State v. Garcia
| Decision Date | 20 February 2002 |
| Docket Number | M2000-01760-CCA-R3-CD |
| Parties | STATE OF TENNESSEE v. GONZALO MORAN GARCIAIN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE |
| Court | Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals |
The appellant, Gonzalo Moran Garcia, appeals his conviction by a jury in the Davidson County Criminal Court of one count of possession of one thousand grams or more of methamphetamine with intent to deliver, a class A felony. He raises the following issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court erred in denying his pre-trial motion to suppress; (2) whether the trial court erred in admitting at trial the testimony of Daniel A. Rosales, an officer employed by the Houston Police Department in Texas; (3) whether the evidence underlying the appellant's conviction is sufficient; and (4) whether the trial court erred in rejecting his proposed jury instructions. Following a thorough review of the record and the parties' briefs, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand this case to the trial court for a new trial.
Richard McGee, James Holt Walker, and Bobby Ballinger, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Gonzalo Moran Garcia.
Paul G. Summers, Attorney General and Reporter; David H. Findley, Assistant Attorney General; Victor S. Johnson, III, District Attorney General; and John Zimmerman, Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.
Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court is Reversed and Remanded.
NORMA MCGEE OGLE, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JERRY L. SMITH J., joined. JOHN EVERETT WILLIAMS, J; filed a dissenting opinion.
On September 24, 1999, a Davidson County Grand Jury returned an indictment charging the appellant with one count of possession of one thousand grams or more of methamphetamine with intent to deliver. The indictment arose from the traffic stop on May 9, 1999, of the vehicle that the appellant was driving on Interstate Highway 24 in Davidson County and the subsequent seizure by police of approximately 40.1 pounds, or more than eighteen thousand grams, of methamphetamine. Following his indictment, the appellant filed a motion to suppress any evidence obtained during or as a result of the traffic stop. The trial court conducted a hearing on the appellant's motion on December 10, 1999.
A. Suppression Hearing
At the suppression hearing, the State presented the testimony of Debra Kohl,1 an officer with the Metropolitan Nashville Police Department. She testified that she had been employed by the police department for eleven years and was currently assigned to the Highway Interdiction Unit of the Twentieth Judicial District Drug Task Force. Prior to working with the Highway Interdiction Unit, she was a patrol officer for several years, which position required training in the investigation and apprehension of drunk drivers. She joined the Highway Interdiction Unit eight months prior to the traffic stop in this case and, due to her new assignment, attended two conferences on illegal drug interdiction that were organized by the United States Customs Service and the Drug Enforcement Administration (hereinafter the DEA). Additionally, she worked with the United States Customs Service in El Paso, Texas, for one week. Finally, she attended additional training conferences in Nashville and Memphis on illegal drug interdiction.
Kohl related that, on May 9, 1999, at approximately 10:50 p.m., she was traveling on Interstate Highways 40 and 24 in a marked patrol car when she noticed the appellant's vehicle traveling in the right lane. Her attention was drawn to the appellant's vehicle because it swerved onto the line demarcating the right boundary of its lane. Kohl slowed her patrol car and began to monitor the appellant's vehicle.
As the appellant's vehicle proceeded on Interstate Highway 24 toward Chattanooga, it continued to weave within its lane. Kohl opined that the driver of the vehicle was driving carelessly, recalling:
The vehicle would drive in its lane - - it stayed in its lane of traffic; but, as the vehicle was going in its lane of traffic, it would go to the left-lane marker, then it would swerve over to the right-lane marker, then it would swerve over to the left-lane marker.
And I became concerned for his safety, as well as the safety of other motorists, and decided to stop the vehicle, at that point in time.
Kohl testified that she suspected, among other possibilities, that the driver of the vehicle was intoxicated.
After stopping the appellant's vehicle, Kohl approached the passenger's side on foot. Peering through the front, passenger's side window, she motioned for the driver to open the window. When the appellant complied, Kohl identified herself and asked the appellant to join her at the rear of his vehicle. The appellant, however, did not respond, and Kohl inquired in English whether he spoke Spanish. The appellant responded affirmatively, whereupon Kohl instructed him in Spanish to get out of his car and come to the rear of his vehicle. Kohl asserted at the suppression hearing that she speaks Spanish with sufficient fluency to "get through a traffic stop."
The appellant followed the officer's instructions, and Kohl informed him in Spanish that she was an officer with the Metropolitan Nashville Police Department and had stopped his vehicle because he was weaving within his lane. The appellant repeated in English, "I was weaving." Accordingly, Kohl continued the conversation in English. She recalled at the suppression hearing that the appellant was appropriately responsive to all her inquiries in English.
Although at this point during the traffic stop Kohl had not observed any signs that the appellant was intoxicated, she was not yet satisfied that he was free of any impairment. Accordingly, she inquired whether the appellant had been drinking alcohol and, upon his denial, inquired if he was tired. The appellant conceded that he was tired, admitting that he had been driving since he left Los Angeles, California, on the previous day, pausing only briefly at a "few rest stops" to sleep. Kohl asked the appellant about his destination, and he indicated that he was traveling to Georgia. Kohl recalled:
And I said, "Where in Georgia?".
He said he didn't know.
I said, "Well, how are you supposed to know where you supposed to go in Georgia?".
And he said, when he got close to the - - to the area, he had a pager number he was supposed to call.
I asked him who the pager number belonged to.
And he said it was his cousin, Miguel's.
I asked if he knew where Miguel lived.
And he said, "No."
Then I asked him where he was going to stay at.
And he said he didn't know where he was going to stay; he thought a hotel, maybe.
Then I asked him if the vehicle was his vehicle.
And he said, no, that it belonged to his cousin.
I asked him what his cousin's name was.
And he told me, "Well, he's not really my cousin."
So, then I said, "Well, who is he?".
"He's my friend."
So, I said, "Well, is he your cousin or is he your friend?".
He - - "Well" - - he said, "Well, he's a friend who's like a cousin."
I said, .
And he gave me a name.
And I said, "Well, that's nice of him to let you borrow the car on this trip."
He said, Well, he's not really my friend."
I said, "Well, then who is he?".
He said, "He's a friend of my friend at work."
I said, "Well, what kind of work do you do?".
And he said that he did hardwood-floor work.
At that point in time, I asked him if he had the registration, and he went to the glove box and retrieved the registration for me.
Kohl further indicated at the suppression hearing that she requested the appellant's driver's license after inquiring concerning the length of the appellant's journey and prior to inquiring concerning the ownership of the vehicle in which the appellant was driving. Upon observing the appellant retrieve his driver's license from his wallet, Kohl was satisfied that the appellant was not intoxicated. As to her subsequent acquisition of the vehicle registration document, Kohl was unable to recall at the suppression hearing whether the name recorded on the document was the same as the name provided by the appellant and identified by him as belonging to the vehicle's owner. Kohl testified that she did, however, confirm that the registration matched the vehicle's license plate. Moreover, after obtaining both the appellant's driver's license and his vehicle registration document, she asked the appellant about his driving record and his arrest record. With respect to the latter, the appellant informed Kohl that he had once been arrested for driving under the influence.
Having examined the appellant's driver's licence and vehicle registration document, Kohl explained to the appellant that she was going to issue him a warning citation. Additionally, upon inquiry by the appellant, she provided him with directions to a location at which he could park his car and sleep. Finally, she instructed the appellant to wait inside his car while she completed the necessary paperwork.
Retaining the appellant's driver's license and vehicle registration document, Kohl returned to her patrol car. Inside the patrol car, she radioed a fellow officer, Dean Hunter, and asked that he transport a drug-detection dog to the scene of the traffic stop. She then filled out a warning citation for violation of "lane restrictions." She also prepared a "Consent to Search" form written in Spanish before returning to the appellant's vehicle.
Upon approaching the appellant once again, Kohl instructed him to get out of his vehicle and, upon his compliance, returned to him his driver's license and vehicle registration document. She also gave to him the warning citation, thanked him, and informed him, "The stop's complete." The appellant began walking...
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