State v. Gefroh
Citation | 458 N.W.2d 479 |
Decision Date | 03 July 1990 |
Docket Number | Cr. N |
Parties | STATE of North Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Gerald GEFROH, Defendant and Appellant. o. 890274. |
Court | United States State Supreme Court of North Dakota |
Lyle Gregory Witham (argued), States Atty., Towner, for plaintiff and appellee.
Laura J. Wetsch (argued), Fleming, DuBois & Trenbeath, Langdon, for defendant and appellant.
Gerald Gefroh appeals from a judgment and commitment upon revocation of probation. We affirm.
On February 4, 1987, judgment was entered on Gefroh's plea of guilty to Burglary, a class C felony with a maximum penalty of imprisonment for five years, a fine of $5,000, or both. The court sentenced Gefroh to imprisonment for two years and provided:
On May 5, 1989, Gefroh's probation officer sought revocation of Gefroh's probation for violations of probation conditions. After a hearing, the district court determined that Gefroh had violated the terms of his probation and ordered that he be confined at the State Penitentiary for a term of four and one-half years. Gefroh appealed, raising the following issues:
In arguing that the State waived his probation violations by failing to petition for revocation in a timely manner, Gefroh asserts:
Gefroh's probation officer learned of various violations of the conditions of Gefroh's probation well before seeking revocation of Gefroh's probation. At the time of the probation revocation hearing on June 12, 1989, Gefroh's probation officer had been aware for over a year of Gefroh's presence in bars and that there were charges of disorderly conduct against Gefroh, which he brought to the attention of the State's Attorney in December 1988. Gefroh had also been charged with driving while his license was under suspension. A revocation hearing was delayed because "[w]e were waiting for pleas on the disorderly and the driving under suspension charges." The district court determined that the defendant "was doing his very best to avoid a completion of trial of these charges until after his probation before this Court had run" and only when that "became clear to the State" did the State decide that "it should probably go ahead with a probation revocation hearing even though there had not yet been a final disposition of the disorderly conduct charge."
Probation officers commonly decide not to immediately institute proceedings to revoke probation upon learning of a probation violation. As the Supreme Court noted with regard to parole in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 479, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 2599, 33 L.Ed.2d 484, 493 (1972):
"...
In United States v. Hamilton, 708 F.2d 1412, 1415 (9th Cir.1983), the court held that "[r]evocation of probation after unreasonable delay or under circumstances inherently misleading to the probationer is an abuse of discretion." However, the court also stated:
(Citations omitted.)
708 F.2d at 1415. "[I]mprisonment should not be the automatic response to the violation of a condition" of probation. Working Papers of the National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws, Vol. II, p. 1309 (1970), quoted in State v. Miller, 418 N.W.2d 614, 616 (N.D.1988). In appropriate cases, probation officers may "wait to assess the cumulative effect of several violations before initiating a revocation proceeding." Hamilton, 708 F.2d at 1415. In State v. Hass, 268 N.W.2d 456, 460 (N.D.1978), this court expressed a preference for trying a criminal charge before seeking revocation of probation for the same act:
Acceptance of Gefroh's arguments would either encourage probationers to delay trial on independent prosecutions for substantive crimes constituting probation violations or deprive probation officers of the opportunity to "wait to assess the cumulative effect of several violations before initiating a revocation proceeding" by forcing probation officers to make revocation proceedings "an automatic reaction to technical or minor violations simply to preserve the government's position" (United States v. Hamilton, supra, 708 F.2d at 1415). We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that it is appropriate for the State to await disposition of criminal charges before initiating probation revocation proceedings. We further conclude that the trial court did not err in refusing to dismiss the revocation petition because of the State's failure to bring its petition to revoke sooner than it did.
Gefroh contends that the State violated his right to a speedy trial under the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution and Art. I, Sec. 12, N.D. Const., by failing to bring its petition to revoke probation in a timely manner. Although the State does not dispute the applicability of speedy trial analysis, it has been held that the constitutional right to a speedy trial does not apply to probation revocation proceedings. See United States v. Jackson, 590 F.2d 121 (5th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 912, 99 S.Ct. 2012, 60 L.Ed.2d 385; State v. Chavez, 102 N.M. 279, 694 P.2d 927 (App.1985). Therefore, the claim is wholly unpersuasive. 1
Gefroh contends that the district court erred in increasing the length of his sentence after revocation of probation because (1) increasing the length of a sentence imposed, but suspended, after revocation of probation is unconstitutional because it violates due process or constitutes double jeopardy; and (2) the district court was not statutorily authorized to increase the length of a sentence imposed, but suspended, after revocation of probation.
In his brief on appeal, Gefroh asserted the following due process argument:
Gefroh did not raise this due process issue in the district court. In his response to the trial court's request for briefs regarding potential sentences upon...
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