State v. Gee, 10429

Citation93 Idaho 636,470 P.2d 296
Decision Date25 May 1970
Docket NumberNo. 10429,10429
PartiesSTATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Monte Earl GEE, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Idaho

Lawrence H. Duffin, and Herman E. Bedke, Burley, for defendant-appellant.

Robert M. Robson, Atty. Gen., Dwight V. Board, Asst. Atty. Gen., Boise, Gordon S. Nielson, Pros. Atty., Gurley, for plaintiff-respondent.

DONALDSON, Justice.

Monte Earl Gee (defendant-appellant), also known as Junior McLaws, was charged by an information with having committed the crime of statutory rape 1 upon Evelyn Burke, age 16, on or about November 23, 1968, at the home of Reed Burke (father of the prosecutrix) located in Oakley, Idaho.

Evelyn Burke, the prosecutrix, testified as follows: that the act of intercourse occurred on Saturday, November 23, 1968, at about 1:00 P.M., in a bedroom of her father's house. During the act, the complaining witness heard her father enter the house. She got dressed and went out of the bedroom but did not say anything to her father. The father then went out of the house and the defendant left. The father then returned but again the complaining witness did not tell her father what had happened to her just a few moments before because 'she was afraid.' However the prosecutrix testified that she did tell her mother three days later about the incident. The prosecutrix first denied, but then admitted, having sexual intercourse on four other occasions with the defendant. This testimony was objected to by defense counsel, but the objection was overruled by the trial court on the ground that the testimony showed 'the whole scheme of facts surrounding the circumstance.'

The father testified that he remembered a day when he saw a two-tone light green Cadillac with a white top bearing '2M' plates (allegedly owned or driven by the defendant 2) parked outside the house on the date when the act allegedly took place. He entered the house and saw his daughter as she was coming out of the bedroom. The father asked his daughter, 'is he here?' and the daughter replied, 'No.' The father then left and upon his return saw the green and white Cadillac drive off.

The brother and father of the defendant testified that on November 23, 1968 (the day of the alleged rape), the defendant arrived at their home in Oakley at 9:30 A.M., and didn't leave until 'after dark' that evening (they watched television programs all day).

Subsequent to trial the jury returned a verdict of guilty and the defendant, Monte Earl Gee was sentenced to the Idaho State Penitentiary for a period not to exceed 5 years.

Monte Earl Gee has appealed to the Supreme Court from the judgment of conviction and from the order of the district court denying his application for a new trial.

Appellant's principal specification of error concerns the failure of the trial court to grant his motion for a new trial. Appellant asserts that he is entitled to a new trial because the evidence was insufficient (insufficient corroboration of the prosecutrix' testimony) to sustain the verdict.

It has long been a rule of this Court that a defendant may be convicted of statutory rape on the uncorroborated testimony of the prosecutrix. 3 However when this rule is applied, three auxiliary criteria must be satisfied, viz., (1) the character of the prosecutrix for truth must remain unimpeached; 4 (2) her character for chastity must remain unimpeached and (3) the circumstances surrounding the offense must be clearly corroborative of the statements of the prosecutrix. Applying these three criteria to the record in this appeal it is apparent that each of them has been satisfied. Although the record reveals that the prosecutrix was slightly confused when responding to questions posed to her, her reputation for truth was not attacked, nor was her reputation for chastity. As a general rule, a chaste female has been defined as an unmarried woman who has had no carnal knowledge of men. Black's Law Dictionary, Rev. 4 ed., p. 299 (1968).

Although the Idaho statute pursuant to which Monte Earl Gee was prosecuted makes no reference to the chaste character of the prosecutrix, and her chastity is completely irrelevant as is the issue of her consent for purposes of proving the necessary elements of the crime of statutory rape pursuant to I.C. § 18-6105, 5 the issue of the prosecutrix' chastity becomes relevant with respect to the quantum of corroboration which is necessary to support the testimony of the prosecutrix.

The record indicates that the prosecutrix engaged in sexual intercourse with the accused before the date of November 23, 1968. 6 The question then to be decided is whether or not the prior sexual relations which were engaged in by the prosecutrix and the accused will defeat the status of 'chastity' attributable to the prosecutrix. We emphasize again that where the character of the prosecutrix for chastity is unimpeached, a conviction for statutory rape may be had on the uncorroborated testimony of the prosecutrix provided that the circumstances surrounding the offense are clearly corroborative of the prosecutrix' statements and provided that her reputation for truthfulness remains unimpeached. In jurisdictions where the victim of statutory rape must be 'of previous chaste character' it has been held that prior acts of sexual intercourse between the accused and the prosecutrix would not defeat her claim to chastity. 7 This is so because, '* * * defendant, being the author of the child's defilement, is precluded from taking advantage of his previous wrongdoing to avoid the application of the statute.' Castleberry v. State, supra, at 507, 136.

In the case at bar, the record is devoid of evidence tending to show that the prosecutrix was of unchaste character prior to engaging in sexual relations with the accused. Therefore her reputation for chastity remained unimpeached. In the opinion of this Court prior acts of intercourse between the prosecutrix and an accused will not defeat her claim of chastity for purposes of obviating the necessity of corroboration for her statements provided that the two other criteria heretofore enumerated are fulfilled. 8

We now will examine the circumstances surrounding the offense for the purpose of determining whether or not they clearly corroborate the testimony of the prosecutrix. The record reveals that both the father and sister of the prosecutrix testified that the accused and the prosecutrix were in each other's company on numerous occasions for about a month preceding the date of the offense (on or about November 23, 1968). Furthermore, the record indicates that Dr. Annest, the prosecutrix' physician, testified that an examination revealed (1) that his patient skipped her menstrual periods for the months of November, December, and January; (2) the patient's uterus was enlarged; (3) the patient had a marital type of introcoitus vagina; and that the prosecutrix was probably pregnant. Laboratory tests were subsequently made which confirmed the physical examination previously made by Dr. Annest. Dr. Annest further testified that it was possible for the girl to have conceived after November 1, 1968. The evidence indicates that the accused was often in the company of the prosecutrix during the period within which sonception must have occurred. There is also testimony that the prosecutrix did not date anyone else while she was going out with the defendant. This is corroborative of her direct testimony that he had unlawful relations with her. State v. Mason, 41 Idaho 506, 239 P. 733 (1925). Furthermore testimony was given by both the mother and father of the prosecutrix which tend to confirm the conclusion that she had sexual intercourse with the defendant on or about November 23, 1968. 9

The record reveals sharply conflicting testimony as to the whereabouts of the accused at the time of the commission of the rape. The father and brother of the accused testified that he spent the day with them watching television. There was also testimony indicating that Gee did not drive the green and white Cadillac (the vehicle which the father of the prosecutrix saw parked outside the house on the day of the rape) until several days after the rape. 10 The mere fact that the testimony of witnesses in a case is sharply conflicting only raises questions as to the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony. These are matters which are exclusively for the jury to determine. State v. Gailey, supra; State v. Blacksten, 86 Idaho 401, 387 P.2d 467 (1963); I.C. § 9-201. 11

In view of all these circumstances which support the prosecutrix' testimony it cannot be said that the evidence was insufficient...

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4 cases
  • State v. Hatton
    • United States
    • Idaho Supreme Court
    • April 9, 1974
    ...failure to give a limiting instruction is not in itself reversible error where such an instruction is not requested. State v. Gee, 93 Idaho 636, 640, 470 P.2d 296 (1970); Wahlgreen v. State, 486 P.2d 753 (Okl.Cr.1971); Johnson v. People, 174 Colo. 413, 484 P.2d 110 (1971); Parish v. State, ......
  • State v. Adair
    • United States
    • Idaho Supreme Court
    • December 15, 1978
    ...and the weight to be given to their testimony. These are matters which are exclusively for the jury to determine. State v. Gee, 93 Idaho 636, 639, 470 P.2d 296, 299 (1970). The remainder of Adair's corroboration argument amounts to a contention that the State is required to prove its case i......
  • State v. Kay
    • United States
    • Idaho Court of Appeals
    • May 28, 1985
    ...and the weight to be given to their testimony. These are matters which are exclusively for the jury to determine. State v. Gee, 93 Idaho 636, 470 P.2d 296 (1970). We have reviewed the transcript of the trial and conclude that the trial court was correct in denying Kay's motion in light of t......
  • State v. Goodrick
    • United States
    • Idaho Supreme Court
    • March 1, 1974
    ...not only pointing to direct testimony of other witnesses, but also certain physical evidence admitted as exhibits. In State V. Gee, 93 Idaho 636, 470 P.2d 296 (1970), the court again discussed the rule concerning corroboration of the testimony of a prosecutrix in a rape case. There the cour......

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