State v. Fuller
| Decision Date | 17 December 1999 |
| Docket Number | No. 32,734-KA.,32,734-KA. |
| Citation | 759 So.2d 104 |
| Parties | STATE of Louisiana, Appellee, v. James FULLER, Appellant. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US |
Peter J. Black, Shreveport, for appellant.
Richard Ieyoub, Attorney General, Paul J. Carmouche, District Attorney, Catherine M. Estopinal, D. Bruce Dorris, Assistant District Attorneys, for appellee.
Before BROWN, STEWART and CARAWAY, JJ.
The defendant, James Fuller, was convicted of second degree murder, a violation of La.R.S. 14:30.1, and sentenced to life imprisonment without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. On appeal of his conviction, the defendant sets forth six assignments of error for our review. We affirm.
On December 1, 1995, the defendant and Kendrick Williams ("Williams"), a co-defendant in this matter, were walking together and smoking marijuana in the Allendale area of Shreveport, Louisiana, when they came upon Willie Drew Graham ("Graham"). The defendant and Williams attempted to rob Graham of his money. Either the defendant or Williams fired multiple shots from a small gun, later identified by the defendant as a .22 caliber pistol. Graham sustained two gunshot wounds, one in his left buttock and one in his back, as he ran from his assailants. Graham managed to reach Caddo Street where he jumped through the open window of a vehicle stopped in traffic. The driver of the vehicle, Lauvata London, drove Graham to the hospital after he pleaded with her to help him. The gunshot wound to his back proved fatal, and Graham died on December 2, 1995.
The defendant was identified as a suspect and a warrant for his arrest was issued. The defendant learned that the police were looking for him and turned himself in while accompanied by his mother. When the defendant was informed by Detective H.D. Malone ("Detective Malone") that he was wanted for the murder of Graham, the defendant immediately stated that he was not the "trigger man." The defendant was charged with second degree murder and found guilty as charged after a jury trial. Following the trial court's denial of his motion for a new trial, the defendant appealed. The six assignments of error presented for our review will be addressed in practical, rather than numerical order.
In this assignment of error, the defendant contends that the evidence was not sufficient to support his conviction for second degree murder. The defendant argues that the prior recorded testimony of Antonio Capers, an eyewitness, was erroneously admitted and that in the absence of Capers' testimony, the remaining evidence was purely circumstantial and insufficient for a rational jury to conclude that he was Graham's assailant.
When issues are raised on appeal concerning both the sufficiency of the evidence and one or more trial errors, we review the sufficiency of the evidence claim first to determine whether the accused is entitled to an acquittal under Hudson v. Louisiana, 450 U.S. 40, 101 S.Ct. 970, 67 L.Ed.2d 30 (1981). Under Hudson, supra, the accused may be entitled to an acquittal if a rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution in accordance with Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), could not reasonably conclude that all of the essential elements of the offense have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Hearold, 603 So.2d 731, 734 (La.1992). When the entirety of the evidence, including erroneously admitted evidence, is insufficient to support the conviction, the accused must be acquitted and the remaining issues concerning trial error become moot. Id. Thus, in reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, we review all evidence presented at trial, including evidence which the defendant claims was erroneously admitted.
The Jackson standard does not provide us with a vehicle to substitute our own appreciation of the evidence for that of the fact finder. State v. Robertson, 96-1048 (La.10/04/96), 680 So.2d 1165. Our role is not to assess credibility or reweigh evidence. State v. Smith, 94-3116 (La.10/16/95), 661 So.2d 442. In the absence of internal contradiction or irreconcilable conflict with physical evidence one witness' testimony, if believed by the trier of fact, is sufficient to support the requisite factual finding. State v. Gradick, 29,231 (La.App.2d Cir. 1/22/97), 687 So.2d 1071; State v. Braswell, 605 So.2d 702 (La.App. 2d Cir.1992).
Second degree murder is the killing of a human being when the offender either has a specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm, or is engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of specifically enumerated crimes, including armed robbery, first degree robbery, or simple robbery, even when the offender has no intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm. La.R .S. 14:30.1(A)(1) and (2)(a). Even though a person does not directly commit the act constituting the offense, the person may still be convicted of the offense if found to be a principal. A principal is defined as "(A)(1) persons concerned in the commission of a crime, whether present or absent, and whether they directly commit the act constituting the offense, aid and abet in its commission, or directly counsel or procure another to commit the crime ...." La.R.S. 14:24.
Thus, in order to convict the defendant of second degree murder, the jury must have found either that he specifically intended to kill Graham or that he was engaged in the perpetration of a robbery along with Williams when Graham was killed. Robbery is the taking of anything of value belonging to another from the person of another or that is in the immediate control of another, by use of force or intimidation, while either armed with a dangerous weapon, believed to be armed, or unarmed. La.R.S. 14:64, 14:64.1, 14:65.
Through his own testimony, the defendant placed himself with Williams both before and during their encounter with Graham. The defendant testified that Williams pointed a .22 caliber gun at Graham and demanded his money. The defendant denied involvement in the crime; however, his testimony established that he remained in close proximity as Graham ran for his life through the Allendale neighborhood and onto Caddo Street, where Graham was able to escape his assailants by jumping into a vehicle through an open window. According to his testimony, the defendant then realized that he was standing out by the street in broad daylight and that people in the area would be able to identify him, so he took off running back in the direction from which he, Williams, and Graham had come. The defendant never attempted to help Graham and never reported the incident to the police. When he turned himself in to the police and learned that he was wanted as a suspect in Graham's murder, the defendant's first response was to announce that he was not the "trigger man."
Contrary to the defendant's denial of any direct involvement in the crime, the testimony of Antonio Capers places the defendant as a direct participant in the crime and as the initial trigger man. Capers, who was outside with his grandfather, Willie Glover, working in a yard at the time of the incident, testified that he spoke with the defendant for a brief period. Capers then observed the defendant meet another guy, whom Capers could not identify. Capers testified that the defendant and his companion approached Graham. Capers saw the defendant firing a gun and heard seven shots initially and then three or four more. Capers' grandfather, Willie Glover, testified that he saw two young males run behind Graham and tussle with him. Glover also heard multiple shots fired from a gun.
Lauvata London was driving the car that Graham jumped into on Caddo Street. She testified that she saw Graham in the middle of the street before he jumped through the open passenger window of her car. She then saw a young man standing next to her car and holding a gun. The young man immediately ran off when he noticed that London saw him. London did not see the defendant, but when she asked Graham what happened, he told her that they shot him and that they were trying to rob him of his check, therby clearly indicating more than one assailant.
Latasha Thomas was stopped in traffic when she saw two young men on the side of the street and a man running across the street away from the two young men. The shorter young man, Williams, had a gun and was less than a foot behind Graham. The taller young man, identified by Thomas as the defendant, was standing nearby, watching, and apparently waiting. Thomas testified that she saw Graham jump into the car in front of her. The defendant and Williams then ran off together away from the street. Thomas pulled her car up to a red light and next to London's car and asked what happened. According to Thomas, Graham stated, "They shot me and they robbed me."
The testimony presented provides ample evidence from which the jury could find the defendant guilty of second degree murder. Capers' testimony placing the gun in the defendant's hands at the time of the initial confrontation with Graham indicates a specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm on the part of the defendant. Testimony also indicates that the defendant and Williams acted in concert to perpetrate a robbery. When viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, there is sufficient evidence, both direct and circumstantial, for a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that the defendant acted as a principal to the robbery and murder of Graham, or that he possessed the specific intent to inflict great bodily harm upon Graham. We find no merit to this assignment of error.
In this assignment of error, the defendant contends that the trial court erred in allowing the state to present the prior recorded testimony of Antonio Capers. The defendant argues that Capers' testimony was the only...
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