial court for failing to issue an instruction sua sponte. State v. Russell, 171 Wn.2d 118, 123-24, 249 P.3d 604 (2011). Brady violation and the right of cross-examination
Mr Fuentes claims the State violated its obligations to turn over exculpatory information, as required by Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), when it failed to turn over unsealed plea agreements pertaining to Mr. Gaither and Mr. Jones. This claim fails for multiple reasons. Most fundamentally, the record indicates the State did not have any unsealed plea agreements to provide. The plea agreements in question were generated by the federal government and were sealed by a federal judge. Brady only requires the State to turn over exculpatory evidence in its possession or control. It does not require the State to obtain exculpatory evidence from a third party. State v. Mullen, 171 Wn.2d 881, 895, 259 P.3d 158 (2011). In addition, Mr. Fuentes has not explained how the failure to disclose unsealed plea agreements negatively impacted his case. Mr. Fuentes's attorney extensively cross-examined Mr. Gaither and Mr. Jones about their plea...
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