State v. Gideon
Decision Date | 15 February 1919 |
Docket Number | No. 21234.,21234. |
Citation | 210 S.W. 358,277 Mo. 356 |
Parties | STATE ex rel. GREENE COUNTY v. GIDEON, Mayor, et al. |
Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Appeal from Circuit Court, Greene County; Guy D. Kirby, Judge.
Action by the State, on relation of Greene County, to compel J. J. Gideon, Mayor, and E. F. James and others, as Commissioners of the City of Springfield, to audit and pay the county certain money. Judgment for defendants, and relator appeals. Affirmed.
Warren L. White and Oliver J. Page, both of Springfield, for appellant.
Fred A. Moon, of Springfield, for respondents.
The county of Greene, as relator, brought this action by mandamus in the circuit court of Greene county against the respondents herein, who constitute the mayor and the commissioners, respectively, of the city of Springfield; said city being under a commission form of government. Upon a trial nisi plaintiff lost, and after the conventional procedure has appealed.
The facts of the case are few and simple. In 1917 the Legislature amended a certain section of the chapter of the Revised Statutes of Missouri which governs cities of the second class, in such wise, it is averred and contended by appellant, as to require cities of the second class—such as the city of Springfield is—to pay to the county wherein such a city is located the sum of $400 per annum for every dramshop license issued. This action is brought by Greene county for the purpose of compelling respondents to audit and pay to that county the sum of $5,900, which is cæteris paribus its proportionate part of all the dramshop license taxes which were collected by the city of Springfield during the period embraced in this controversy. Respondents having refused to pay the above sum of $5,900, which is conceded to be correct if the act under which the same is demanded is valid, Greene county instituted this action, and, as stated, having lost below, has appealed.
The defense, among others urged by respondents, as excusing their refusal to pay the amount demanded, is that the act under which appellant bottoms its demand for payment is unconstitutional. The grounds of unconstitutionality of the act of 1917 so urged by respondent are: (a) Because the act is in conflict with section 28 of article 4 of the Constitution, which provides that "no bill * * * shall contain more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title;" (b) because said act violates sections 1 and 10 of article 10 of the Constitution, in that it levies a direct tax upon cities of the second class of $400 per year for the benefit of the county in which a city of the second class is located, for each and every saloon license issued by such city; and (c) because, if such levy of the tax aforesaid is not in fact a tax, then the act of 1917 is a grant of the public money of the city by the Legislature to the county in which the city is located, contrary to sections 46 and 47 of article 4 of the Constitution of Missouri.
Other contentions, as forecast, are made, but since one of these at least has already been decided against respondent, and as in the view we take of the case mention of others is unnecessary, we content ourselves with the above recital of respondents' contentions. We think the above facts, together with such others as we shall find it necessary to refer to in our discussion of the points made in the case, will be sufficient to an understanding thereof.
Appellant bottoms its right to demand from the city of Springfield payment of the sum here in dispute upon subdivision 40 of section 8 of "An act to amend an act approved on the 26th day of March, 1915, entitled, `An act to amend section 8 of an act, approved on the 25th day of March; 1913, entitled "An act to repeal article 3 of chapter 84 of the Revised Statutes of Missouri of 1909, with all amendments thereto, said article being entitled `Cities of the second class,' and to enact in lieu thereof a new article providing for the government of cities of the second class,"' by repealing subdivision fortieth of said act and enacting a new subdivision in lieu thereof." Laws Mo. 1917, P. 357.
Subdivision 40, above referred to and herein relied on by appellant as furnishing its sole right to the money demanded from respondent city, reads thus:
It is clear that appellant is entitled to the money demanded and should prevail, if subdivision fortieth is valid. But respondent, admitting so much, urges that for numerous reasons said subdivision is invalid, because its provisions are in irreconcilable conflict with other provisions of the amended act, and because both its title and contents offend against express provisions of the Constitution.
In the view which we are constrained to take of this case we need burden the books with but one of respondents' contentions touching the unconstitutionality of the act.
That one is that—
"It conflicts with that provision of the Constitution which reads: `No bill * * * shall contain more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title.'" Section 28, art. 4, Const.
Whether this contention is well taken may be demonstrated by a reference to the legislative history and career (the...
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