State v. Garcia

Decision Date28 September 2022
Docket NumberA-1-CA-37991
PartiesSTATE OF NEW MEXICO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. VICTOR T. GARCIA, JR., Defendant-Appellant.
CourtCourt of Appeals of New Mexico

Corrections to this opinion/decision not affecting the outcome, at the Court's discretion, can occur up to the time of publication with NM Compilation Commission. The Court will ensure that the electronic version of this opinion/decision is updated accordingly in Odyssey.

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF CURRY COUNTY Matthew E. Chandler District Judge.

Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General Santa Fe, NM Charles J Gutierrez, Assistant Attorney General Albuquerque, NM for Appellee.

Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender B. Douglas Wood III Assistant Appellate Defender Santa Fe, NM Victor E. Sanchez, Assistant Appellate Defender Albuquerque, NM for Appellant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

JENNIFER L. ATTREP, Judge.

{¶1} Following a conditional plea, Defendant Victor T. Garcia, Jr., appeals the district court's order denying his motion to suppress. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

{¶2} The charges in this case arose after Defendant was stopped while exiting a residence that law enforcement had cleared of occupants and for which they were seeking a search warrant. Defendant moved to suppress his statements to law enforcement and the evidence discovered during the stop, arguing his warrantless seizure was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.[1] After a hearing, the district court denied the motion in a short written order, without making factual findings to support its decision. "In such circumstances, we generally draw all inferences and indulge all presumptions in favor of the district court's ruling," State v. Taylor E., 2016-NMCA-100, ¶ 9, 385 P.3d 639, and we view the evidence "in the light most favorable to affirmance," State v. Aragon, 1999-NMCA-060, ¶ 10, 127 N.M. 393, 981 P.2d 1211. With these principles in mind, we consider the following facts derived from the testimony at the suppression hearing.

{¶3} Defendant was visiting Sabrina Martinez when her probation officer arrived to conduct a home visit. While walking through Martinez's residence, the probation officer located a parole absconder hiding in a shower. In the adjacent bedroom, the probation officer observed items of drug paraphernalia in plain sight. The officer detained the absconder, notified law enforcement, and informed responding officers about the paraphernalia. At some point, law enforcement apparently decided to seek a search warrant for the residence.

{¶4} Sergeant Rafael Aguilar, one of the responding officers, testified that he and another officer, Detective Albert Sena, were called out to assist in securing the residence because drug paraphernalia was found in the home. Aguilar testified that another officer told them that the resident (i.e., Martinez) had been taken into custody and that nobody was inside the residence. Sena consistently testified that he was called out to assist with securing a residence for a search warrant for the Region 5 Drug Task Force, and that he understood the residence to be unoccupied and secured.

{¶5} Aguilar drove around the back of the residence and Sena remained in the front. While seated in his vehicle, Sena saw Defendant come out the front door.[2] This "freaked out" Sena, because, as he explained, this was the first time in his eighteen years of law enforcement that he had observed someone coming out of a residence that should have been secured. This was very concerning to Sena because he did not know who Defendant was, whether he was armed, or what he was doing inside the already-secured residence; Sena testified there was no reason for Defendant to be inside the residence. Further, when Defendant exited the front door, Sena's view of Defendant was obstructed, and all he could see of Defendant was his face. In response to the situation, Sena got out of his vehicle, drew his firearm, and ordered Defendant to come toward him.

{¶6} Although Defendant initially complied with Sena's commands, Defendant turned his back to Sena, dropped his hands, and began stuffing something in his pants. By that point, Aguilar had returned to the front of the residence, where he observed Defendant with his hands in his pants. Both Sena and Aguilar testified that they were concerned Defendant was attempting to conceal something, such as a weapon, narcotics, or contraband. Eventually, officers found methamphetamine on Defendant.

{¶7} After the district court denied Defendant's suppression motion, Defendant pled guilty to possession of a controlled substance and tampering with evidence, but reserved his right to appeal the suppression ruling.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

{¶8} The State bears the burden of proving facts that justify a warrantless seizure. State v. Martinez, 1997-NMCA-048, ¶ 9, 123 N.M. 405, 940 P.2d 1200. As noted, however, we indulge all reasonable inferences in support of the district court's ruling and view the evidence in the light most favorable to that ruling. See Taylor E., 2016-NMCA-100, ¶ 9; Aragon, 1999-NMCA-060, ¶ 10. Our review of the district court's application of the law to the facts is de novo. See State v. Leyva, 2011-NMSC-009, ¶ 30, 149 N.M. 435, 250 P.3d 861. Nevertheless, it is Defendant's burden to clearly demonstrate that the district court erred. See Aragon, 1999-NMCA-060, ¶ 10 (recognizing a presumption of correctness in the district court's rulings and explaining that it is the appellant's burden on appeal to demonstrate any claimed error below).

DISCUSSION

{¶9} Neither party disputes that Defendant was seized at the moment when Sena ordered him to come toward him, or that the seizure was not supported by probable cause. See generally State v. Graves, 1994-NMCA-151, ¶ 9, 119 N.M. 89, 888 P.2d 971 ("The traditional justification for detention is probable cause."). The parties instead dispute the applicability of an exception to the probable cause requirement- the exception recognized by the United States Supreme Court in Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981), and later extended by this Court in Graves, for detentions incident to premises searches. "In Summers, the United States Supreme Court established another limited exception to the probable cause requirement and ruled that a resident of the premises being searched [pursuant to a warrant] could be detained for the duration of the search." Graves, 1994-NMCA-151, ¶ 10; see Summers, 452 U.S. at 705. Graves, in turn, examined whether the Summers exception extended to non-residents present at the time a warrant is executed. Graves, 1994-NMCA-151, ¶ 12. In that situation, this Court ruled that "mere presence" was not enough-there must be "presence plus" to justify the detention of a non-resident. See id. ¶¶ 14-15, 17; see also id. ¶ 16 (providing that "to justify the detention of visitors there must be facts present that would render it reasonable under the circumstances"). Under the "presence plus" approach, law enforcement may detain a non-resident during the execution of a search warrant only if they have "a reasonable basis to believe that the non-resident has some type of connection to the premises or to criminal activity." Id. ¶ 8.

{¶10} On appeal, Defendant argues two reasons his seizure cannot be justified under Summers.[3] First, Defendant argues that the "presence plus" standard was not satisfied because he did not have a connection to the premises or to the criminal activity. Second, Defendant briefly contends that the Summers exception cannot apply in the absence of a search warrant and that there was no evidence that a search warrant was obtained in this case. We address each contention in turn.

I. "Presence Plus" Was Satisfied

{¶11} Viewing the facts and circumstances known to Sena in the light most favorable to the district court's ruling, as we must, we conclude that the "presence plus" standard was satisfied at the time of Defendant's seizure.[4] See Aragon, 1999-NMCA-060, ¶ 10; State v. Madsen, 2000-NMCA-050, ¶ 16, 129 N.M. 251, 5 P.3d 573 (considering the information known to the officers at the time of the seizure in resolving the "presence plus" issue); cf. State v. Ochoa, 2008-NMSC-023, ¶ 21, 143 N.M. 749, 182 P.3d 130 (providing that "generally, an officer may reasonably rely on information from another officer that a crime has been or is being committed").

{¶12}In this case, Defendant was seen exiting a private home to which access presumably was limited. This raises an inference that Defendant was connected to the activities in the home. See United States v. Holder, 990 F.2d 1327, 1329 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (providing that access to a private apartment, in contrast to a public place, "is presumably limited, and thus a person's admission to the apartment normally would raise a stronger inference of connection to the activities conducted within"), cited with approval in Graves, 1994-NMCA-151, ¶ 15. The timing of Defendant's presence in the residence also is significant-he was there after Martinez had been arrested and taken into custody and after the residence had been cleared for the purpose of obtaining a search warrant. This demonstrates a level of access to, or control over, the residence beyond that of a mere visitor. See Graves 1994-NMCA-151, ¶ 16 (explaining that the Summers exception relates to a person's "control over premises which are the subject of a search warrant" because such control "provides a sufficient connection with the suspected illegal activities so that it is reasonable to detain that individual for the duration of the search" (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Further, Defendant had free rein of the Martinez residence, in which law enforcement believed there was probable cause of...

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