State v. Garnett

• Decision Date: 29 May 1992
• Docket Number: No. 17677,17677
• Citation: 488 N.W.2d 695
• Parties: STATE of South Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Jason GARNETT, Defendant and Appellant. . Considered on Briefs
• Court: South Dakota Supreme Court

Page 695

488 N.W.2d 695

STATE of South Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Jason GARNETT, Defendant and Appellant.

No. 17677.

Supreme Court of South Dakota.

Considered on Briefs May 29, 1992.

Decided Aug. 19, 1992.

Mark Barnett, Atty. Gen., Frank Geaghan, Asst. Atty. Gen., Pierre, for plaintiff and appellee.

David R. Wurm of Pennington County Public Defender's Office, Rapid City, for defendant and appellant.

MILLER, Chief Justice.

Jason Garnett (Garnett) appeals his judgment of conviction for burglary. We affirm in part and reverse and remand in part.

FACTS

Garnett, Chris Zoss and Rick Woehler broke into the Arc Thrift Store in Rapid City while trying to burglarize the First Stop Gun and Pawn Shop. Garnett and Woehler entered the pawn shop while Zoss waited on the roof as a lookout. They tripped an alarm to which law enforcement officers responded. The building was soon surrounded and Garnett gave himself up almost immediately. Woehler hid in the building. Since the pawn shop was known to contain guns, the law enforcement officers surrounded the building and waited for Woehler to surrender. He finally gave up after several hours.

Garnett was charged with two counts of third degree burglary. He moved to dismiss both counts of the information on the grounds that they did not describe a public offense. The trial court denied his motion. State later dismissed the second count from the information. The remaining count (Count I) read:

That on or about the 25th day of May, 1991, in the County of Pennington, State of South Dakota, JASON GARNETT did commit the public offense of THIRD DEGREE BURGLARY in that he did then and there feloniously did (sic) enter or remain in an unoccupied structure, to-wit: First Stop Gun, with intent to commit a crime therein, theft, in violation of SDCL 22-32-8,.... (underline added)

Garnett filed a motion with the trial court to compel the prosecution to amend the language in the information to parallel that in SDCL 22-32-8. The trial court denied the motion.

During voir dire, Garnett's attorney asked the entire prospective juror panel if any of them had been a victim of crime. Several prospective jurors said they had been victims of crime. Garnett's defense attorney David Wurm asked each of those prospective jurors further questions about the nature of the crimes committed against them. He eventually questioned Mrs. Burmeister.

Burmeister: I had a ring stolen a couple years ago which I recovered from a pawn shop and dropped the charges against the young man.

Wurm: You dropped the charges?

Burmeister: Yeah.

Wurm: You're uncomfortable, then, about that?

Burmeister: Well--.

Wurm: You have some reservations?

Burmeister: I guess my problem is this, there was an acquaintance of my son's and I don't remember the young man's name, but it was Jason.

The trial court immediately had a conference with the attorneys and Mrs. Burmeister outside the presence of the jury. Mr. Wurm asked Mrs. Burmeister if she meant the boy was Jason Garnett.

Burmeister: I am not sure.

Wurm: Are you saying that?

Burmeister: I guess if I knew, if he could answer to me particular friends, then, I would be sure.

Wurm: You think it is though?

Burmeister: I think it is, yes.

Mrs. Burmeister said she recognized Garnett's face. The trial judge excused Mrs. Burmeister from the prospective jury panel. Garnett moved for a mistrial. The prosecutor contended that the prospective jury panel had not been contaminated. The trial court decided to admonish the remaining prospective jurors and suggested that the defense should make a more in-depth inquiry during voir dire to uncover any prejudicial effects from Mrs. Burmeister's remarks. The trial court reconvened open court and admonished the prospective jurors to disregard Mrs. Burmeister's remarks. Voir dire was completed and the case proceeded to trial.

The jury found Garnett guilty of burglary as charged in count I of the information. The trial court sentenced Garnett to six years in the penitentiary and ordered him to pay restitution of $3,412.48. Of that amount, $1,085 was restitution for damages and lost business to the Arc Thrift Shop and First Stop Pawn. The remaining $2,326.48 was to be paid to Pennington County for overtime compensation to law enforcement officers involved in the arrest of Garnett and his companions. (The trial court's restitution total is inaccurate by one dollar). Garnett appeals and raises three issues.

DECISION

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO DISMISS THE INFORMATION.

The decision to deny a motion to dismiss an indictment is in the discretion of the trial court and will only be reversed if there has been an abuse of discretion. State v. Kleinsasser, 436 N.W.2d 279, 281 (S.D.1989).

Garnett was charged under SDCL 22-32-8, which provides:

Any person who enters an unoccupied structure, with intent to commit any crime other than the act of shoplifting or retail theft as described in chapter 22-30A constituting a misdemeanor, or remains in an unoccupied structure after forming the intent to commit any crime other than shoplifting as described in chapter 22-30A constituting a misdemeanor, is guilty of third degree burglary. Third degree burglary is a Class 4 felony. (emphasis added)

Garnett wanted the information dismissed because it did not contain the language excluding shoplifting and retail theft from the list of intended underlying crimes.

It is not necessary for an information to quote the exact language contained in a statute. SDCL 23A-6-17. All that is necessary is that the information apprises the defendant of the charge against him and enables him to plead an acquittal of the conviction to bar future prosecutions. Kleinsasser, 436 N.W.2d at 281; State v. Loop, 422 N.W.2d 420 (S.D.1988). See also SDCL 23A-6-7(5).

The information specified the crime and explicitly set forth the statute under which Garnett was charged. Moreover, the language in the information specifies that Garnett entered the building with the intent to commit the crime of theft. In other words, the prosecutor undertook the added burden to prove that Garnett entered the building with the intent to commit the crime of theft. Garnett clearly knew the offense with which he was charged. See State v. Wilson, 297 N.W.2d 477 (S.D.1980); State v. Hansen, 407 N.W.2d 217 (S.D.1987) (failure to specify ulterior crime was not reversible error).

Where the information explicitly cited the criminal statute by number, Garnett cannot legitimately claim he is not protected from subsequent prosecution for the same criminal acts (double jeopardy). ^* We affirm the trial court's denial of the motion to dismiss the information.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO DECLARE A MISTRIAL.

Garnett argues that he was denied his constitutional right to an impartial jury because of Mrs. Burmeister's remarks. See U.S. Const., amend VI; S.D. Const., art. VI, Sec. 7. A trial court's decision to deny a motion for mistrial will only be reversed if the decision was an abuse of discretion. State v. Bogenreif, 465 N.W.2d 777 (S.D.1991); State v. Blalack, 434 N.W.2d 55 (S.D.1988); State v. McDowell, 349 N.W.2d 450 (S.D.1984). See also State v. Younger, 453 N.W.2d 834 (S.D.1990) (trial judge was in a superior position to evaluate the prejudicial effect of testimony).

There should be an actual showing of prejudice before a mistrial is granted. State v. Clabaugh, 346 N.W.2d 448 (S.D.1984). Garnett has not shown that he was prejudiced by Mrs. Burmeister's remarks. Her comments heard by the other jurors were, at best, vague. Moreover, her comments did not directly relate to the charges against Garnett in this case. The trial judge excused Mrs. Burmeister and admonished the prospective jurors to disregard her comments. Perhaps most important, voir dire continued and Garnett's counsel had the opportunity to question the prospective jurors to discover any prejudice. See State v. Young, 469 So.2d 1014, 1019 (La.Ct.App.1985) (entire juror panel did not need to be dismissed where voir dire could not uncover any prejudice). Garnett has not argued that actual prejudice was found during the continuing voir dire. Thus, Garnett has simply not shown any actual prejudice he suffered because of Mrs. Burmeister's comments.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion for mistrial.

THE TRIAL COURT'S RESTITUTION ORDER WAS PARTIALLY ERRONEOUS.

The trial court ordered Garnett to make restitution for damage and lost business caused to the stores he and his companions burglarized. The trial court also ordered Garnett to make restitution to Pennington County for overtime paid to officers called out to apprehend Garnett and his companions.

Garnett argues that he was not responsible for the lost business caused to the burglarized stores. He claims Woehler was responsible for the lost business because he remained hidden in the store for several hours after Garnett surrendered.

Garnett was found guilty of breaking into the stores. The loss of business was a direct result of the break-in. He waived a hearing on the amount of restitution to be paid to the businesses. See State v. Tuttle, 460 N.W.2d 157 (S.D.1990) (defendant is entitled to a hearing on restitution). Therefore, he did not offer the trial court any evidence to prove that the stores would have lost less business but for Woehler's delay in surrendering. Since Garnett did not dispute the amount of damage and lost business when he had the opportunity, the trial court did not err in ordering Garnett to make restitution for those amounts. That portion of the restitution order is affirmed.

Garnett contends that he may not be ordered to pay Pennington County for overtime for the police officers. The restitution statutes only authorize the trial court to order restitution to "victims." State v. No Neck, 458 N.W.2d 364 (S.D.1990). A victim is defined as "any person, ... who has suffered...