State v. Gardiner
| Decision Date | 25 April 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. 2004-128-C.A.,2004-128-C.A. |
| Citation | 895 A.2d 703 |
| Parties | STATE v. Lionel R. GARDINER. |
| Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
Aaron L. Weisman, Providence, for Plaintiff.
Janice M. Weisfeld, Providence, Timothy P. Gumkowski, Office of the Public Defender, for Defendant.
Present: WILLIAMS, C.J., GOLDBERG, FLAHERTY, SUTTELL, and ROBINSON, JJ.
Justice FLAHERTY, for the Court with respect to the entire opinion, except for Part II-F. Justice GOLDBERG, for the Court with respect to Part II-F, from which Justice FLAHERTY dissents, while concurring in the judgment.
The defendant, Lionel R. Gardiner, appeals his conviction after a jury found him guilty of the first-degree sexual assault of a developmentally disabled woman at the KG Ranch Group Home in Hope Valley, Rhode Island. Gardiner argues that the trial justice improperly vouched for the testimony of the complaining witness Jane.1 He further contends that the trial justice erred when he excluded certain evidence and incorrectly instructed the jury. For the reasons set forth herein, we deny the defendant's appeal and affirm the judgment of conviction.
The events leading to Gardiner's conviction began in 1995, while defendant was employed as a community-living aide at the KG Ranch Group Home. Jane, a developmentally disabled adult woman with an IQ of approximately fifty-five, began residing at KG Ranch in September 1995, after she was relocated from another state-run home where she had been placed after her father had died and her mother no longer was able to care for her.2
Brenda Fugere was the group home manager at KG Ranch when Jane arrived in 1995. At trial, Fugere testified that Jane had a lot of "emotional problems" and that she had a habit of making false accusations. This testimony was buttressed by nurse Judith Mendelsohn, who testified that Jane had accused Fugere of kicking and bruising her. Mendelsohn knew this accusation to be false, however, because she personally had examined Jane when she arrived, and the bruise in question was present at that time. Jane also reported that a male patient had touched her in her genital area, even though he was "nowhere near [Jane]" when the alleged incident occurred. Because of these accusations, Fugere warned staff members to be careful around Jane.
Fugere also testified that in the fall of 1995, Gardiner reported to her that Jane was referring to him as her "boyfriend," even though he said he discouraged her from doing so. In October 1995, Jane complained to a friend that Gardiner "had taken his thing [i.e., his penis] and put it in her mouth." This information was reported to the state police, but Jane later recanted the story and said that she had lied.3
Approximately six months later, in April 1996, Fugere learned from two community-living aides, Patricia Levine Burdick and Richard Driscoll, that Jane had again complained of sexual contact with defendant. This time, Jane related that Gardiner had had sexual contact with her in the boiler room of KG Ranch and that Gardiner had "touched her in the butt." When Fugere spoke with Jane about this allegation, she was told that Driscoll would know about the incident because he had walked in on them as the incident was occurring.
At trial, Driscoll testified that he had, in fact, witnessed the incident in the boiler room. He explained that on a Sunday in the fall of 1995, he and Gardiner were on duty at KG Ranch. Driscoll was preparing to take some of the residents to church, and he wanted to tell Gardiner that he was leaving the premises. At first he could not find Gardiner, so he ventured around the property until he noticed that the entrance to the boiler room was ajar. This piqued Driscoll's curiosity because that door usually was closed. When he opened the door, he saw Jane bent over a chair with Gardiner standing directly behind her, both of them with their pants down. "You got to be f'ing kidding me," Driscoll said, as he turned and walked away.
Despite his shock, Driscoll did not report the incident right away, even though it was required protocol that he do so. Because he feared that his failure to promptly report the incident would result in the loss of his job, he did not tell anyone what he had witnessed until months later, when he confided in one of his coworkers, Patricia Levine Burdick. Neither he nor Burdick reported the incident at that time, and it remained secret until Jane herself came forward with allegations of abuse on April 26, 1996.
On that day, Driscoll and Burdick had driven Jane to a dental appointment. As they were returning home, Jane began crying, "why did [Gardiner] have to do that to me; why did he have to touch me there?" When they arrived back at KG Ranch, Driscoll prepared a written statement describing what Jane said, but he still did not reveal that he personally had witnessed the boiler-room incident. In light of the fact that the police had dismissed their investigation of Jane's previous allegation against Gardiner, Driscoll felt it was necessary to "pad" his statement to make it more believable, so in addition to the boiler-room incident, he falsely reported that Jane also had complained of being abused in her bedroom.4
Also on April 26, 1996, Burdick informed Fugere, the KG Ranch manager, that she ought to speak with Jane. When Fugere and Jane spoke, Jane led her to the boiler room and described the events. She showed Fugere where the chair had been positioned, and said that "he [Gardiner] had put his thing in her behind." Fugere sought to clarify what "his thing" meant, and Jane said, "the thing that he goes pee with."
A formal investigation ensued, during which a doctor examined Jane, but he found no signs of trauma or penetration.5 Given the lack of corroboration, the lack of physical evidence, and Jane's history of false accusations, no further action was taken at that time. However, months later, in the fall of 1996, Driscoll finally came forward and told a fellow employee, Robert Hayward, about what he had witnessed in the boiler room at KG Ranch. After Hayward reported the incident,6 a criminal investigation ensued, which ultimately led to charges of sexual assault against Gardiner.
In May 2002, an indictment charged Gardiner with one count of first-degree sexual assault, occurring sometime between September 13, 1995, and April 26, 1996, and alleging that he had penetrated Jane "by force and coercion and knowing or having reason to know that the victim was mentally disabled, in violation of [G.L 1956] § 11-37-2 and § 11-37-3."7 After a six-day trial, a jury returned a guilty verdict on June 26, 2003. The defendant timely appealed.
On appeal, Gardiner argues that the trial justice committed several errors that warrant reversal of his conviction. First, he contends that the trial justice committed serious error when, in response to a question by Jane during her testimony, he told her that she was "doing fine." Second, he says that the trial justice improperly excluded evidence that Jane previously had made false allegations of physical abuse. Third, Gardiner maintains that the state failed to provide expert testimony with respect to Jane's mental condition, thus warranting acquittal on the charge that he sexually assaulted a mentally disabled person in violation of G.L.1956 § 11-37-2. Fourth, Gardiner argues that it was improper for the justice to give the jury an expert-witness instruction because there was no expert testimony at trial and, additionally, that the justice's instruction improperly vested the jury with the responsibility of determining whether one of the state's witnesses qualified as an expert. Fifth, Gardiner urges that the trial justice abused his discretion by refusing to allow a nurse's testimony that Jane was capable of consenting to sex. Finally, he asserts that it was improper for the trial justice to instruct the jury that it could find him guilty if they found that he had used threats to force Jane's sexual submission because no evidence of threats was presented at trial.
We consider each of these arguments below.
Gardiner argues that the trial justice improperly vouched for Jane's credibility when, just before a break in her testimony, she sought assurances from the judge, and he told her in the presence of the jury that she was "doing fine." The defendant argues that this remark prejudiced him because it was an improper endorsement of a key witness's testimony. Therefore, argues Gardiner, the trial justice erred when he denied his motion for a mistrial. The remark at issue took place during the following colloquy between the judge and Jane:
After the witness left the courtroom, the trial justice immediately instructed the jury sua sponte as follows:
Gardiner claims that this instruction was insufficient to cure the justice's comment that...
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