State v. Fuqua, A-4 September Term 2017

CourtUnited States State Supreme Court (New Jersey)
Citation234 N.J. 583,192 A.3d 961
Docket Number079034,A-4 September Term 2017
Parties STATE of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Danyell FUQUA, Defendant-Appellant.
Decision Date09 August 2018

234 N.J. 583
192 A.3d 961

STATE of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
Danyell FUQUA, Defendant-Appellant.

A-4 September Term 2017
079034

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

Argued April 10, 2018
Decided August 9, 2018


Matthew Astore, Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney; Matthew Astore, of counsel and on the briefs, and John A. Albright, Designated Counsel, on the brief).

Nancy A. Hulett, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for respondent (Andrew C. Carey, Middlesex County Prosecutor, attorney; Nancy A. Hulett, of counsel and on the briefs).

Sarah D. Brigham, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for amicus curiae Attorney General of New Jersey (Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney; Sarah D. Brigham, of counsel and on the brief).

JUSTICE TIMPONE delivered the opinion of the Court.

234 N.J. 587
192 A.3d 963

In this case, the Court considers whether the State must prove actual harm to a child to convict a defendant under N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a), endangering the welfare of children. Because the trial court and Appellate Division correctly determined that a conviction under N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a) can be sustained by exposing children to a substantial risk of harm, we affirm their denial of defendant Danyell Fuqua's motion for a judgment of acquittal.

I.

We marshal these facts from the record.

In September 2011, the Middlesex County Prosecutor's Office opened a narcotics investigation into Tyrell Johnson that later swept in defendant Fuqua. Defendant checked into a Studio Motel 6 in late September 2011. That December, in conjunction with the ongoing investigation, a task force began surveillance of the Studio Motel 6. In the early morning hours of December 10, 2011, after obtaining a search warrant, officers entered room 205. There, the officers found defendant, Johnson, and six children between the ages of one and thirteen -- three were defendant's children, one was Johnson's child, and two were defendant's relatives. The small room had a kitchenette, two beds, and a bathroom. Upon their entry, officers smelled the lingering odor of raw and burnt marijuana.

On the kitchen table, officers found marijuana, a grinder containing marijuana residue, an open box of clear plastic bags, and a white, unlabeled pill bottle holding various, multicolored pills. Between the two beds, officers discovered a lockbox with key inserted containing several items of jewelry, three loose packets of heroin, a separate plastic orange bag holding 653 packets of heroin, and one large bag of cocaine. Below the rear wall window, officers found an exposed black plastic bag holding 201 packets of heroin and fourteen plastic bags containing cocaine. To the immediate left and right of the drug-laden black plastic bag were children's shoes and a "little puppy dog" toy. Officers also discovered

234 N.J. 588

a digital scale covered in white cocaine residue on a nearby windowsill. In addition to the narcotics and related paraphernalia, officers came upon five cell phones, more than $2000 in cash located in a purse on the kitchen table, and around $1700 belonging to Johnson.

Johnson subsequently pled guilty to drug distribution charges, and a jury convicted defendant of endangering the welfare of children, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a).

The trial court denied defendant's motion for a judgment of acquittal, finding that the State need not prove actual harm to children to convict under N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a). Rather, relying on ample appellate precedent, the court held that the State needed only prove, and did prove, that a child faced a "risk" of harm sufficient to convict under N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a).

The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that the phrase "causes harm" in N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a) refers not only to one who causes actual harm, but also to one who "unreasonably allows a substantial risk of harm." The panel concluded that the children here were in "imminent danger" and exposed to a "substantial risk of harm" given the small motel room, the number of children present, and the large quantity of accessible drugs to which they were exposed and which they could easily have ingested.

We granted certification. 230 N.J. 560, 170 A.3d 335 (2017). We also granted amicus

192 A.3d 964

curiae status to the Attorney General of New Jersey.

II.

A.

Defendant urges us to reverse the Appellate Division's conclusion that exposing a child to a substantial risk of harm is sufficient to convict under N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a).

Defendant maintains that under N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)'s plain language a conviction may be based only on evidence establishing

234 N.J. 589

actual harm, and that the statute also includes the requisite elements for a finding of abuse or neglect under Title 9. Defendant proposes that N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)'s reference to Title 9 is convoluted, resulting in the Appellate Division's erroneous conclusion that "risk of harm" equals "harm."

Defendant also raises fears that if the Appellate Division's holding is left undisturbed, prosecutors will retain unbridled discretion in choosing between a second-degree prosecution under N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a) and a fourth-degree prosecution under Title 9.

B.

The State stresses that we should affirm the Appellate Division's conclusion that a conviction under N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a) can be sustained by proving a risk of harm to a child without proof of actual harm.

The State notes that its proposition is bolstered by numerous appellate opinions, all holding that N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a), in all its incarnations, subsumed exposing a child to a substantial risk of harm into the statute through Title 9. The State maintains that "risk of harm" is apparent from the plain language of the statute.

The State reasons that if conduct violates more than one statute, prosecutors retain discretion in deciding which charge to pursue provided that they do not discriminate against any class of defendants and that their choice is not arbitrary, capricious, or a patent or gross abuse of discretion.

C.

The Attorney General also argues that both the plain language and legislative history of N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a) indicate the Legislature's intent to include "risk of harm." The Attorney General notes that the title of the statute -- Endangering Welfare of Children -- connotes legislative intent to include the risk of harm. The Attorney General counters with specific references defendant's notion of linguistic gymnastics by the Appellate Division, with respect to

234 N.J. 590

its finding that "causes harm" equals "risk of harm." The Attorney General notes that "endanger" is defined as "put[ting] (someone or something) at risk or in danger." (quoting New Oxford American Dictionary 561 (1st ed. 2001) ). The Attorney General cites numerous appellate cases that interpret N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(2) to encompass a substantial risk of harm. Taking the precedent and common definitional usage together, the Attorney General maintains that defendant knowingly subjected the six children in her care to a substantial risk of harm because the children had easy access to a large quantity and variety of drugs intermingled among their toys and clothing. The Attorney General underscores the likely physical danger to the children of unwittingly ingesting the openly displayed drugs and the potential emotional damage stemming from a child's exposure to drugs and drug trafficking.

Lastly, the Attorney General maintains that prosecutors historically retain broad prosecutorial discretion when a defendant's action violates more than one statute. With the defendant having proffered no proofs that the prosecutor abused her

192 A.3d 965

discretion or acted arbitrarily or capriciously, the Attorney General argues that the Appellate Division decision should be affirmed.

III.

A.

In reviewing the grant or denial of a motion for a judgment of acquittal, we apply the same standard as the trial court. State v. Sugar, 240 N.J. Super. 148, 153, 572 A.2d 1170 (App. Div. 1990) (citing State v. Moffa, 42 N.J. 258, 263, 200 A.2d 108 (1964) ). That standard is the same whether the motion is made at the close of the State's case, at the end of the entire case, or after a jury returns a guilty verdict under Rule 3:18-2. State v. Kluber, 130 N.J. Super. 336, 341, 327 A.2d 232 (App. Div. 1974). We will deny a motion for a judgment of acquittal if

the evidence, viewed in its entirety, be it direct or circumstantial, and giving the State the benefit of all of its favorable testimony as well as all of the favorable inferences which reasonably could be drawn therefrom, is sufficient to enable a
234 N.J. 591
jury to find that the State's charge has been established beyond a reasonable doubt.

[ Id. at 341–42, 327 A.2d 232 (citing State v. Mayberry, 52 N.J. 413, 436–37, 245
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