State v. Geer
Decision Date | 26 October 1891 |
Citation | 61 Conn. 144,22 A. 1012 |
Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
Parties | STATE v. GEER. |
Appeal from criminal court of common pleas, New Loudon county; Crump, Judge.
Edgar M. Geer was convicted of violation of the game law, and he appeals. Affirmed.
R. Wheeler and H. A. Hull, for appellant.
Solomon Lucas, for the State.
The General Statutes (section 2530) provide that "every person who shall buy, sell, expose for sale, or have in his possession for any purpose, or who shall hunt, pursue, kill, destroy, or attempt to kill, any woodcock, quail, ruffled grouse, called 'partridge,' or gray squirrel, between the first day of January and the first day of October, the killing or having possession of each bird or squirrel to be deemed a separate offense, *** shall be fined not more than twenty-five dollars," etc. Section 2546 provides that "no person shall at any time kill any woodcock, ruffled grouse, or quail for the purpose of conveying the same beyond the limits of the state; or shall transport, or have in possession with intent to procure the transportation, beyond said limits, any of such birds killed within this state. The reception by any person within this state of any such bird or birds for shipment to a point without the state shall be prima-$$$
facie evidence that said bird or birds were killed within the state for the purpose of conveying the same beyond its limits." The defendant is prosecuted for unlawfully receiving and having in his possession, on the 19th day of October, A. D. 1889, with force and arras, and with the unlawful intent to procure the transportation beyond the limits of this state, certain woodcock, ruffled grouse, and quail, killed within this state after the 1st day of October, A. D. 1889, against the peace, and contrary to the form of the statute. He demurred to the complaint because (1) the allegations contained therein do not constitute any offense in law; (2) because in the complaint it is not alleged that said birds were killed for the purpose of conveying the same beyod the limits of the state.
It will be seen from the section of the statute above quoted that it is unlawful to kill or have in possession for any purpose, woodcock, quail, or ruffled grouse, between the 1st days of January and October, and that it is unlawful to kill them at any time for the purpose of conveying them out of the state. Is it also unlawful to have them in possession with intent to procure their transportation beyond the limits of the state, if killed between the 1st day of October and the 1st flay of January, regardless of the question whether they were killed for the purpose of conveying them out of the state? In other words, if they were lawfully killed,—i. e., between October 1st and January 1st, and without any intention of conveying them out of the state,—can they be lawfully held with the intent to procure their transportation beyond the limits of the state? In 1882 an act was passed as follows: Pub. Acts 1882, c. 102. It is evident that under the act as originally passed the complaint would have been good and sufficient. It is claimed by the defendant that under the act as revised no offense is committed unless the birds, by him held for transportation, were killed for the purpose of being conveyed beyond the limits of the state. He says that the word "such" in the provision of section 2546 against transporting, or having in possession with intent to procure the transportation, beyond said limits, any of such birds, killed within the state, means woodcock, ruffled grouse, or quail, killed for the purpose of conveying the same beyond the limits of the state. As already suggested, that construction involves a change in the law from the original act, which expressly forbade any person to have in his possession, with the intention to procure the same to be transported beyond the limits of the state, any woodcock, ruffled grouse, or quail killed within the state. It seems to us evident, also, upon the face of the statute as revised, that the word "such" was used only to obviate the necessity of repeating the words "woodcock, ruffled grouse, or quail," and that to carry its force and operation further, so as to include the purpose...
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...'Sixth. In not rendering judgment for defendant.' In the supreme court the conviction was affirmed. The case is reported in 61 Conn. 144, 22 Atl. 1012, and to this judgment of affirmance, this writ of error is Mr. Justice Field and Mr. Justice Harlan dissenting. H. A. Hull, for plaintiff in......