State v. Garcia, 88020–4.

Citation318 P.3d 266,179 Wash.2d 828
Decision Date13 February 2014
Docket NumberNo. 88020–4.,88020–4.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Washington
PartiesSTATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Phillip Barrara GARCIA, Jr., Petitioner.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Nancy P. Collins, Washington Appellate Project, Seattle, WA, for Petitioners.

Richard Alan Weyrich, Skagit County Prosecutor, Erik Pedersen, Skagit County Prosecuting Atty., Attorney at Law, Skagit Co. Prosc. Atty. Ofc., Mount Vernon, WA, for Respondents.

WIGGINS, J.

¶ 1 Phillip Garcia Jr. challenges his convictions for kidnapping in the first degree, burglary in the second degree, and criminal trespass in the first degree. He argues that that there is insufficient evidence to support each of the alternative means of kidnapping presented to the jury, that the trial court violated his confrontation rights by limiting his cross-examination of an adverse witness, that the trial court erroneously admitted evidence of a prior crime of dishonesty, and that the prosecutor incorrectly defined “burglary” during closing arguments.

¶ 2 We reverse Garcia's convictions for kidnapping in the first degree because there is insufficient evidence to support each of the alternative means of kidnapping presented to the jury. We reverse his conviction for burglary in the second degree because of prejudicial trial error. We affirm his conviction for criminal trespass in the first degree because the errors were not prejudicial as to that conviction.

FACTS

¶ 3 On June 6, 2010, Garcia was convicted of burglary in the second degree, criminal trespass in the first degree, and kidnapping in the first degree with a deadly weapon enhancement. The convictions were based on the following testimony:

¶ 4 In the early morning of December 24, 2009, Garcia was cut off by three cars while driving near Sedro–Woolley. He heard two gunshots coming from the cars. Believing that the people in the cars were chasing him, he tried to escape. In the process, he hit a railway track, and the car became stuck. Garcia abandoned the car and a passenger on the tracks and ran. Eventually, he made it to a nearby Valero gas station. He testified that he thought the gas station would be open and that he could ask for help. However, the gas station's doors were locked. After trying to kick the doors open, Garcia picked up a cinder block and broke the glass door. Surveillance cameras showed him entering the store, turning around, and walking out, without going near the cash register or causing other property damage inside. Garcia testified that he walked out of the gas station after hearing an alarm because he had outstanding warrants and did not want to go to jail.

¶ 5 After leaving the gas station, he tried knocking on the door of a nearby house. The occupant would not open the door but spoke with him briefly through the door. Garcia told her that he needed help and that people were trying to kill him. When the occupant told him that she would call 911 but would not open the door, Garcia left.

¶ 6 He next ran to a mobile home park where Juliana Wilkins happened to be asleep on the sofa of her late father's home. Garcia saw the television on and entered the trailer through an unlocked door. It was 3:55 a.m. when Garcia tapped Wilkins on her upper thigh to wake her up. She had never seen Garcia before these events.

¶ 7 Garcia remained with Wilkins in the mobile home for around two hours. She testified that during that time he “was extremely agitated,” on “an adrenaline rush, very jumpy and out of breath.” She also testified that his “behavior was very unpredictable.”

¶ 8 The timeline of what happened inside the mobile home is not clear. There was testimony that Garcia sat in a chair five or six feet away from where Wilkins sat on the couch and the two talked. He explained his situation to Wilkins and asked her to give him a ride. She declined. He also made numerous telephone calls, trying to find someone else to pick him up. At some point during the two hours, Garcia grabbed a knife from the kitchen. He briefly held the knife two feet away from Wilkins. Otherwise, he kept the knife in his pocket. At trial, he explained that the knife was to protect himself and Wilkins from the people Garcia believed were after him.

¶ 9 During their conversations, they talked about their families, and Wilkins gave him advice. She told him that she had 10 children and hoped to go home to them. She testified that she desired to keep the situation calm, while Garcia testified that he felt like Wilkins was helping him and tagging along.

¶ 10 At one point, Garcia decided to leave without having found a ride. Wilkins walked him to the door and gave him a necklace with religious significance. Garcia, however, returned within moments. Eventually, he was able to find a friend who agreed to pick him up. This friend talked with Wilkins on the phone to get directions. As Garcia was leaving, he offered to give Wilkins back the necklace. She declined and hugged Garcia.

¶ 11 Wilkins testified that she was very, very terrified during the event. She believed that she might be killed, and her fear did not decline while Garcia was in the residence.

¶ 12 Before trial, the State filed a motion in limine to have all statements made by Garcia to others excluded as hearsay. The prosecutor argued that they were being offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, and argued at multiple times that Garcia was trying to get the statements into evidence without taking the stand. Defense counsel countered that the statements were necessary to give a complete picture of what happened in the mobile home and were important for determining Garcia's intent. The judge did not make a firm ruling as to the statements but said he would consider them objection by objection.

¶ 13 During trial, the court allowed the jury to know that Garcia had previously been convicted of felonies of dishonesty. The prosecutor used statements in a police report to establish that a previous burglary conviction involved intent to commit theft. During the prosecutor's closing argument, he told the jury that Garcia was guilty of burglary in the second degree if he intended to commit malicious mischief while throwing a cinder block into the Valero gas station.

¶ 14 Following the jury trial, Garcia was sentenced to 173 months of confinement. The Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions.

ANALYSIS

¶ 15 Garcia's kidnapping in the first degree and burglary in the second degree convictions are reversed and remanded for a new trial consistent with this opinion. The kidnapping conviction is reversed because there is insufficient evidence to support each of the three alternative means presented to the jury. The Court of Appeals also misinterpreted and misapplied the statutory elements of kidnapping in the first degree. The burglary conviction is reversed because the trial court erroneously admitted evidence of prior crimes of dishonesty. This error was prejudicial.

¶ 16 In the following discussion, we analyze whether there was sufficient evidence to support the kidnapping in the first degree conviction. We then address Garcia's argument that the trial court unjustifiably restricted his cross-examination of Wilkins. Finally, we analyze the trial court's admission of Garcia's prior convictions for crimes of dishonesty.

I. Insufficiency of evidence for the alternative means of kidnapping in the first degree presented to the jury

¶ 17 We reverse Garcia's conviction for kidnapping in the first degree and remand for new trial because there is insufficient evidence to support each alternative means of kidnapping in the jury instructions. When alternative means of committing a single offense are presented to a jury, each alternative means must be supported by substantial evidence in order to safeguard a defendant's right to a unanimous jury determination. State v. Smith, 159 Wash.2d 778, 783, 154 P.3d 873 (2007); see State v. Sweany, 174 Wash.2d 909, 914, 281 P.3d 305 (2012). On review, we view the “evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and determine whether any rational fact finder could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Engel, 166 Wash.2d 572, 576, 210 P.3d 1007 (2009). The three alternative means presented during Garcia's trial were intentionally abducting Wilkins with intent (a) to hold [her] as a shield or hostage, or (b) to facilitate the commission of Burglary in the Second Degree or flight thereafter, or (c) to inflict extreme mental distress on [her].” Jury Instruction 18; seeRCW 9A.40.020(1) (kidnapping in the first degree). Garcia also disputes the Court of Appeals' interpretation of the kidnapping elements. We first review statutory interpretation of the kidnapping elements de novo, and then determine whether there is sufficient evidence to support each alternative means. See Engel, 166 Wash.2d at 576, 210 P.3d 1007.

A. The shield and hostage prong of kidnapping in the first degree

¶ 18 The first alternative means of kidnapping in the first degree is to hold the victim as a shield or hostage. RCW 9A.40.020(1)(a). “Shield” and “hostage” are not defined in RCW 9A.40.020 or the accompanying provisions. And no clear interpretations have developed through our case law.

¶ 19 When determining the meaning of a statute, [t]he court's fundamental objective is to ascertain and carry out the legislature's intent.” In re Det. of Danforth, 173 Wash.2d 59, 67, 264 P.3d 783 (2011). “The legislature is presumed to intend the plain meaning of its language.” State v. Gibson, 16 Wash.App. 119, 127, 553 P.2d 131 (1976). “In determining the plain meaning of a provision, we look to the text of the statutory provision in question, as well as ‘the context of the statute in which that provision is found, related provisions, and the statutory scheme as a whole.’ State v. Ervin, 169 Wash.2d 815, 820, 239 P.3d 354 (2010) (quoting State v. Jacobs, 154 Wash.2d 596, 600, 115 P.3d 281 (2005))....

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