State v. G.S. Blodgett Co.

• Decision Date: 20 January 1995
• Docket Number: No. 94-004,94-004
• Citation: 163 Vt. 175,656 A.2d 984
• Parties: , 6 A.D. Cases 1361, 6 NDLR P 84 STATE of Vermont, et al. v. G.S. BLODGETT COMPANY.
• Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Page 984

656 A.2d 984

163 Vt. 175, 6 A.D. Cases 1361, 6 NDLR P 84

STATE of Vermont, et al. v. G.S. BLODGETT COMPANY.

No. 94-004.

Supreme Court of Vermont.

Jan. 20, 1995.

Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Atty. Gen., and Seth A. Steinzor, Asst. Atty. Gen., Montpelier, for plaintiff-appellant State of Vt.

John D. Shullenberger of Mickenberg, Dunn, Sirotkin & Dorsch, Burlington, for plaintiff-appellant Beauchemin.

Robert B. Hemley and Lucy T. Brown of Gravel and Shea, and Christopher R. Gannon, Burlington, for defendant-appellee.

Before ALLEN, C.J., and GIBSON, DOOLEY and MORSE, JJ., and PECK, J. (Ret.), Specially Assigned.

ALLEN, Chief Justice.

Plaintiffs, Joan Beauchemin and the State of Vermont, appeal from summary judgment dismissing their handicapped discrimination claim against Beauchemin's former employer, defendant G.S. Blodgett Company. We affirm.

Defendant manufactures ovens at its Burlington, Vermont facility where Beauchemin was employed full-time as a general helper from 1978 until 1983. According to defendant's written job description, a general helper is a floater whose responsibilities change with the demands of the factory. Beauchemin, who was one of approximately eight general helpers, did welding, cut insulation, worked on drill presses, and assembled, tested and repaired parts in various departments.

During the latter part of her tenure, Beauchemin's ability to perform the full range of routine tasks was substantially and adversely affected by multiple sclerosis. Beauchemin's work assignments were restructured to accommodate her deteriorating condition. She spent the majority of her time in the wiring department, sorting and cutting various wires with a large cutting machine. The wires were then affixed to motor mounts for installation in the ovens. Defendant provided Beauchemin with a stool so she would not have to stand and had other employees lift the wire spools. In November 1983, Beauchemin was placed on medical leave of absence.

Beauchemin was diagnosed with relapsing remitting multiple sclerosis. As explained by her neurologists, the disease is unpredictable and the symptoms vary in intensity and duration. Beauchemin suffered from muscle weakness, fatigue, incontinence, and slurred speech. Her ability to concentrate, balance, lift heavy objects or stand for extended periods of time was significantly impaired. She responded well to medical treatment and was able to manage some symptoms by controlling the room climate and resting intermittently. Plaintiffs acknowledged, however, that periods of alleviation were interspersed with periods of exacerbation which, at worst, required hospitalization.

Shortly after Beauchemin went on leave, defendant introduced a new oven, which required defendant to redesign its production regimen. To save space, improve efficiencies, and reduce costs, defendant hired two independent contractors to perform the wiring and motor mount operations. One of the contractors was a sheltered workshop employing disabled workers. The contractors picked up supplies from defendant, performed the work as necessary, and returned the finished parts. Each contractor supplied the needed machines, tools, supervisory staff and insurance coverage.

In February 1984, Beauchemin contacted personnel manager, Robert Morris, about reentry and retraining. Morris told Beauchemin that reentry would depend on her physical condition, and he would rely heavily on her physician's reports in making judgments about her abilities. From 1984 through 1985, Beauchemin regularly submitted her doctor's reports to Morris. In March 1984, her treating neurologist wrote Morris, concluding that Beauchemin's "rapid progression of multiple sclerosis presents a sufficiently poor prognosis as to make further regular employment unlikely." Morris encouraged Beauchemin to get a second opinion. Beauchemin began diagnostic and therapeutic treatment at the University Health Center of Vermont in May 1984.

By her own admission and her doctors' advice, she could not work at all during 1984 and 1985. While her doctors noted improvement in late 1985, they opined that she was unable to perform the usual duties of her occupation, but could work approximately four hours per day in a sedentary position. They specifically advised against work involving lifting, frequent walking, prolonged standing, or any situation requiring intense concentration, such as heights, with loud noise or with dangerous machinery. Early in 1986, her doctors reported that Beauchemin was stable and asymptomatic.

In April 1986, Beauchemin renewed discussions with defendant about the possibility of being reinstated. She spoke with several managers, including James Clucas, plant manager, about working at home because she could not tolerate the factory environment. She suggested relocating the nine foot by four foot wiring machine to her garage. Beauchemin hypothesized that she could do wiring in her insulated garage because it would provide a climate controlled environment and opportunities to rest. She suggested this idea after learning that most of the work that she had been doing prior to her medical leave had been contracted to a sheltered workshop. Shortly after discussing this option with defendant, Beauchemin received a letter from defendant notifying her that her health benefits would be terminated because her absence from work would exceed two and one-half years.

Beauchemin called Clucas and reiterated her interest in performing wiring in her garage. She followed up with a letter requesting that she be reinstated in her old capacity (as a wirer), but at home. She noted that "I am able to do the type of work that I was primarily engaged in prior to my illness. However, I can no longer tolerate the environment of the plant given the lack of climate control and the danger that fatigue or loss of balance could place myself and/or others in danger." Beauchemin also recommended that Clucas contact a vocational rehabilitation expert to assist in fashioning a solution. Clucas did not review Beauchemin's medical records or contact the vocational expert. He did, however, discuss with several Blodgett managers the viability of performing the wiring function in Beauchemin's garage. Because of safety, monetary, logistical and legal issues, they decided it was impractical. At this time, there was only one general helper still employed by Blodgett. That person was not doing any wiring or motor mount assembly because of the subcontract arrangement.

Beauchemin, with the State of Vermont, filed a complaint alleging that defendant discriminated against Beauchemin on the basis of her handicap in violation of § 495(a)(1) of Vermont's Fair Employment Practices Act (VFEPA), 21 V.S.A. §§ 495-496. Plaintiffs maintained that Beauchemin was qualified to work as a general helper with reasonable accommodations, and that defendant was obligated to provide her with a reasonable accommodation when she requested reemployment in April 1986. Plaintiffs sought money damages, including civil fines, and Beauchemin's reinstatement in her former position.

Following extensive discovery, defendant successfully moved for summary judgment. The court concluded that plaintiffs had failed to establish that Beauchemin could perform the essential functions of general helper because she could not meet its physical demands, and that plaintiffs had failed to present evidence that a particular accommodation was reasonable, while defendant had satisfied its burden of proving that setting up a mini-factory in Beauchemin's garage was not a reasonable accommodation. In reaching its conclusions , the court relied on sworn statements Beauchemin made on her application for Social Security benefits. ¹

On appeal, plaintiffs argue that summary judgment was improper because the trial court ignored material evidentiary conflicts in determining that Beauchemin was not a qualified handicapped individual. Plaintiffs also argue that, regardless of the outcome on the merits, defendant should be liable because it failed to conduct an adequate individualized inquiry into Beauchemin's qualifications prior to making its adverse employment decision.

The standard of review of a motion for summary judgment is the same as that used by the trial court. Hodgdon v. Mt. Mansfield Co., 160 Vt. 150, 158-59, 624 A.2d 1122, 1127 (1992). Summary judgment is appropriate when the moving party has demonstrated that there are no genuine issues of material fact and it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. V.R.C.P. 56(c); Kelly v. Town of Barnard, 155 Vt. 296, 299, 583 A.2d 614, 616 (1990). In determining whether a material fact exists, the opposing party is entitled to all reasonable doubts. Hodgdon, 160 Vt. at 158-59, 624 A.2d at 1127. The nonmoving party may survive the motion if it responds with specific facts raising a triable issue, Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986), and it is able to demonstrate sufficient evidence to support a prima facie case. Id. at 323, 106 S.Ct. at 2552-53. If the nonmoving party fails to establish an essential element of its case on which it has the burden of proof at trial, the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. Id.

VFEPA prohibits discrimination in employment against "a qualified handicapped individual." 21 V.S.A. § 495(a)(1). The handicapped discrimination provisions under VFEPA are patterned after § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794. Hodgdon, 160 Vt. at 165, 624 A.2d at 1130. Therefore, we look to federal case law to guide our interpretation, the allocations of burdens and standards of proof. See id. To establish a claim under VFEPA, plaintiffs must show that Beauchemin is a qualified handicapped individual and was excluded from her position because of her handicap. For purposes of this motion, defendant conceded that Beauchemin was a handicapped individual and that it denied...