State v. Gant
| Decision Date | 08 July 1999 |
| Docket Number | No. 98-357.,98-357. |
| Citation | 597 N.W.2d 501 |
| Parties | STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Anthony Maurice GANT, Appellant. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and David Arthur Adams, Assistant State Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Sharon K. Hall, Assistant Attorney General, Mary E. Richards, County Attorney, and Angelina M. Smith, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by HARRIS, P.J., and CARTER, LAVORATO, NEUMAN, and TERNUS, JJ.
The defendant, Anthony Maurice Gant, pleaded guilty to extortion. See Iowa Code § 711.4 (1997). He appeals from the judgment of conviction and sentence entered on his plea. On appeal, Gant contends his trial counsel was ineffective because counsel failed to preserve error on his challenge to the factual basis of the guilty plea. We transferred the case to the court of appeals. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding there was a factual basis for the plea. We granted Gant's application for further review. We affirm the decision of the court of appeals and affirm the judgment of the district court.
On July 22, 1997, someone stole Courtney Graber's 1982 Chevrolet pickup truck. At the time of the theft, there was a stereo, a set of speakers, and a toolbox in the truck. Several days later, Gant came to Graber's place of employment and told Graber that he knew something about the stolen truck. Gant also told Graber that he might be able to help Graber recover the truck if Graber was willing to pay money for its return.
On August 5 Gant returned to Graber's place of employment and tried to sell a stereo and a set of speakers to Joseph Banks who worked with Graber. Banks recognized the stereo equipment as Graber's. Banks told Graber about this incident.
The next day Gant approached Graber again. This time Gant said he knew where Graber's truck and stereo equipment were and offered to recover the items for Graber provided Graber pay him $200. Graber then contacted the police who searched Gant's apartment pursuant to a search warrant. The police found Graber's toolbox in the apartment.
The State ultimately charged Gant with theft in the second degree, extortion, and theft in the fourth degree. The State agreed to drop the two theft charges in return for Gant's plea of guilty to the extortion charge. The district court accepted Gant's plea to the extortion charge and later sentenced him to an indeterminate term of imprisonment not to exceed five years on that charge.
As to the extortion charge, the State alleged that Gant committed extortion by "threaten[ing] to withhold testimony or information with respect to another's legal claim or defense" in violation of Iowa Code section 711.4(6). We set out that portion of the plea proceeding pertinent to this allegation:
Gant contends that these admissions to the court do not establish a factual basis for the section 711.4(6) extortion alternative as the State had charged. He therefore insists that his trial counsel's failure to object to the plea and counsel's subsequent failure to file a motion in arrest of judgment challenging the plea amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel. Gant believes he is now entitled to a vacation of his plea and sentence.
Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 23(3)(a) provides that a defendant's failure to file a motion in arrest of judgment bars a defendant from challenging the adequacy of guilty plea proceedings on appeal. The purpose of these two rules is to allow the district court to correct defects in guilty plea proceedings before an appeal and therefore eliminate the necessity for the appeal. Wenman v. State, 327 N.W.2d 216, 218 (Iowa 1982). It is undisputed that the district court advised Gant of the requirement to file a motion in arrest of judgment and that Gant failed to file the motion.
Gant, however, contends the error preservation rule does not apply because his failure to file a motion in arrest of judgment was due to the ineffective assistance of his trial counsel. Gant correctly argues that a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may be an exception to our error preservation rule. See State v. Hildebrant, 405 N.W.2d 839, 840 (Iowa 1987)
().
Although we ordinarily do not address ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims on direct appeal, we have the obligation to determine whether such claims should be disposed of on direct appeal or should be reserved for postconviction relief proceedings. Id. at 840-41. Here, we are convinced the record is sufficient for us to consider Gant's ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim on direct appeal.
To establish his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Gant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his trial counsel failed to perform an essential duty and that this failure resulted in prejudice. Id. at 841. We affirm if either element is absent. See State v. Crone, 545 N.W.2d 267, 270 (Iowa 1996)
. As to the first element, Gant must prove his trial counsel's performance was not within the normal range of competence. See id.
As to the second element, Gant must prove his counsel's error resulted in an actual and substantial disadvantage, creating a reasonable probability that but for the error the outcome of the proceeding would have been different. See id.
Because ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims raise issues under the Sixth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, we perform a de novo review, making an independent evaluation of the circumstances as shown by the entire record. See State v. Terry, 544 N.W.2d 449, 451 (Iowa 1996)
.
Iowa Code § 711.4(6) (emphasis added).
B. Existence of a threat. As mentioned, Gant told Graber that Gant knew the whereabouts of Graber's stolen property and that he was not going to give Graber that information unless Graber paid Gant money. Gant insists that this conversation with Graber as admitted in the plea proceeding does not constitute an extortionate threat against Graber.
In Crone, we applied the dictionary meaning to the word "threat" in section 711.4. We said that an extortionate threat is a promise of punishment, of reprisal, or of other distress. See Crone, 545 N.W.2d at 271
. An extortionate threat also includes an act of retaliation. Id. An extortionate threat need not be explicit. Id. Such a threat may arise out of innuendo or suggestion. Id. All that is necessary is that the threat be definite and understandable to a reasonable person of ordinary intelligence. Id.
We think a reasonable person of ordinary intelligence would have understood Gant's statement to be a...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Martin v. Mapes
...must file a motion in arrest of judgment prior to sentencing." State v. Ortiz, 789 N.W.2d 761, 764 (Iowa 2010) (citing State v. Gant, 597 N.W.2d 501, 503-04 (Iowa 1999)); Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.24(3)(a) ("A defendant's failure to challenge the adequacy of a guilty plea proceeding by motion in a......
-
State v. Straw
...State v. Dalton, 674 N.W.2d 111, 119 (Iowa 2004). Straw must prove both elements by a preponderance of the evidence. State v. Gant, 597 N.W.2d 501, 504 (Iowa 1999). As discussed in the following analysis, the record does not adequately present the issues in this case and the case is more pr......
-
State v. Hanes
...to correct defects in guilty plea proceedings before an appeal and therefore eliminate the necessity for the appeal." State v. Gant , 597 N.W.2d 501, 503–04 (Iowa 1999). This "admirable purpose would be thwarted" by allowing Hanes's appeal to proceed "after [he had been properly] advised of......
-
State v. Hischke, 00-1924.
...the other element. Id. Hischke must first prove Bishop's performance was not within the normal range of competence. State v. Gant, 597 N.W.2d 501, 504 (Iowa 1999). We measure the attorney's performance by standards of reasonableness consistent with "prevailing professional norms." Ledezma, ......