State v. Garcia
| Decision Date | 20 June 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 40544.,40544. |
| Citation | 326 P.3d 354 |
| Court | Idaho Court of Appeals |
| Parties | STATE of Idaho, v. Robert Javier GARCIA, Jr. |
STATE of Idaho,
v.
Robert Javier GARCIA, Jr.
No. 40544.
Court of Appeals of Idaho.
March 25, 2014.
Review Denied June 20, 2014.
[326 P.3d 355]
Sara B. Thomas, State Appellate Public Defender; Elizabeth A. Allred, Deputy Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Daphne J. Huang, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.
LANSING, Judge.
Robert Javier Garcia, Jr. appeals from his conviction for aiding and abetting delivery of methamphetamine. Garcia contends that the evidence was insufficient to convict and that the district court erred by granting the jury's request to have a portion of an informant's testimony read back to them after deliberations had begun. We affirm the sufficiency of the evidence, but vacate the conviction on the latter claim of error.
In June or July of 2010, an individual was arrested for felony possession of methamphetamine. In exchange for reduction of the charge to an unspecified misdemeanor, he agreed to cooperate with law enforcement in pursuit of drug distributors. In August 2010, this individual (hereinafter “informant”), at the behest of a Blaine County detective, telephoned Ricardo Vargas–Hurtado and arranged to buy one-eighth of an ounce of methamphetamine. The transaction was set to take place on August 25, 2010, at a Hailey, Idaho apartment building.
Before the appointed time for the meeting, the police outfitted the informant with an audio recording device and gave him $350 in marked bills, and four officers set up surveillance. As a result of the transaction that followed, Garcia was charged with aiding and abetting delivery of methamphetamine, Idaho Code §§ 37–2732(a)(1)(A), 18–204. The State alleged that Garcia delivered the methamphetamine to Jose Hurtado–Delatorre who in turn delivered it to the informant.
At Garcia's trial, the informant described events that occurred following his arrival to pick up the drugs at the arranged meeting with Vargas–Hurtado. The informant said that when he arrived, Vargas–Hurtado and Hurtado–Delatorre were outside on the front lawn. Hurtado–Delatorre made a phone call and told the informant that the methamphetamine
[326 P.3d 356]
would be there in about an hour. A short time later, defendant Garcia drove up in a white Mercedes SUV. The informant knew Garcia from previous encounters, but their conversation at the scene was limited to saying hello. Garcia and Hurtado–Delatorre spoke, but the informant was not privy to their conversation. After Garcia left, Hurtado–Delatorre told the informant that it would be about another half hour before the methamphetamine arrived. The informant gave Hurtado–Delatorre the buy money. Awhile later, Garcia again drove up. Hurtado–Delatorre went to Garcia's vehicle and spoke to him, but again the informant was not privy to their conversation. After Garcia left, Hurtado–Delatorre delivered the methamphetamine to the informant.
Following submission of the case to the jury, the jury asked that the informant's testimony on the State's direct examination be read back to them. The defense objected to the reading of only the informant's direct testimony, contending that the cross-examination should also be read because “a lot of the answers of the confidential informant changed or were significantly clarified by the cross-examination.” The district court overruled the defense objection, stating that it would not tell the jury what it wanted to rehear. The direct examination was then read in open court. The reading stopped about halfway through the direct examination when the jury informed the court that it had heard enough. The jury thereafter returned a verdict of guilty.
Following the verdict, Garcia renewed an earlier request for an Idaho Criminal Rule 29 judgment of acquittal on the ground that the evidence was insufficient to prove his guilt. The district court denied the motion. Garcia appeals, contending that the court erred in denying his motion for acquittal and in allowing a read-back of part of the informant's direct testimony without including the cross-examination.
A. Denial of I.C.R. 29 Motion for Judgment of Acquittal
Garcia first contends that because the evidence was insufficient to convict, the district court erred in denying his Idaho Criminal Rule 29 post-verdict motion for a judgment of acquittal. That rule mandates that a trial court enter a judgment of acquittal “if the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction of such offense or offenses.” I.C.R. 29(a). In ruling on Garcia's motion, the district court expressed its view that “this is a very, very, very, close case” and that a finding of guilt or innocence “turns on a razor's edge.” But, the court reasoned, “The jury [felt] there was proof beyond a reasonable doubt” and “in view of the jury's finding, I'm not willing to grant a motion for judgment of acquittal.”
Garcia first argues that the district court erred by deferring to the jury's verdict, thereby abdicating its duty to independently evaluate the evidence for sufficiency. If that is what occurred, then Garcia would be correct that it was error. If deference to the jury verdict resolved the matter, there would be no reason for the I.C.R. 29(c) authorization for post-verdict motions for a judgment of acquittal. However, whether the district court erred in this respect is not dispositive because on appeal this Court conducts a de novo review of the denial of a motion for a judgment of acquittal. We independently consider the evidence to determine whether a reasonable mind could conclude that the defendant's guilt as to each material element of the offense was proven beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Dietrich, 135 Idaho 870, 873, 26 P.3d 53, 56 (Ct.App.2001); State v. Kopsa, 126 Idaho 512, 521, 887 P.2d 57, 66 (Ct.App.1994); State v. Printz, 115 Idaho 566, 567, 768 P.2d 829, 830 (Ct.App.1989). In assessing the sufficiency of evidence, we will uphold a judgment of conviction entered upon a jury verdict so long as there is substantial evidence upon which a rational trier of fact could conclude that the prosecution proved all essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 712, 215 P.3d 414, 432 (2009). Evidence is substantial if a reasonable trier of fact would accept it and rely upon it in determining whether a disputed point of fact has been proven. Id.;
[326 P.3d 357]
State v. Tankovich, 155 Idaho 221, 228, 307 P.3d 1247, 1254 (Ct.App.2013). On appeal, this Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 286, 77 P.3d 956, 975 (2003). In assessing the sufficiency of evidence, we will not substitute our own judgment for that of the jury on matters such as the credibility of witnesses, the weight to be given to certain evidence, and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. Severson, 147 Idaho at 712, 215 P.3d at 432.
Garcia asserts that the trial evidence did not sufficiently show that he is the person who delivered methamphetamine to Hurtado–Delatorre. Garcia notes there was testimony showing that a number of people arrived and left during the time that the informant was present at the scene and that Hurtado–Delatorre left the scene in his car at one time and then returned. Garcia argues Hurtado–Delatorre could have obtained the drugs from any of the other people or when he left the scene or even, given the relatively small amount of the substance, from his pocket. The defense further notes, correctly, that this case was tried almost exclusively on the testimony of the informant, that the informant did not testify to any incriminating statements by Garcia, and that the informant admitted that he was not in a position to directly observe any exchange of money or drugs between Garcia and Hurtado–Delatorre. The defense further emphasizes that no buy money was ever recovered from Garcia and there was no evidence, independent of the informant's testimony, tending to show that Garcia delivered the drugs.
Sufficiency of the evidence, however, is determined from the evidence that was presented, not solely from the evidence that was absent. Applying our standards of review, we conclude that there was substantial circumstantial evidence upon which a rational trier of fact could find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Garcia delivered the drugs to Hurtado–Delatorre. The evidence showed that after Hurtado–Delatorre made a phone call and told the informant that the methamphetamine would be there in about an hour, Garcia arrived. He and Hurtado–Delatorre spoke. Soon after Garcia left, Hurtado–Delatorre told the informant that it would be about another half hour before the methamphetamine arrived. From this one can reasonably infer the Hurtado–Delatorre learned from Garcia that the delivery of the methamphetamine would be delayed. A short while later, Garcia again drove up and Hurtado–Delatorre went up to the...
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