State v. Genous

• Decision Date: 04 June 2021
• Docket Number: No. 2019AP435-CR,2019AP435-CR
• Citation: 961 N.W.2d 41,397 Wis.2d 293,2021 WI 50
• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE of Wisconsin, Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, v. James Timothy GENOUS, Defendant-Appellant.

397 Wis.2d 293

961 N.W.2d 41

2021 WI 50

STATE of Wisconsin, Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner,

v.James Timothy GENOUS, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 2019AP435-CR

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

Oral Argument: March 3, 2021

Opinion Filed: June 4, 2021

For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner, there were briefs filed by Scott E. Rosenow, assistant attorney general; with whom on the brief was Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general. There was an oral argument by Scott E. Rosenow.

For the defendant-appellant, there was a brief filed by Leon W. Todd, assistant state public defender. There was an oral argument by Christopher P. August.

HAGEDORN, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in which ZIEGLER, C.J., ROGGENSACK, and REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, JJ., joined. DALLET, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which ANN WALSH BRADLEY and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined.

BRIAN HAGEDORN, J.

¶1 The question in this case is whether a vehicle stop was supported by reasonable suspicion of drug activity. Examining the totality of the circumstances, we hold the stop was lawful and reverse the court of appeals.¹

I. BACKGROUND

¶2 At 3:36 a.m. on August 28, 2016, James Genous sat in a parked, running vehicle on a residential street in West Allis with its headlights turned on. Genous momentarily turned off the headlights, and a woman emerged from the house he was parked in front of. She entered the vehicle through the front passenger door and remained in the car for 10 to 15 seconds. The woman then exited the vehicle and ran back into the house. A few seconds later, the vehicle's headlights turned back on and the car pulled away.

¶3 West Allis Patrol Officer Adam Stikl watched these events from an unmarked squad car half a block away. Two weeks prior, he received an intra-department email regarding K.S., a resident of the single-family home Genous was parked in front of. K.S. was a known heroin and narcotics user who previously worked with the department. The email explained that the department was no longer working with K.S. and that officers were to "keep an eye on her because she does obviously still use." After receiving the email, Officer Stikl looked up K.S.’s physical description on his department's local system. As Officer Stikl watched the brief, nighttime interaction when the events leading to this case took place, he observed that the woman entering and exiting Genous’ car matched K.S.’s physical description. He also knew from communications within his department that this area had a reputation for high drug-trafficking activity.

¶4 Based on this context and his training, Officer Stikl suspected he had witnessed a drug transaction. As Genous drove away, Officer Stikl followed him for about three blocks and executed a traffic stop. During the stop, officers discovered a handgun in Genous’ vehicle. Genous was arrested and later charged with unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon.

¶5 Genous filed a motion to suppress the firearm evidence in part on the basis that Officer Stikl lacked reasonable suspicion to stop Genous’ vehicle. The circuit court² denied the motion following a hearing. The court of appeals reversed, and we granted the State's petition for review.

II. DISCUSSION

¶6 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons ... against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated." Genous and the State agree that Officer Stikl seized Genous by executing the traffic stop, but they disagree on whether the stop complied with the Fourth Amendment.

¶7 An investigatory stop, also known as a Terry stop, "usually involves only temporary questioning and thus constitutes only a minor infringement on personal liberty." State v. Young, 2006 WI 98, ¶20, 294 Wis. 2d 1, 717 N.W.2d 729. It allows police officers to briefly detain someone to "investigat[e] possible criminal behavior even though there is no probable cause to make an arrest." State v. Waldner, 206 Wis. 2d 51, 55, 556 N.W.2d 681 (1996). This type of limited stop complies with the Fourth Amendment "if the police have reasonable suspicion that a crime has been committed, is being committed, or is about to be committed." Young, 294 Wis. 2d 1, ¶20, 717 N.W.2d 729.

¶8 Reasonable suspicion must be supported by specific and articulable facts. Id., ¶21. While it is a low bar, a mere hunch is insufficient. Id.; State v. Eason, 2001 WI 98, ¶19, 245 Wis. 2d 206, 629 N.W.2d 625. Yet "officers are not required to rule out the possibility of innocent behavior before initiating a brief stop." State v. Anderson, 155 Wis. 2d 77, 84, 454 N.W.2d 763 (1990). The question is, "What would a reasonable police officer reasonably suspect in light of his or her training and experience?" Id. at 83-84, 454 N.W.2d 763 ; United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418, 101 S. Ct. 690, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981) ("[A] trained officer draws inferences and makes deductions ... that might well elude an untrained person.").

¶9 A reasonable suspicion determination is based on the totality of the circumstances. State v. Post, 2007 WI 60, ¶18, 301 Wis. 2d 1, 733 N.W.2d 634. We focus not on isolated, independent facts, but on "the whole picture" viewed together. Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417-18, 101 S. Ct. 690 ; see also United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 9-10, 109 S. Ct. 1581, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989) ("Indeed, Terry itself involved a series of acts, each of them perhaps innocent if viewed separately, but which taken together warranted further investigation." (internal quotation marks omitted)).

¶10 Therefore, our task is to consider everything observed by and known to the officer, and then determine whether a reasonable officer in that situation would reasonably suspect that criminal activity was afoot. Whether reasonable suspicion was present is a legal question we analyze independently, but we accept the circuit court's findings of historical fact unless they are clearly erroneous. Post, 301 Wis. 2d 1, ¶8, 733 N.W.2d 634.

¶11 In this case, Officer Stikl suspected that the interaction he witnessed in Genous’ car was a drug deal. The facts show that his suspicion was objectively reasonable. Informed by his training, experience, and department communications, Officer Stikl could reasonably infer quite a bit about the events he observed that night. He knew that drug transactions often occur during brief exchanges in vehicles, which was consistent with the 10-15 second contact in Genous’ car.³ He also knew that a brief meeting in a vehicle at 3:36 a.m., immediately after the vehicle's headlights are turned off, and in an area with a reputation for drug-trafficking, are potential indicators of illegal activity.⁴ And perhaps most significantly, Officer Stikl had good reason to believe that the woman Genous met in his vehicle was a known drug user with whom his department had a documented history. All these factors, viewed collectively in the eye of a trained and experienced law enforcement officer, support the conclusion that Officer Stikl reasonably suspected a drug transaction had occurred.

¶12 Genous contests this conclusion largely by isolating various factors, attacking them one by one, and then excluding each factor from the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis. We reject "this sort of divide-and-conquer analysis." United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274, 122 S. Ct. 744, 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002). It is true that a citizen visiting a vehicle at night does not automatically constitute grounds for law enforcement to intervene, nor do officers have a green light to detain and question anyone who has a short conversation with a known drug user.⁵ But the reasonable suspicion test is not an exercise in evaluating individual details in isolation. It is the whole picture, evaluated together, that serves as the proper analytical framework. See Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 9, 109 S. Ct. 1581 ("Any one of these factors is not by itself proof of any illegal conduct .... But we think taken together they amount to reasonable suspicion.").

¶13 Considering the totality of the circumstances, we hold that a reasonable law enforcement officer knowing what Officer Stikl knew and seeing what he saw would reasonably suspect that the short-term contact he witnessed in Genous’ car was a drug transaction. His investigatory stop of Genous’ vehicle therefore complied with the Fourth Amendment. We reverse the court of appeals’ conclusion to the contrary and remand to the court of appeals to address Genous’ additional arguments not presented to this court.⁶

By the Court. —The decision of the court of appeals is reversed, and the cause is remanded to the court of appeals.

REBECCA FRANK DALLET, J. (dissenting).

¶14 The record contains insufficient particular facts, as opposed to generalized suspicions and hunches, that Genous had committed or was about to commit a crime. It appears that Genous's presence in an alleged "high-drug-trafficking area" played a disproportionate role in the circuit court's reasonable-suspicion analysis, coloring those general hunches as concrete suspicions. Allowing that designation to so heavily influence the analysis—particularly when it is unsupported by any empirical evidence—continues a troubling erosion of the Fourth Amendment's particularized-suspicion requirement. I therefore respectfully dissent.

I

¶15 An officer may conduct an investigatory traffic stop, akin to a Terry stop,¹ only if the officer has a "reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot." Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123, 120 S. Ct. 673, 145 L.Ed.2d 570 (2000) ; State v. Post, 2007 WI 60, ¶¶10-12, 301 Wis. 2d 1, 733 N.W.2d 634. An officer must be able to point to concrete, particularized facts that warrant suspicion of a particular defendant; "inchoate and unparticularized suspicion[s] or ‘hunch[es]’ " are insufficient. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 123-24, 120 S. Ct. 673 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) ); Post, 301 Wis. 2d 1, ¶10, 733...