State v. Gasperavich, 45657.

CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Iowa
Writing for the CourtHALE, Justice.
Citation300 N.W. 638,231 Iowa 11
Docket Number45657.
Decision Date18 November 1941

300 N.W. 638

231 Iowa 11


No. 45657.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

November 18, 1941

Appeal from District Court, Polk County; Joseph E. Meyer, Judge.

Defendant was indicted for lascivious acts with a child. She entered a plea of not guilty, and on trial was convicted and sentenced to imprisonment.


Carl E. Patterson, of Des Moines, for appellant.

John M. Rankin, Atty. Gen., Jens Grothe, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Walter Selvy, Asst. Co. Atty., of Des Moines, for appellee.

HALE, Justice.

The defendant was indicted for the commission of lewd acts with a child, under section 13184, 1939 Code of Iowa, the indictment charging that such acts were committed with a boy under sixteen years of age. The defendant is a married woman, about forty-two years of age, living in Des Moines, and the criminal acts with which she is charged occurred in November, 1940. Such acts involved not only the prosecuting witness but other boys ranging in age from thirteen to eighteen years. It is not necessary to set out the evidence in relation to the alleged crime [300 N.W. 639] of which defendant was found guilty. Motion for directed verdict was made by defendant and overruled, and after verdict defendant filed a motion for a new trial, alleging twenty-three grounds, only two of which, however, are urged or argued in this court. Judgment was entered on the verdict and defendant sentenced to imprisonment and she appeals.

The first ground argued is the court's failure to sustain defendant's motion to strike the testimony of another boy witness as to acts committed by the defendant at a time when the prosecuting witness was not present. Defendant argues that this was evidence of a separate and distinct crime, not related to the crime charged. Even if this were true, which we doubt, inasmuch as the act complained of was connected with other conduct, evidence of which was properly admitted, still defendant cannot claim error. Nowhere in the testimony of the witness did the State prove or attempt to prove any act of this witness at a time when the prosecuting witness was not present. No objection was made to the testimony of this witness on his examination by the State. The only reference to the other occasion was on cross-examination of the witness, and all the testimony complained of was introduced by the defendant in the course of such cross-examination. A general motion to strike the testimony of this witness was made by...

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