State v. Gannites

• Decision Date: 19 July 1966
• Docket Number: No. 10540,10540
• Citation: 101 R.I. 216,221 A.2d 620
• Parties: STATE v. Andrew GANNITES. Ex.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Page 620

221 A.2d 620

101 R.I. 216

STATE v. Andrew GANNITES.

Ex. No. 10540.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

July 19, 1966.

J. Joseph Nugent, Atty. Gen., Corinne P. Grande, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., for State

Leo Patrick McGowan, Public Defender, Eugene F. Toro, Sp. Counsel to Public Defender, for defendant.

OPINION

JOSLIN, Justice.

This indictment charging the defendant with the murder of a police officer is before us for the second time. When first here we reversed on the ground that the jury had been incorrectly charged on the issue raised by the defendant's plea of insanity. State v. Gannites, 91 R.I. 209, 161 A.2d 818. Thereafter in June of 1961 the defendant was again tried before a justice of the superior court sitting with a jury and was again found guilty. He is now serving a life sentence. His bill of exceptions was allowed and the papers in the case were certified here on May 23, 1963. The case was submitted to us on briefs on June 10, 1966, both parties with our permission having waived oral arguments. The long delay between the docketing of the bill of exceptions and the submission is attributable to the parties and not to a crowded condition of our docket.

The only substantial question is whether the admission into evidence over defendant's objections of certain inculpatory oral and written statements made under the following described circumstances makes necessary the granting of a new trial.

On January 6, 1958 shortly after noontime defendant, then under suspicion of having at about 6 o'clock that morning shot and killed an East Providence policeman, was apprehended by the police and taken to the office of deputy chief Hourigan in the Pawtucket police station. It was then about 1:15 p.m. Hourigan knew Gannites from previous contacts and without any preliminary interrogation asked him 'Andy, who shot the policeman?' Gannites answered, 'I did, Mr. Hourigan.' Gannites was questioned intermittently throughout the remainder of that day and its early evening and was also taken to the place where the murder weapon had been hidden as well as to the scene of the killing where at the request of the police he participated in a reenactment of what had taken place early that morning. At about 11:15 that night after approximately two hours of continuous questioning Gannites signed a statement in which he confessed to the fatal shooting.

The confession which is in question and answer form opens with Gannites' statement that it is made voluntarily without any threats or coercion or promise of reward or leniency and with the knowledge that whatever might be said could be used for or against him. It, as well as certain oral admissions made during his custodial interrogation starting with the original statement, 'I did, Mr. Hourigan,' was introduced into evidence at the trial, some over and others without objection. The record fails to disclose that defendant was at any time before or during the interrogation either advised that he could maintain his silence or told that he had the right to have either retained or appointed counsel present.

The submission in this court follwed in point of time our decisions in State v. Dufour, R.I., 206 A.2d 82, and State v. Mendes, R.I., 210 A.2d 50, and came after arguments but before decisions in Miranda v. State of Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, and Johnson v. State of New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 86 S.Ct. 1772, 16 L.Ed.2d 882.

In Dufour and in Mendes the justices of this court sharply disagreed, as have judges wherever the question has arisen, on the implications which flow from Escobedo v. State of Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 84 S.Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977. By a one-vote majority this court which had divided evenly in Dufour on the thrust of Escobedo enlarged it in Mendes beyond its precise factual situation and held that the failure of the police to advise a defendant of his right to remain silent and to the assistance of counsel during his custodial interrogation made his incriminating statement inadmissible.

Whatever doubts which the opinion in Escobedo may have created in the courts as to its true meaning have now in the light of Miranda where the court divided 5-4 been resolved. Escobedo has been enlarged and the rule now in both the state and the federal courts is that evidence of exculpatory or inculpatory statements made by an accused during in-custody interrogation is inadmissible unless he has clearly and unequivocally been advised of his right to remain silent, warned that anything he may say can be used against him, and told that he is entitled to the presence of retained or appointed counsel during the questioning process.

Having announced the rule the court was still faced with whether it should be applied prospectively or retrospectively. This was decided in Johnson v. State of New Jersey, supra, which, although argued at the same time as was Miranda, was not decided until a week later. There the court, this time with seven justices voting in favor of the conclusion, came face to face with the problem of whether Escobedo and Miranda, notwithstanding the long-settled principles which they overturned, were to be applied retroactively. Influenced obviously by the considerations but recently expressed in Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 85 S.Ct. 1731, 14 L.Ed.2d 601, which go to the 'administration of justice and the integrity of the judicial process' the majority refused retrospective application to Escobedo or Miranda. An additional compelling reason undoubtedly was that a rule of retrospectivity 'would require the retrial or release of numerous prisoners found guilty by trustworthy evidence in conformity with previously announced constitutional standards.' Johnson v. State of New Jersey, supra.

While reiterating the principle announced by Mr. Justice Cardozo in Great Northern Ry. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co., 287 U.S. 358, 364, 53 S.Ct. 145, 148, 77 L.Ed. 360, which gives to each state the right to 'make a choice for itself between the principle of forward operation and that of relation backward,' the court in Johnson held that any accused whose...