State v. Gagne

• Decision Date: 31 December 1986
• Docket Number: No. 86-201,86-201
• Citation: 523 A.2d 76,129 N.H. 93
• Parties: The STATE of New Hampshire v. Wilma GAGNE and Richard Cote.
• Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court

Page 76

523 A.2d 76

129 N.H. 93

The STATE of New Hampshire v. Wilma GAGNE and Richard Cote.

No. 86-201.

Supreme Court of New Hampshire.

Dec. 31, 1986.

Stephen E. Merrill, Atty. Gen. (Bradford W. Kuster, Asst. Atty. Gen., on brief and orally), for State.

James E. Duggan, Appellate Defender, Concord, by brief and orally, for defendants.

THAYER, Justice.

The two cases were consolidated below for purposes of this interlocutory transfer without ruling from the Manchester District Court (Champagne, J.) pursuant to RSA 502-A:17-a. They concern the authority of the district courts to order competency evaluations for defendants charged with a misdemeanor, and for unindicted defendants charged with a felony pending a probable cause hearing.

The court has requested determination of five separate but related issues: 1) whether the district courts have the authority to order defendants charged with a misdemeanor to submit to a psychiatric evaluation to determine the defendant's competency to stand trial; 2) if the district courts have such authority, from where is it derived; 3) whether the district courts have the authority to order unindicted defendants charged with a felony pending a probable cause hearing to submit to a psychiatric evaluation to determine competency; 4) if the district courts have such authority, from where is it derived; and, 5) if the district courts have the authority to order misdemeanor or felony defendants to submit to a competency evaluation, whether the district courts have the authority to transfer the defendant to the New Hampshire Hospital for the evaluation?

We first address the issue of the district courts' authority to order an individual charged with a misdemeanor to submit to a pre-trial competency evaluation. This issue concerns defendant Richard Cote, who was arrested on March 27, 1986, and charged with the misdemeanor offenses of resisting arrest, criminal threatening, and criminal trespass, in violation of RSA 642:2, 631:4, 635:2, I, respectively. The defendant was arraigned on March 28, 1986. On April 16, 1986, the defense counsel filed a motion requesting the district court to order a pre-trial evaluation to determine the defendant's competency to stand trial.

Both parties acknowledge the well settled rule that a defendant's due process rights, guaranteed under both the Federal and State Constitutions, prohibit him from being placed on trial if "legally incompetent," i.e., not capable of understanding the proceedings against him or her or assisting his or her lawyer in the preparation of his or her defense. N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 15; State v. Champagne, 127 N.H. 266, 270, 497 A.2d 1242, 1245 (1985); see Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 86 S.Ct. 836, 15 L.Ed.2d 815 (1966); State v. Bertrand, 123 N.H. 719, 465 A.2d 912 (1983). In Bertrand, we held that a trial judge must order an "evidentiary hearing whenever a bona fide or legitimate doubt arises whether a criminal defendant is competent to stand trial." 123 N.H. at 725, 465 A.2d at 914.

Having underscored the federal and State constitutional right of a defendant charged with a misdemeanor to a pre-trial competency hearing, we now focus on the district court's query regarding the source of the court's authority to order a competency evaluation and the procedure to be followed if such authority exists.

A review of the relevant statutory authority reveals that the district courts are statutorily powerless to order competency evaluations for defendants charged with misdemeanors, see RSA 135:17 (Supp.1986), and further, no court has the authority to order competency evaluations for misdemeanors. RSA 135:17 (Supp.1986) empowers the superior court to order pre-trial competency evaluations, permitting such authority to be exercised only after a person has been indicted for an offense or bound over by a district or municipal court to await action by the grand jury. RSA 135:17 (Supp.1986) provides that:

"When a person is indicted for any offense, or is bound over by any district or municipal court to await the action of the grand jury, the superior court before which he is to be tried, if a plea of insanity is made in court, or said court is notified by either party that there is a question as to the sanity of the respondent, may make such order for a pre-trial psychiatric examination of such person by a psychiatrist on the staff of any public institution or by a private psychiatrist as the circumstances of the case may require, which order may include, though without limitation, examination at the secure psychiatric unit on an out-patient basis, the utilization of local mental health clinics on an in- or out-patient basis, or the examination of such person, should he be incarcerated for any reason, at his place of detention by psychiatrists assigned to a state or local mental health facility. Such pre-trial examination shall be completed within 30 days after the date of the order for such examination."

Although the district courts lack the specific statutory authority to order competency evaluations, they do possess the inherent authority to insure that the constitutional rights of defendants are protected. The authority "to protect a constitutional right 'is not dependent upon legislative enactment or grant of authority [by the legislature] to the judiciary. The authority of the judiciary to provide a remedy guaranteed by the constitution ... stems from the constitution itself and is inherent in the very nature of the judicial function.' " Brauch v. Shaw, 121 N.H. 562, 570, 432 A.2d 1, 5 (1981) (quotingLocke v. Ladd, 119 N.H. 136, 141, 399 A.2d 962, 965 (1979)); see State v. Moquin, 105 N.H. 9, 11, 191 A.2d 541, 543 (1963). Thus, we hold that in the exercise of its inherent authority to protect a defendant's constitutional rights, a district court may order competency evaluations. In so doing, the district court should adhere to RSA 135:17 (Supp.1986) insofar as it proscribes the manner in which an individual may be evaluated.

The authority of the district courts to order competency evaluations does not, however, extend to the approval of payment for said services to a private psychiatrist or a private mental health clinic, without approval of the superior court. RSA 604-A:6 provides in pertinent part that the superior court may grant counsel's application to obtain "investigative, expert or other services necessary to an adequate defense in [the] case." The superior court may also "ratify and approve such services after they have been obtained." RSA 604-A:6. When the district court, in its discretion, finds it necessary to order an evaluation utilizing the services of a private psychiatrist or mental health clinic and the superior court assesses the petition for payment, neither court shall give consideration to the ability of the defendant to pay. Further, the superior court shall not consider the merits of the evaluation order unless that issue is otherwise properly before it.

Accordingly, we find that the district courts through their inherent authority have the power to order pre-trial psychiatric evaluations for defendants charged with misdemeanors. This authority should be exercised in accordance with RSA 135:17 as amended by (Supp.1986). In so doing, the district courts should note that RSA 135:17 (Supp.1986) no longer provides for evaluations at the New Hampshire Hospital, but provides that they be conducted at the "secure psychiatric unit." However, if the district court orders that an evaluation be conducted by utilizing the services of a private psychiatrist or a private mental health clinic, superior court approval must be obtained. See RSA 604-A:6. The Cote case is thus remanded to the district court for proceedings consistent with our findings herein.

We now turn our attention to the district court's questions concerning its authority under both the Federal and State Constitutions to order a pre-trial competency evaluation for a defendant charged with a felony prior to a probable cause hearing. These questions concern defendant Wilma Gagne, who was arrested on April 10, 1986, and charged with arson in violation of RSA 634:1, II, a Class A felony. At the arraignment, the judge set the defendant's bail and ordered a probable cause hearing for May 22, 1986. On April 17, 1986, the defense counsel filed a motion requesting the defendant be transferred to the New Hampshire Hospital for a competency evaluation, unaware that on April 16, 1986, the defendant had already been transferred there for treatment pursuant to RSA 623:1. The transfer, however, did not include an evaluation of the defendant's competency. On May 9, 1986, the defendant was indicted on the charge of arson by the Hillsborough County Grand Jury.

The defendant argues that a competency determination should be made prior to the probable cause hearing to insure the preservation of both her federal and State constitutional rights. The State counters that the Gagne case has been rendered moot by her subsequent indictment and proceedings in the superior court, and assuming, arguendo, that it is not, the defendant was not entitled to an evaluation prior to the probable cause hearing because a probable cause hearing is not a judicial trial determining guilt or innocence.

We first address the State's contention that the Gagne case is moot. We disagree. Mootness is not subject to rigid rules and should be regarded as a matter of convenience and discretion. Moody v Cunningham, 127 N.H. 550, 553, 503 A.2d 819, 821 (1986). The defendant raises an issue of significant constitutional dimension which justifies a decision on the merits, id.; Royer v. State Dep't of Empl. Security, 118 N.H. 673, 675, 394 A.2d 828, 829 (1978), that constitutional right being that of a defendant not to be tried before an adversary hearing if he or she is legally incompetent. See Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 86 S.Ct. 836, 15 L.Ed.2d 815; State v. Bertrand, 123 N.H....