State v. Geter
| Decision Date | 18 August 2021 |
| Docket Number | Appellate Case 2018-001647,5851 |
| Parties | The State, Respondent, v. Robert Xavier Geter, Appellant. |
| Court | South Carolina Court of Appeals |
Heard June 7, 2021
Appeal From Richland County DeAndrea G. Benjamin, Circuit Court Judge
Chief Appellate Defender Robert Michael Dudek, of Columbia, for Appellant.
Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Deputy Attorney General Donald J. Zelenka, Senior Assistant Deputy Attorney General Melody Jane Brown, Assistant Attorney General Tommy Evans Jr., and Solicitor Byron E. Gipson, all of Columbia, for Respondent.
In this criminal case, Robert Xavier Geter appeals his convictions for the murder of James Lewis (Decedent) and the attempted murder of Clarence Stone. The events in the case stem from a bar fight between Geter and Decedent. Geter maintains the circuit court erred in charging the jury on transferred intent in relation to the attempted murder charge and in allowing certain testimony from Investigator Joseph Clarke. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
On the night of March 7, 2015, Stone was at a pool room/restaurant Culler's Pool Hall, located on Monticello Road in Richland County. Stone acted as something of a bouncer for the business, watching out for arguments or other types of trouble or disturbances. According to Stone, he was playing a game of pool when he heard a commotion and went to investigate. He found Decedent and Geter on the floor fighting. Stone broke up the fight and took Decedent outside on a deck behind the building. Decedent wanted to go back inside to get his chain, and Stone indicated he would retrieve it for him. As Stone was preparing to go back inside, Geter came out onto the deck, approaching Decedent and asking "we good?" Then, Geter swung at Decedent and Stone was caught in between the two while attempting to break up the altercation. Geter had a knife and stabbed and killed Decedent. Geter also struck Stone, stabbing him in the eye, causing permanent blindness in that eye.
Geter was indicted on one count of murder and one count of attempted murder. At trial, in opening statements Geter's attorney indicated Geter had acted in self-defense after several men, including Decedent and Stone, had attacked and beaten him.
Investigator Joseph Clarke, of the Richland County Sheriff's Office, testified after Stone in the State's case and indicated he was the on-call homicide investigator on the night of the stabbing. He testified as follows regarding his investigation of the incident.
At the close of the State's case, Geter moved for a directed verdict arguing the State had offered no evidence Geter specifically intended to kill Stone as required by the attempted murder statute. The State contended the necessary intent to establish the attempted murder charge could be transferred based on Geter's intent to kill Decedent. The circuit court agreed and denied the directed verdict motion.
Geter testified in his own defense and indicated he had accidentally stepped on Decedent's foot and when confronted by Decedent, he apologized. While doing so, Stone came over and interfered in their conversation by hitting Geter in the back of the head. Then, according to Geter, Stone and Decedent were beating him pretty severely and he believed several other men were also attacking him. To defend himself, he pulled out his knife and while brandishing it, Decedent and Stone were injured.
At the close of all testimony, Geter renewed his motion for directed verdict which the circuit court denied. Geter objected to the circuit court charging on the doctrine of transferred intent. The circuit court denied the objection and charged the jury as follows:
The circuit court also charged the jury on self-defense. Geter was convicted of murder and attempted murder and sentenced to forty years' imprisonment and twenty years' imprisonment, respectively, to run concurrently. This appeal followed.
"An appellate court will not reverse the trial judge's decision regarding a jury charge absent an abuse of discretion." State v. Mattison, 388 S.C. 469, 479, 697 S.E.2d 578, 584 (2010). "An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court's ruling is based on an error of law or, when grounded in factual conclusions, is without evidentiary support." State v. Jennings, 394 S.C. 473, 477-78, 716 S.E.2d 91, 93 (2011) (quoting Clark v. Cantrell, 339 S.C. 369, 389, 529 S.E.2d 528, 539 (2000)). Likewise, the admission or exclusion of evidence is subject to the discretion of the circuit court. State v. Kromah, 401 S.C. 340, 349, 737 S.E.2d 490, 494-95 (2013). Additionally, any abuse of discretion related thereto is subject to a harmless error analysis. Id. at 362, 737 S.E.2d at 501.
Geter argues the circuit court erred in charging the jury on the doctrine of transferred intent to support the attempted murder charge. We agree.
The South Carolina Court of Appeals has twice-answered the first question presented in this appeal-whether the doctrine of transferred intent applies to attempted murder which requires specific intent.[1] In State v. Williams, 422 S.C. 525, 539, 812 S.E.2d 917, 924 (Ct. App. 2018), aff'd in part as modified, vacated in part, 427 S.C. 148, 829 S.E.2d 702 (2019), the court concluded "the doctrine of transferred intent is proper to convict a defendant of attempted murder regardless of whether a victim, intended or unintended, suffers an injury." In that case, Williams had fired shots into a trailer in which his intended target and two other people were located. Id. This court found:
However, the Supreme Court of South Carolina, based on preservation grounds, vacated the portion of Williams that decided the transferred intent question. State v. Williams, 427 S.C. 148, 150, 829 S.E.2d 702, 703 (2019). Because the defendant had not appealed the erroneous jury charge indicating attempted murder was a general intent crime, the court declined to weigh in. Id. "Because the court of appeals treated the case as if it had been tried as a specific-intent crime, we vacate the portion of its opinion dealing with the issue of transferred intent and leave for another day the determination of whether the doctrine applies to attempted murder." Id. at 157-58, 829 S.E.2d at 707. In spite of declining to address the merits of the issue, the court offered more insight in a footnote to the opinion.
[W]e find the doctrine of transferred intent unnecessary to sustain the convictions for the attempted murders of Young and Wrighton. Petitioner was alleged to have specifically intended to kill Young the night of the shooting, and to have shot at the door where Wrighton stood, intending to kill the figure in the doorway. It matters not that Petitioner may have been unaware it was Wrighton in the door, rather than Young. Simply put, Petitioner intended to shoot the person (Wrighton) who appeared in the doorway. As a result, we alternatively sustain Petitioner's convictions for the attempted murders of Young and Wrighton without resort to the doctrine of transferred intent. Because Petitioner was sentenced to three concurrent twenty-year sentences, reversing his conviction for the attempted murder of [Ycedra[2] would have no effect on the...
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