State v. Funk
| Decision Date | 15 May 2015 |
| Docket Number | 107,422. |
| Citation | 301 Kan. 925,349 P.3d 1230 |
| Parties | STATE of Kansas, Appellee, v. Cody Steven FUNK, Appellant. |
| Court | Kansas Supreme Court |
Gerald E. Wells, of Jerry Wells Attorney–at–Law, of Lawrence, argued the cause and was on the briefs for appellant.
Robert A. Walsh, county attorney, argued the cause, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, was with him on the brief for appellee.
Cody Steven Funk appeals from the imposition of lifetime postrelease supervision following his guilty plea and conviction of one count of attempted indecent solicitation of a child. His plea arises from criminal charges filed against him following his sexual encounter with a 14–year–old girl. Funk contends lifetime postrelease supervision is disproportionate as applied to him, constituting cruel and/or unusual punishment in violation of Section 9 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights and the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Both the district court and Court of Appeals rejected his arguments. See State v. Funk, No. 107,422, –––Kan.App. 2d ––––, 2013 WL 1444718 (Kan.App.2013) (unpublished opinion), rev. granted October 13, 2013. We affirm.
In December 2010, Funk was charged with one count of criminal sodomy, a severity level 3 person felony, in violation of K.S.A. 21–3505. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Funk pleaded guilty to one count of attempted indecent solicitation of a child, a severity level 8 person felony, which carried a lower severity level for sentencing purposes. See K.S.A. 21–3510(a)(1) (); K.S.A.2010 Supp. 21–3301 (). Funk's presentence investigation report revealed one prior nonperson felony conviction for burglary and two prior nonperson misdemeanor theft convictions. He was on probation for the burglary conviction when he committed the offense in this case.
Funk filed a motion seeking probation rather than imprisonment. In support of this, he attached a portion of the victim's testimony at a preliminary hearing in another case pending against a different defendant. Funk had waived a preliminary hearing in his case. The district court sentenced him to 18 months' probation, with an underlying 10–month prison term and lifetime postrelease supervision. The district court also required Funk to register as a sex offender for 10 years.
Funk objected to the imposition of lifetime postrelease supervision, and the district court granted him 30 days to submit a motion challenging the constitutionality of the lifetime postrelease supervision.
No evidence was presented at a postsentencing hearing, although Funk's counsel and the State argued the merits. Funk claimed lifetime postrelease supervision was disproportionate as applied to him and, therefore, constituted cruel and/or unusual punishment under Section 9 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights and the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Importantly, defense counsel noted that appellate courts had declined to review these types of constitutional claims because of inadequate findings and urged the district court to make adequate findings—despite the failure to offer evidence on Funk's behalf.
In rejecting Funk's objection, the district court made factual findings based on the preliminary hearing transcript attached to Funk's motion seeking probation, as well as a probable cause affidavit in the case file that contained police accounts of witness statements. From those sources, the district court found:
After setting out its findings of fact, the district court acknowledged the legal issues in the case were governed by the three Freeman factors. See State v. Freeman, 223 Kan. 362, 367, 574 P.2d 950 (1978). But despite this, its analysis did not follow the Freeman outline and was limited to the following:
Parenthetically, we note also that although the district court characterized Funk as an 18–year–old man in its legal conclusion, it made no specific factual finding regarding Funk's age. Our appellate record contains Funk's birth year, but it does not identify the month or day, so we cannot confirm whether he was 18 years old when the crime was committed as mentioned by the district court or 18 or 19 as stated by the panel. It is also unclear from the district court's findings whether Funk believed H.D. was 16 at the time the crime occurred. The court's only findings were that Funk initially believed H.D. was 16 years old and at least one of the men was later told that she was younger.
Funk filed an untimely notice of appeal, but the Court of Appeals retained jurisdiction after the district court found Funk's attorney failed to perfect the appeal. See Funk, 2013 WL 1444718, at *3 ; see also State v. Ortiz, 230 Kan. 733, 735–36, 640 P.2d 1255 (1982) ().
In contrast to the district court's more limited review, the Court of Appeals set out and applied the Freeman factors individually in addressing Funk's Section 9 challenge. Funk, 2013 WL 1444718, at *5–11. The panel found the first factor, under which a court examines the nature of the offense and the character of the offender, weighed neither in favor of nor against finding the sentence unconstitutional. The panel observed: “Kansas appellate courts have consistently found that the first Freeman factor weighs against defendants convicted of sex offenses against children.” Funk, 2013 WL 1444718, at *7.
In support of this, the panel referenced this court's decisions in State v. Ross, 295 Kan. 424, 284 P.3d 309 (2012), State v. Mossman, 294 Kan. 901, 281 P.3d 153 (2012), and State v. Cameron, 294 Kan. 884, 281 P.3d 143 (2012), as well as several Court of Appeals opinions in which the first Freeman factor weighed against the defendant. Funk, 2013 WL 1444718, at *8 (). The panel concluded that “[a]lthough these cases involve facts that arguably are more egregious than Funk's case, they demonstrate Kansas appellate courts' deference to the legislature's policy decision to treat sex offenses against children as sexually violent crimes regardless of the facts of the offense.” Funk, 2013 WL 1444718, at *8.
Turning to the case-specific facts, the panel noted those weighing in Funk's favor were: (1) his age, H.D.'s age, and that H.D. represented she was 16, which Funk might not have known to be untrue when the crime occurred; (2) there was little evidence Funk encouraged or coerced H.D. into drinking for the purpose of taking advantage of her; (3) Funk did not “knowingly [take] advantage of the age and experience difference between himself and H.D. or H.D.'s status as a minor”; (4) Funk's criminal history did not suggest any future threat of a sexual or violent nature; and (5) Funk did not request or force the sexual contact. 2013 WL 1444718, at *8. The panel then...
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