State v. Galloway, 02FE0202.

• Court: Court of Appeals of Oregon
• Writing for the Court: Brewer
• Citation: 200 P.3d 175,225 Or. App. 67
• Parties: STATE of Oregon, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Nathan Wayne GALLOWAY, Defendant-Appellant.
• Docket Number: 02FE0202.,A121922.
• Decision Date: 07 January 2009

200 P.3d 175 225 Or. App. 67 STATE of Oregon, Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
Nathan Wayne GALLOWAY, Defendant-Appellant. 02FE0202. A121922. Court of Appeals of Oregon. Submitted on Remand October 28, 2008. Decided January 7, 2009.

[200 P.3d 176]

George W. Kelly, Eugene, for appellant.

Hardy Myers, Attorney General, Mary H. Williams, Solicitor General, and Paul L. Smith, Assistant Attorney-in-Charge, Criminal Appeals, for respondent.

Before LANDAU, Presiding Judge, and BREWER, Chief Judge, and HASELTON, Judge.

BREWER, C.J.

225 Or. App. 69

This case is before us on remand from the Supreme Court, which vacated our prior decision, State v. Galloway, 202 Or.App. 613, 123 P.3d 352, rev. den., 340 Or. 201, 131 P.3d 195 (2006) (Galloway I), in light of State v. Ramirez, 343 Or. 505, 173 P.3d 817 (2007), adh'd to as modified on recons., 344 Or. 195, 179 P.3d 673 (2008), and State v. Fults, 343 Or. 515, 173 P.3d 822 (2007). State v. Galloway, 345 Or. 315, 195 P.3d 62 (2008). In Galloway I, we vacated defendant's sentences and remanded for resentencing because the trial court had imposed a departure sentence based on a judicial finding that defendant's crime had created a serious risk to human life. That factfinding enterprise constituted plain error, and we exercised our discretion to correct it. The issue before us on remand is whether, in light of Ramirez and Fults, we properly exercised our discretion under Ailes v. Portland Meadows, Inc., 312 Or. 376, 381-82, 823 P.2d 956 (1991). We conclude that, under Ramirez, our exercise of discretion in Galloway I was erroneous. Accordingly, we affirm.

Defendant was convicted of nine counts of attempted aggravated murder; five counts of attempted murder; six counts of first-degree arson; two counts of first-degree burglary; four counts of recklessly endangering another person; and one count of arson in the second degree. Defendant assigns error to the trial court's imposition of an upward departure sentence on the second-degree arson conviction.¹ The trial court concluded that the presumptive sentence for arson in the second degree, 30 days in jail, was insufficient. The court explained:

"I'm shaking my head because, given all of this stuff that you've just been convicted of under the sentencing guidelines that are supposed to give us truth in sentencing, the presumptive sentence is 30 days in jail. And I'm not imposing that, but that's absolutely absurd in my mind under those circumstances and the potential risk to other human beings setting a fairly significant fire in the Crook County in the middle of August in one of the driest years in the history of recorded weather.

225 Or. App. 70

"And I'm going to impose a dispositional departure sentence of six months. That sentence is to run consecutively to the other sentences. And the basis for the departure sentence is that the presumptive...