State v. Gant

Citation201 P.3d 673
Decision Date30 January 2009
Docket NumberNo. 98,026.,98,026.
PartiesSTATE of Kansas, Appellee, v. Christopher D. GANT, Appellant.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Kansas

Six, attorney general, were with him on the brief for the appellee.

The opinion of the court was delivered by ROSEN, J.:

Christopher D. Gant appeals to this court from his conviction and sentence for one count of felony murder, K.S.A. 21-3401(b), and one count of attempted aggravated robbery, K.S.A. 21-3427. Jurisdiction lies with this court under K.S.A. 22-3601(b)(1).

On March 20, 2006, Gant drove three other men, Jeremy Miles, Kendrall Ransom, and Karlan Ransom to a house on North Lorraine Street in Wichita, Kansas. The men had previously armed themselves, and Gant believed they were "going to go probably rob somebody and get the money." After noting that they might have been observed, Kendrall Ransom directed Gant to drive them to a house on North Kansas Street. There they saw Donta McDonald leave the house and walk to a truck in the driveway. Gant and the other occupants of the car approached the truck, and Gant heard the other men demand money. After making the demand for money, the men saw McDonald reach under the seat of his truck, at which time one of the men fired two shots from a shotgun, killing McDonald.

Gant and the other men returned to their car without taking any money from McDonald. Gant drove them back to the house on North Lorraine, where they observed people walking in and out of the house. Gant announced that he had to pick up his child and needed to leave, and he drove them to another address. Watching the 10 p.m. news that night, Gant learned a murder had also been committed on North Lorraine after he had left the other men.

On June 7, 2006, the State filed an information charging Gant, Miles, and the Ransoms each with one count of felony murder in the death of McDonald and one count of attempted aggravated robbery. The other defendants were also charged with various additional crimes, including felony murder in the death of Christopher Spain Bey.

A jury found Gant guilty of both counts, and the district court sentenced him to a term of life imprisonment for the felony murder and a consecutive term of 34 months in prison for the attempted aggravated robbery. He took a timely notice of appeal.

Gant initially argues that the district court erroneously admitted certain statements of his into evidence because he had requested counsel prior to a custodial interview.

During an interview with Detective Timothy Relph and Detective Heather Bachman conducted early in the morning of March 26, 2006, Gant explained in detail his role in the shootings. The interview with police detectives was apparently videotaped, but the tape is not included in the record on appeal, and the record contains no transcript of the interview. The record shows that Gant confirmed that he provided the transportation for all the men to the scenes of both murders. He acknowledged that they brought firearms with them and that he was carrying a firearm at the scene of McDonald's murder.

Gant filed a motion to suppress the interview statements. The district court conducted an evidentiary hearing to determine whether Gant requested an attorney and whether he waived his right to an attorney before or during the interview.

The district court heard testimony that police waited outside an apartment complex and observed a man who they believed was Gant going back and forth between the complex and a car. He and two women then got into the car. The police approached the car, pointed service weapons at Gant, and told him to keep his hands in plain view and get out of the car. As Gant was getting out of the car, the police overheard him calling out to the women that he loved them, that he loved his children, that he was sorry, that they were to call another individual, and that they were to call a lawyer.

The arresting officer testified that Gant did not request that the police call a lawyer. One of the women in the car, who was Gant's girlfriend and the mother of one of his children, testified that Gant told the police that he wanted to talk to a lawyer. Gant testified that, after the police handcuffed him outside his car, they informed him of his rights, and he requested a lawyer. He testified that he again requested a lawyer when he got into the police car.

The arresting officer explained to the interviewing detectives that Gant had requested that his female companions call a lawyer. Before interviewing Gant at the police department, Detective Bachman read him his Miranda rights. Gant informed her that he understood each of his rights, and he placed his initials next to the enumerated rights written on a card. He told the detectives that he was ready to speak with them at that time, and he signed the card. Gant conceded that he did not tell the interviewing detectives that he wanted to speak to a lawyer.

The district court found it "more probably true than not that the defendant made a statement to the two ladies in the car about contacting a lawyer." The court concluded that Gant did not tell the police that he wanted to speak to a lawyer or that he would not answer questions without speaking to a lawyer first—"there was no unambiguous request for counsel." The court noted that Gant and his girlfriend had a personal interest in testifying that he requested an attorney at the time of his arrest; the court also noted that Gant did not request counsel at the time that he was interviewed, that he specifically waived his right to counsel at the time of the interview, and that he had significant experience with the arrest and interview process.

When reviewing a district court ruling on a motion to suppress a confession, an appellate court reviews the factual underpinnings of the decision under a substantial competent evidence standard. The ultimate legal conclusion drawn from those facts is reviewed de novo. The appellate court does not reweigh the evidence, assess the credibility of the witnesses, or resolve conflicting evidence. State v. Brown, 285 Kan. 261, 271-72, 173 P.3d 612 (2007).

The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides defendants in criminal prosecutions with protection from self-incrimination, protection that includes the right to have an attorney present during custodial interrogation and the right to remain silent pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, reh. denied 385 U.S. 890, 87 S.Ct. 11, 17 L.Ed.2d 121 (1966). A suspect may invoke the Miranda right to counsel at any time, requiring at a minimum "some statement that can reasonably be construed to be an expression of a desire for the assistance of an attorney in dealing with custodial interrogation by the police." McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 178, 111 S.Ct. 2204, 115 L.Ed.2d 158 (1991). The suspect must articulate the request for counsel with sufficient clarity that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand the statement to be a request for an attorney, and the request must be for counsel to be present at the custodial interrogation, not for subsequent hearings or proceedings. State v. Walker, 276 Kan. 939, 945, 80 P.3d 1132 (2003) (citing Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459, 129 L.Ed.2d 362, 114 S.Ct. 2350 [1994], and McNeil, 501 U.S. at 178, 111 S.Ct. 2204).

When a suspect makes a statement that might be ambiguous as to whether the suspect is asserting a right to remain silent or to confer with an attorney, the interrogator is permitted to ask clarifying questions but is not required to clarify the ambiguous statement. State v. Gonzalez, 282 Kan. 73, 106, 145 P.3d 18 (2006).

Gant asks this court to reweigh the district court's finding that his request for counsel was directed to the women in the car instead of to police. Substantial evidence supports the district court's finding. Gant was presumably not telling the police that he loved them, that he loved his children, that he was sorry, and that they were to call another individual; it was reasonable to assume that his connected statement requesting that someone obtain a lawyer for him was also not directed to the police. The request was at best ambiguous. The arresting officer testified that Gant made no other request for counsel; his testimony was substantial and competent.

In addition, Gant made no unambiguous request for counsel to assist him at a custodial interrogation. He was being taken into custody at gunpoint at the time he asked the occupants of his car to call an attorney, and no interrogation took place until later at the police department. When the interrogation began, detectives went over his Miranda rights with him, and he explicitly waived them.

It is inappropriate for this court to reweigh the evidence, and the district court's legal conclusions were soundly based on the evidence before it.

Gant next argues that his trial was improperly prejudiced by Detective Bachman's proximity to the prosecution prior to her testimony. It appears from a passing reference during trial testimony that Detective Bachman sat at the end of the table with counsel for the State. The issue was not preserved through a contemporaneous objection and is not properly before this court.

When the defendant has lodged an objection, the standard of review for a decision by a district court to allow a witness to sit at the table with counsel is abuse of discretion. State v. Kirkpatrick, 286 Kan. 329, 342-43, 184 P.3d 247 (2008). Judicial discretion is abused when judicial action is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable. If reasonable...

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