State v. German
| Decision Date | 05 April 2023 |
| Docket Number | 28149,Appellate Case 2018-002090 |
| Parties | The State, Respondent, v. Mary Ann German, Appellant. |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
Heard September 21, 2021
Appeal from Beaufort County Brooks P. Goldsmith, Circuit Court Judge
Appellate Defender David Alexander, of Columbia, for Appellant.
Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant Attorney General Joshua Abraham Edwards, both of Columbia; Solicitor Isaac McDuffie Stone, III, of Bluffton, all for Respondent.
Appellant was convicted of felony driving under the influence ("DUI") resulting in death and sentenced to eleven years' incarceration. Before trial, Appellant moved to suppress evidence of her blood alcohol content ("BAC") obtained through a warrantless blood draw which was taken pursuant to section 56-5-2946 of the South Carolina Code[1] while she was hospitalized after an automobile accident. Finding that section 56-5-2946 was constitutional as applied and unchanged by the holdings of McNeely[2] and Birchfield,[3] the trial court denied the motion to suppress. The court concluded that law enforcement had probable cause to suspect Appellant of felony DUI and properly obtained the blood draw pursuant to section 56-5-2946.
Appellant appealed her conviction based on the denial of her motion, and the court of appeals requested certification pursuant to Rule 204(b), SCACR. We agreed to consider whether the warrantless blood draw based on section 56-5-2946 violated Appellant's Fourth Amendment rights or her rights under the South Carolina Constitution and, in effect, whether section 56-5-2946 is constitutional.
We conclude section 56-5-2946 is facially constitutional but unconstitutional as applied in Appellant's case. However, we find the trial court did not err in denying Appellant's motion to suppress because law enforcement acted in good faith based on existing precedent at the time of the blood draw. We affirm Appellant's conviction.
On July 9, 2016, Appellant and her husband were diverted from their vacation camping plans due to traffic and decided to pull off Highway 21 in Beaufort County. The couple decided to rest for the evening and have a few drinks at a bar, known locally as "Archie's." There, patrons offered the couple an all-you-can-drink bracelet for ten dollars as part of an event being held that night. The bar served "free pouring" liquor, and Appellant consumed a beer and four to six vodka drinks.
Around 12:30 a.m., Appellant drove their truck off the property. Upon leaving the parking lot, Appellant entered the road, ran the stop sign before Highway 21, and drove into the wrong side of the divided highway. Her truck collided with a sedan head-on, and, tragically, the other driver did not survive the collision.
Paramedics, firefighters, and police officers all responded to the collision. First responders extracted Appellant and her husband from the vehicle, and a responding officer noted an alcoholic odor emanating from each of them. The responding paramedics placed Appellant into an ambulance and noted an ethanol smell from Appellant. In response to paramedics' questions, Appellant heavily slurred her speech. One paramedic testified Appellant was intoxicated.
In the early morning hours of July 10, 2016, Appellant arrived at Beaufort Memorial Hospital by EMS on a backboard, and medical professionals expressed concern she had a serious head injury. However, Appellant's only ultimate injury was a laceration on the bottom of her foot. Later, Appellant became belligerent and agitated. The emergency room physician testified that, based on her medical opinion, Appellant was intoxicated.
After arriving on the scene of the collision, a state trooper went to the hospital to obtain a blood draw from Appellant, who was the driver of the truck involved in the accident. Based on hearing information from other law enforcement officers, being at the scene himself, and observing Appellant at the hospital, the trooper suspected Appellant of felony DUI. He placed Appellant under arrest at the hospital around 2:00 a.m.
The trooper read Appellant her rights pursuant to the implied consent statute. However, instead of reading the felony DUI advisement of rights form, he read Appellant the advisement of rights form for misdemeanor DUI because he inadvertently "grabbed the wrong form." Regardless, Appellant resisted cooperation and refused to sign the paperwork detailing her rights. The emergency room physician declined to release Appellant for a breath test within the two-hour window to take Appellant to a police station for a breath test as required by law.[4] Because the trooper could not administer a breath test in the hospital, he ordered a blood draw while Appellant was in a hospital bed.[5] Appellant's BAC registered 0.275%.
The trooper was the only officer at the hospital, and neither he nor any other responding officer sought a warrant to collect the sample of Appellant's blood. He conceded on cross examination that his office had provided him with a number to reach a magistrate late at night and he had used the number before. He also admitted it was "[p]ossible" to obtain a warrant; however, he explained that he did not seek a warrant because he "was trained . . . when [he] came into law enforcement" that "if there's a felony DUI involving death, [he] [did] not need permission." He told Appellant, "like it or not, we are getting a blood draw."
Three months before trial, the court heard arguments on Appellant's motion to suppress evidence of the blood draw and its results. Appellant focused her argument on an as-applied challenge rather than a facial challenge to the constitutionality of the statute. Specifically, she believed there is a way to read the statute such that a person, who is suspected upon probable cause of committing felony DUI, must consent. However, Appellant maintained that, under the facts in this case, a search warrant was necessary and only a neutral and detached magistrate could determine probable cause for a search warrant. Conversely, the State argued that, under section 56-5-2946, the probable cause to arrest Appellant for felony DUI is sufficient to eliminate the need to obtain a warrant. The State waived its argument that the officer relied on the exceptions for a search incident to an arrest or exigent circumstances and, instead, relied solely on the felony DUI statute.
The court, finding the statute constitutional as applied, ultimately adopted the State's arguments and denied the motion to suppress. Appellant renewed the motion throughout trial, and this appeal followed.
State v. Frasier, 437 S.C. 625, 63334, 879 S.E.2d 762, 766 (2022).
"This Court has a limited scope of review in cases involving a constitutional challenge to a statute because all statutes are presumed constitutional and, if possible, will be construed to render them valid." Curtis v. State, 345 S.C. 557, 569, 549 S.E.2d 591, 597 (2001). "Further, a legislative act will not be declared unconstitutional unless its repugnance to the Constitution is clear and beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 570, 549 S.E.2d at 597.
Appellant contends the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress the BAC results because the warrantless blood draw violated the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. Appellant further argues the warrantless blood draw violated her right against unreasonable invasions of privacy in South Carolina's Constitution. Additionally, Appellant avers the State waived any reliance on the exceptions for exigent circumstances and a search incident to an arrest. Even if preserved, Appellant maintains the State failed to prove an applicable exception that would justify the warrantless blood draw. Finally, Appellant contends any error in admitting the BAC results cannot be harmless.
In response, the State claims the trial court correctly denied Appellant's motion to suppress the BAC results. The State argues the warrantless search was reasonable because exigent circumstances existed and the search was a permissible search incident to a lawful arrest. The State further maintains the good-faith exception applies and, if the trial court erred, the error was harmless.
Initially, we note that our appellate courts have said that an operator of a motor vehicle in South Carolina is not required to submit to alcohol or drug testing. Sanders v. S.C. Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 431 S.C. 374, 383, 848 S.E.2d 768, 773 (2020) (citing S.C. Dep't of Motor Vehicles v. Nelson, 364 S.C. 514, 522, 613 S.E.2d 544, 548 (Ct. App. 2005)). Both Sanders and Nelson involved suspended driver's licenses due to refusal to submit to an alcohol breath test. However, these cases are distinguishable from the case now before this Court because they involved civil penalties, not criminal convictions; they did not address the constitutionality of the statutes; and the decisions appear to be founded on statutory interpretation. Nonetheless, it is arguable that our appellate courts have spoken on the issue of mandatory alcohol and blood testing, even if some may view it as dicta. In any case, clarity of the law is needed.
This Court has recognized that a blood draw is a search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment in a triad of cases dealing with our implied consent statut...
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