State v. Garzell Plastics Industries

• Decision Date: 28 June 1957
• Docket Number: No. 16469.,16469.
• Citation: 152 F. Supp. 483
• Parties: STATE OF MARYLAND for the use and benefit of Elsie C. WOODZELL, Barbara Ann Woodzell, and Alice Jane Edwards, Elsie C. Woodzell, Executor of the Last Will and Testament of Peyton C. Woodzell, Deceased, Plaintiffs, v. GARZELL PLASTICS INDUSTRIES, Inc., a Michigan corporation, Arena Craft Corp., a Michigan corporation, and Dan Arena, individually and d/b/a Dan Arena Company, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Michigan

152 F. Supp. 483

STATE OF MARYLAND for the use and benefit of Elsie C. WOODZELL, Barbara Ann Woodzell, and Alice Jane Edwards, Elsie C. Woodzell, Executor of the Last Will and Testament of Peyton C. Woodzell, Deceased, Plaintiffs, v. GARZELL PLASTICS INDUSTRIES, Inc., a Michigan corporation, Arena Craft Corp., a Michigan corporation, and Dan Arena, individually and d/b/a Dan Arena Company, Defendants.

No. 16469.

United States District Court E. D. Michigan, S. D.

June 28, 1957.

Cary & BeGole, Detroit, Mich., for plaintiffs.

John F. Noonan, R. E. Rutt, Foster, Meadows & Ballard, Detroit, Mich., for defendants.

LEDERLE, Chief Judge.

This is an action to recover for the wrongful death of Peyton C. Woodzell, who was drowned when the boat which he had purchased from agents of defendants, Arena and Arena Craft Corp., broke apart in the Potomac River. The complaint alleges that the hull of this boat was negligently made by defendant Garzell Plastics Industries, Inc., and that it was the hull which broke causing the boat to sink. Garzell Plastics Industries, Inc. (hereinafter called Garzell) has moved to dismiss the action as to it on the ground that, under applicable Maryland law, it could not be liable to the plaintiffs in the circumstances presented.

This motion raises the familiar and troublesome question of a manufacturer's duty of care to a remote vendee. Since the Maryland decisions on the problem are not entirely clear, a brief review of the principles involved seems in order.

It would seem that on the ordinary principles of negligence that a manufacturer would have a duty of care to all those who may come into contact with his product if he must know that the article will be dangerous if not carefully made. However, in Winterbottom v. Wright, 152 Eng.Reprint 402 (1842), it was held that one who had contracted with the Postmaster General to supply mail coaches and to keep them in a fit, proper and safe condition, could not be held liable to one who was injured when one of these coaches broke down. Since the plaintiff was attempting to rely on the contract between the defendant and the Postmaster General, the court's objection that plaintiff was a stranger to that contract had some merit. The court stated that the only safe rule in such cases was to confine the right to recover to those who were parties to the contract.

Disregarding the actual facts of this case and the nature of the holding, many courts quickly applied it as authority for the proposition that manufacturers could not be held liable for negligence in the making of their goods except to their immediate vendees. This rule developed despite the fact that it had never before been the law that there must be a contract involved before there can be liability for negligence.

Almost as soon as this so-called general rule of nonliability was recognized, its obvious injustice led to the creation of "exceptions."

The most important of these exceptions can be traced to Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397, in which a manufacturing druggist was held liable for damages resulting from his negligence in putting the label of a harmless medicine on a bottle of deadly poison. It was said that the general rule of nonliability did not apply to products which were inherently dangerous to human life. This exception to the so-called general rule was later extended and applied to a wide variety of products, such as poisons, drugs, guns, explosives, and subsequently to articles of foodstuffs.

The final extension of this "dangerous instrumentality exception" came in the celebrated decision of Justice Cardozo in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Company, 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050, L.R.A. 1916F, 696. In that case, the court held that an automobile manufacturer was liable for negligence to a remote vendee, who was injured when a wheel of the car in which he was riding broke down causing a collision. The evidence indicated that even though the wheel was not made by the defendant manufacturer, it was defective when made and the defect in it could have been discovered by the automobile manufacturer on due inspection. Justice Cardozo did not attempt to eliminate the use of the phrase "inherently dangerous," rather, he vastly widened the scope of that phrase by holding that it applied to any article which may be foreseen to result in injury to anyone properly using it if the article has been defectively made.

In Carter v. Yardley & Co., 1946, 319 Mass. 92, 64 N.E.2d 693, 164 A.L.R. 559, plaintiff was injured by the application of some perfume which was manufactured by the defendant and purchased from an independent retailer. The court, in reversing a judgment for the defendant, held that there was sufficient evidence of negligence and causation and that a manufacturer could be held liable in those circumstances. The court in so doing noted that the doctrine of the MacPherson case is now generally accepted.

"Its acceptance has brought all dangerous things into the same class as the `inherently dangerous' things to which the principle already stated has always been applied. The MacPherson case caused the exception to swallow the asserted general rule of nonliability, leaving nothing upon which that rule could operate. Wherever that case is accepted, that rule in truth is abolished, and ceases to be part of the law. * * * The time has come for us to recognize that that asserted general rule no longer exists. In principle it was unsound. It tended to produce unjust results. It has been abandoned by the great weight of authority elsewhere. We now abandon it in this commonwealth." 64 N.E.2d 693, at page 700, 164 A.L.R. 559, at page 568.

Winterbottom v. Wright has been unable to withstand...