State v. Gibson
| Decision Date | 29 November 2018 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 45449 |
| Citation | 431 P.3d 255,164 Idaho 420 |
| Court | Idaho Supreme Court |
| Parties | STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Dillon Grant GIBSON, Defendant, and Judy Luis, Individually, Surety/Real Party in Interest-Appellant. |
Blaser, Oleson & Lloyd, Chartered, Blackfoot, for appellant. Michael A. Pope argued.
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Idaho Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. Kenneth K. Jorgensen argued.
This appeal arises from the district court's denial of a motion to exonerate a cash deposit posted as bail. Dillon Gibson was arrested for vehicular manslaughter and leaving the scene of an accident. His mother, Judy Luis, posted a cash deposit and a property bond that collectively enabled Gibson's release on bail. After he pleaded guilty to felony vehicular manslaughter, but before sentencing, Gibson was alleged to have violated his conditions of release. He was arrested on a bench warrant, remanded to custody, and informed by the district court that additional bail would be required and that the previous bail amount would not be forfeited. Following sentencing, Luis moved for release of the cash deposit, asserting that it should have been exonerated when Gibson was remanded to custody. The district court denied the motion and directed the clerk of the court to apply the cash deposit against Gibson's fine, costs, and restitution obligations pursuant to Idaho Code section 19-2908. Luis timely appealed. We reverse the district court's order but deny Luis's request for attorney's fees and costs.
Gibson drove drunk and crashed into a home, killing a resident. The State charged Gibson with one felony count of vehicular manslaughter and leaving the scene of an accident. Given Gibson's prior record, the State initially requested a bail amount of $500,000, which the magistrate court granted. The magistrate court later reduced the bail amount to $240,000. Thereafter, Luis posted a cash deposit of $50,000 and a property bond for the remaining $190,000, guaranteeing Gibson's appearance in court when required. The magistrate court accepted Luis's undertaking and entered an order for Gibson's release on bail with conditions.
Gibson subsequently pleaded guilty to felony vehicular manslaughter, and the State agreed to dismiss the other charges. About six weeks later, before sentencing had occurred, the State moved to revoke Gibson's release pursuant to Idaho Code section 19-2919, alleging that Gibson had admitted to violations of his conditions of release by drinking alcohol and using methamphetamine. The district court granted the State's motion and ordered a warrant issued for Gibson's arrest.
Gibson was arrested pursuant to the warrant. The next day, the magistrate court held a brief hearing where the court informed Gibson that it was ordering additional bail in the amount of $100,000 and that the previously posted bail would not be forfeited (the correct term is actually "exonerated"; "forfeiture" of bail occurs when the defendant has failed to appear as ordered). Gibson was remanded to custody and remained there until his sentencing hearing.
About a month after he was remanded to custody, Gibson was sentenced to serve a term of fifteen years with three years fixed. The district court entered a judgment of conviction. Within the judgment, Gibson was ordered to pay a fine of $1,000 and court costs of $275.50. The district court also ordered exoneration of the property bond Luis posted, but declared that the cash deposit would be retained until resolution of the restitution issue.
Gibson and the State subsequently stipulated to a restitution amount of $300,000. The day the stipulation was filed, Luis, through Gibson's counsel, moved for the "release" of the cash deposit (again, it is called "exoneration" under Idaho Code section 19-2905(8) ). The district court denied Luis's motion and ordered the clerk of the court to apply the cash deposit against any fines, court costs, and restitution pursuant to Idaho Code section 19-2908. The district court later entered an order of restitution consistent with the parties’ stipulation. Luis timely appealed.
Statutory interpretation is a question of law over which the Court exercises free review. State v. Boren , 156 Idaho 498, 499, 328 P.3d 478, 479 (2014).
This dispute involves various provisions of the Idaho Bail Act. In Idaho, defendants are entitled to bail as a matter of right, subject to the limitations set forth by Idaho Code section 19-2903. See also Idaho Const. art. I, § 6. "Admission to bail is the order of a competent court that the defendant shall be released from actual custody of the sheriff upon posting bail." I.C. § 19-2906. When releasing a defendant on bail, the court has discretion to impose "conditions of release." I.C. § 19-2904. The term " ‘conditions of release’ means any reasonable restrictions, conditions or prohibitions placed upon the defendant's activities, movements, associations or residences by the court, excluding the court order requiring the defendant to appear in court." I.C. § 19-2905(7).
Idaho Code section 19-2919 provides the procedural requirements for the revocation of bail arising from the defendant's violation of conditions of release and reads, in part:
Upon its own motion or upon a verified petition alleging that the defendant willfully violated a condition of release, the court may issue a bench warrant directing that the defendant be arrested and brought before the court for a bail revocation hearing, or the court may order the defendant to appear before the court at a time certain.
I.C. § 19-2919(1) ; accord I.C.R. 46(i)(1). At a bail revocation hearing, if the court finds that the defendant willfully violated a condition of release, "the court may revoke the bail and remand the defendant to the custody of the sheriff." I.C. § 19-2919(1) ; accord I.C.R. 46(i)(2). At any time after such a hearing, "the court may reset bail in the same or a new amount and impose conditions of release." I.C. § 19-2919(1) ; accord I.C.R. 46(i)(1), (j). In other words, it is left to the court's discretion whether to allow the defendant to post new bail after he has been recommitted following a violation of the conditions of release. I.C. 19-2903(4) ; see also I.C. § 19-2905(13) ().
Here, the State filed a motion and affidavit alleging Gibson violated his conditions of release and admitted those violations. The same day the motion was filed, the district court entered an order revoking Gibson's release and directing the issuance of a bench warrant:
Gibson was then arrested and appeared before the magistrate court the next morning. The minute entry for that hearing reflects that the magistrate court ordered that the bail amount be increased by $100,000 and that Gibson be remanded to custody in lieu of the additional bail money:
Bond will be set at $100,000.00 cash or surety in addition to the previously posted bond and that bond previously posted would not be forfeited. Defendant was remanded to the custody of the Bingham County Sheriff's Department in lieu of bond $100,000 cash or surety.
Gibson remained in custody until sentencing and is now serving his prison sentence.
Much of Luis's briefing on appeal focuses on arguments that the procedural requirements of the Idaho Bail Act were not followed by the magistrate court or district court in revoking Gibson's bail. Regardless of any procedural missteps that might have occurred, what is important for purposes of this appeal is the inescapable conclusion that Gibson's bail was actually revoked and he was recommitted to custody prior to sentencing. When bail is revoked and a defendant is recommitted, a trial court must exonerate any bail that has been posted. I.C. § 19-2922(6). Section 19-2922(6) states:
I.C. § 19-2922(6) (emphasis added).
The State argues that upon Gibson's recommitment, the magistrate court chose to neither exonerate nor forfeit the previously posted bail, and that therefore the $50,000 cash posted by Luis remained on deposit at the time of sentencing. This argument is contrary to the unambiguous mandatory language in section 19-2922(6). The statute unequivocally states that the court "shall order the bail exonerated" when a defendant's bail has been revoked and he has been recommitted. See Rangen, Inc. v. Idaho Dep't of Water Res. , 160 Idaho 251, 256, 371 P.3d 305, 310 (2016) ; State v. Tribe , 123 Idaho 721, 726, 852 P.2d 87, 92 (1993) ().
In rejecting Luis's position, the district court noted that she had not requested the exoneration of the cash deposit at the time Gibson was remanded to custody. The State asserts a similar idea on appeal with argument that the relevant statutes do not allow for a party to seek "retroactive revocation of [a] bond." Nothing in the Idaho Bail Act imposes an affirmative requirement on parties to request exoneration of posted bail upon the defendant's...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Nampa Highway Dist. No. 1, v. Knight
...below, but the issues presented on appeal and NHD's position with respect to those issues remain the same. See State v. Gibson , 164 Idaho 420, 423, 431 P.3d 255, 258 (2018) ("specific arguments in support of a position may evolve and receive additional support on appeal."). Because it is i......
-
Rome v. State
... ... Such conjecture, however, is unnecessary because "[w]hen a party appealing an issue presents an incomplete record, this Court will presume that the absent portion supports the findings of the district court." Hansen v. White , 163 Idaho 851, 853, 420 P.3d 996, 998 (2018) (quoting Gibson v. Ada Cnty. , 138 Idaho 787, 790, 69 P.3d 1048, 1051 (2003) ). Therefore, this Court will presume that the charging document, or its absence at the trial stage, supports the trial court's findings. We find no error in the district court's determination that "no evidence or basis in law" was 431 ... ...
-
Fitzpatrick v. Kent
...that there are no unfair surprises to opponents and the trial courts can rule, thus forming a justiciable issue." State v. Gibson, 164 Idaho 420, 423, 431 P.3d 255, 258 (2018).The Fitzpatricks never used the term "quasi-estoppel" before filing their reply brief on appeal. In the proceedings......