State v. Funches

Decision Date07 October 2004
Docket NumberNo. 96784.,96784.
Citation288 Ill.Dec. 654,212 Ill.2d 334,818 N.E.2d 342
PartiesThe People of the STATE of Illinois, Appellant, v. Tremain FUNCHES, Appellee.
CourtIllinois Supreme Court

Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, Springfield, and Scott A. Rueter, State's Attorney, Decatur (Gary Feinerman, Solicitor General, and Linda D. Woloshin, Lionel W. Weaver and Jay Paul Hoffmann, Assistant Attorneys General, Chicago, of counsel), for the People.

Asher O. Geisler and Gary F. Geisler, Decatur, for appellee.

Justice FREEMAN delivered the opinion of the court:

Section 4-103.2(b) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Code) incorporates an inference that a person who exercises the exclusive, unexplained possession of a stolen vehicle has knowledge that the vehicle is stolen. 625 ILCS 5/4-103.2(b) (West 2002) (incorporating 625 ILCS 5/4-103(a)(1) (West 2002)). In People v. Greco, 204 Ill.2d 400, 274 Ill.Dec. 73, 790 N.E.2d 846 (2003), we held that application of this inference to "special mobile equipment," as defined by the Code, violated due process and, therefore, was unconstitutional. Greco, 204 Ill.2d at 411-15, 274 Ill.Dec. 73, 790 N.E.2d 846. However, we "express[ed] no opinion with regard to the constitutionality of the permissive inference in the context of other vehicles as defined under the Code." Greco, 204 Ill.2d at 414, 274 Ill.Dec. 73, 790 N.E.2d 846.

In this case, the proper question presented for review is whether this inference violates due process as applied to this particular defendant in the context of his charged crime. We hold that defendant has not established a constitutional violation.

BACKGROUND

Sworn statements of two Decatur police officers contain the following allegations. On the afternoon of January 2, 2003, defendant, Tremain Funches (a/k/a Tremain Parker), entered a drugstore purportedly to make a purchase. Katrina Fisher, a sales clerk, went to the rear of the store to get help. Defendant walked behind the counter, opened a drawer, and took a post office deposit bag that contained over $300 in cash. Scott Finch, a pharmacist, chased defendant from the store and maintained pursuit.

In flight, defendant encountered an automobile with the engine running parked in a driveway. Defendant entered the automobile, backed out of the driveway, and sped forward. Rose Miller, the owner of the automobile, did not give anyone permission to take her vehicle. Driving the car, defendant struck Finch, who fell onto the hood of the car and rolled off.

Decatur police officers were alerted to the theft of the money and of the car. Police were also given a description of the car with its license plate number. En route to the drugstore, police officers observed the stolen automobile. They activated their lights and sirens, but defendant refused to stop. Defendant engaged in a dangerous, high-speed flight from police. He finally wrecked the car at the end of a dead-end street. Defendant was taken into custody. The deposit bag was found with defendant. Finch and another witness, Seanna Little, were transported to the arrest scene, where they identified defendant as the person who stole the deposit bag and the car.

A four-count information was brought against defendant in the circuit court of Macon County. Defendant was charged with one count each of theft of the money and of the automobile (720 ILCS 5/16-1(a)(1)(A) (West 2002)); one count of attempted first degree murder of Finch (720 ILCS 5/8-4(a), 9-1(a)(1) (West 2002)); and one count of aggravated unlawful failure to obey a peace officer's order to stop (625 ILCS 5/4-103.2(a)(7)(A) (West 2002)).

Section 4-103.2(a)(7)(A) of the Code establishes a violation for a person "who is the driver or operator of a vehicle and is not entitled to the possession of that vehicle and who knows the vehicle is stolen or converted," who has been given a signal by a peace officer directing the driver to stop the vehicle, to wilfully fail or refuse to obey such direction, increase speed, extinguish the vehicle's lights, or otherwise flee or attempt to elude the officer. (Emphasis added.) 625 ILCS 5/4-103.2(a)(7)(A) (West 2002). Section 4-103.2(b) incorporates a permissive inference contained in section 4-103(a)(1). Pursuant to that section, it may be inferred that a person who exercises the exclusive unexplained possession of a stolen vehicle has knowledge that the vehicle is stolen, regardless of whether the date when the vehicle was stolen is recent or remote. 625 ILCS 5/4-103.2(a)(1) (West 2002).

Prior to trial, defendant filed an amended motion to dismiss count I of the information, i.e., the charge of aggravated failure to obey the police order to stop. Defendant contended that section 4-103.2(a)(7)(A) of the Code is unconstitutional "in that it violates the proportionate penalties clause of the Constitution of the State of Illinois, and the equal protection, due process and cruel and unusual punishment clauses of the State and Federal constitutions." Defendant cited other Code sections that establish offenses for failing to obey a peace officer's signal to stop. See 625 ILCS 5/11-204, 11-204.1 (West 2002). Defendant argued that section 4-103.2(a)(7)(A) violates due process because the circumstance that a vehicle was stolen is not a rational basis to establish a separate antiflight offense. Defendant also argued that section 4-103.2(a)(7)(A) is unconstitutionally disproportionate because it punishes the failure to stop while driving a stolen vehicle more severely than the failure to stop under more dangerous conditions, but while driving a vehicle that is not stolen.

The circuit court mailed to the parties the following record sheet entry:

"1. In Count I, the Defendant is charged with a violation of 625 ILCS 5/4-103.2(a)(7)(A).
2. Subsection (b) of that statute expressly provides that the inference set forth in 625 ILCS 5/4-103(a)(1) shall apply to the offenses set out in subsection (a) of 625 ILCS 5/4-103.2.
3. The Defendant has standing because he is in immediate danger of being subjected to the permissive inference.
4. The permissive inference violates due process by removing the requirement that a vehicle be recently stolen in order for possession of it to give rise to an inference that the possessor knows that the vehicle was stolen. See PEOPLE V. HOUSBY, 84 Ill.2d [415] 420 [50 Ill.Dec. 834, 420 N.E.2d 151 (1981)].
5. The statute under which the Defendant has been charged in Count I is unconstitutional.
For these reasons, the Amended Motion to Dismiss Count I of the Information is allowed. Count I is dismissed."

The State filed a motion to reconsider, stating "[t]hat People v. Housby, 84 Ill.2d 415, 50 Ill.Dec. 834, 420 N.E.2d 151, doesn't appear to address the issues that were presented in the defendant's Amended Motion to Dismiss."

At the hearing on the State's motion to reconsider, the circuit court allowed defendant to file a second amended motion to dismiss count I, which included an additional allegation reflecting the circuit court's finding of a due process violation. The circuit court denied the State's motion to reconsider.

The State appeals directly to this court. 134 Ill.2d R. 603. Additional pertinent background will be discussed in the context of our analysis of the issues. We now reverse the order of the circuit court and remand the cause to that court for further proceedings.

ANALYSIS

All statutes are presumed to be constitutional. The party challenging the constitutionality of a statute bears the burden of rebutting this presumption and clearly establishing a constitutional violation. If reasonably possible, a court must construe a statute so as to affirm the statute's constitutionality and validity. Greco, 204 Ill.2d at 406, 274 Ill.Dec. 73, 790 N.E.2d 846; In re R.C., 195 Ill.2d 291, 296, 253 Ill.Dec. 699, 745 N.E.2d 1233 (2001). As the issue is one of law, this court reviews de novo any decision holding that a statute is unconstitutional. R.C., 195 Ill.2d at 296, 253 Ill.Dec. 699, 745 N.E.2d 1233.

In this case, the circuit court, sua sponte, declared that section 4-103.2(b) of the Code, incorporating section 4-103(a)(1), is unconstitutional on its face. The State assigns error to the circuit court's finding of facial unconstitutionality and contends that section 4-103.2(b) does not violate due process as applied to this particular defendant.

In this case, the circuit court concluded, sua sponte, that section 4-103.2(b), incorporating section 4-103(a)(1), is facially unconstitutional based on abstract legal reasoning and without consideration of any evidence. Whether the circuit court could assess the statute's validity in this manner depends on the type of evidentiary device involved here. See County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 155-56, 99 S.Ct. 2213, 2223-24, 60 L.Ed.2d 777, 791 (1979).

This case involves an evidentiary inference. "While the words inference and presumption are sometimes used interchangeably, they are by no means the same thing." (Emphases in original.) M. Graham, Cleary & Graham's Handbook of Illinois Evidence § 302.2, at 81 (8th ed.2004); accord 1 R. Steigmann, Illinois Evidence Manual § 3:01, at 66 (3d ed.1995).

An inference is a factual conclusion that can rationally be drawn by considering other facts. Thus, an inference is merely a deduction that the fact finder may draw in its discretion, but is not required to draw as a matter of law. M. Graham, Cleary & Graham's Handbook of Illinois Evidence § 302.2, at 81 (8th ed.2004); 1 C. Fishman, Jones on Evidence § 4:1, at 299-300 (7th ed.1992). The fact finder is free to accept or reject the suggested inference; no burden is placed on the defendant. Allen, 442 U.S. at 157,99 S.Ct. at 2224,60 L.Ed.2d at 792; People v. Watts, 181 Ill.2d 133, 142, 229 Ill.Dec. 542, 692 N.E.2d 315 (1998); see People v. Frazier, 123 Ill.App.3d 563, 572, 79 Ill.Dec. 27, 463 N.E.2d 165 (1984). "Inferences are by their nature permissive, not mandatory." 1 C. Fishman, Jones on Evidence § 4:1, at...

To continue reading

Request your trial
50 cases
  • People v. Lattimore
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • September 2, 2011
    ...478 N.E.2d 402 (1985). An inference is a “factual conclusion that can rationally be drawn by considering other facts.” People v. Funches, 212 Ill.2d 334, 340, 288 Ill.Dec. 654, 818 N.E.2d 342 (2004). If divergent inferences could be drawn from undisputed facts, a question of fact remains. P......
  • Jackson v. City of Chi.
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • June 29, 2012
    ...not have standing to argue that it would be unconstitutional if applied to third parties in hypothetical situations.” People v. Funches, 212 Ill.2d 334, 346, 288 Ill.Dec. 654, 818 N.E.2d 342 (2004) (citing County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 154–55, 99 S.Ct. 2213, 60 L.Ed.2d 777 (1979)). H......
  • People v. Velez
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • April 16, 2012
    ...merely a deduction that the fact finder may draw in its discretion, but is not required to draw as a matter of law.” People v. Funches, 212 Ill.2d 334, 340, 288 Ill.Dec. 654, 818 N.E.2d 342 (2004) (citing Michael H. Graham, Cleary & Graham's Handbook of Illinois Evidence § 302.2, at 81 (8th......
  • In re Lakisha M.
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Illinois
    • January 25, 2008
    ... . 882 N.E.2d 570 . 227 Ill.2d 259 . In re LAKISHA M. (The People of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Lakisha M., a Minor, Appellant). . No. 103541. . Supreme Court of Illinois. . January 25, 2008. . [882 N.E.2d 571] . ...887, 827 N.E.2d 416 (2005). A court must construe a statute so as to affirm its constitutionality, if reasonably possible. People v. Funches, 212 Ill.2d 334, 339-40, 288 Ill.Dec. 654, 818 N.E.2d 342 (2004), citing People v. Greco, 204 Ill.2d 400, 406, 274 Ill.Dec. 73, 790 N.E.2d 846 ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT