State v. Gilligan

Decision Date30 April 1918
Citation92 Conn. 526,103 A. 649
PartiesSTATE v. GILLIGAN.
CourtConnecticut Supreme Court

chases of poison connected only with such other killings was also inadmissible.

Roraback and Wheeler, JJ., dissenting from reasoning of opinion.

Appeal from Superior Court, Hartford County; Gardiner Greene, Judge.

Amy E. Archer Gilligan was convicted of murder in the first degree, and she appeals. Error, and new trial ordered.

The accused, in one indictment, was charged in separate counts with five separate murders in the first degree by means of poison. She kept a home for aged and infirm persons at Windsor, and, as the result of a succession of deaths among the inmates under circumstances exciting suspicion, the bodies of some of the deceased were exhumed, and the accused indicted of four murders by arsenic and one by strychnine. At the opening of the trial the court granted a motion that the state be required to proceed upon one count, and the state elected to proceed upon the first count charging the accused with the murder of one Andrews by arsenic. The material facts upon which the state relied were substantially as follows:

The accused was an experienced nurse, and for some years had the sole ownership and management of the so-called Archer Home for aged and invalid persons at Windsor. She was engaged largely in the business of taking care of people for life under written contracts to provide room, board, care, nursing, and in some cases a decent burial; the consideration for such contracts being a sum varying from $450 to $1,000, which was paid upon the execution of the contract. Andrews entered the Archer Home at the age of 00 years in September, 1912, under such a life contract, for which he paid $1,000. Early in May, 1914, a Mr. and Mrs. Gowdy, of Hartford, sought admission to the Home, inspected the place, and agreed to come, provided they could have the room occupied by Andrews and his roommate, Ramsey, and they were then told that they could have that room about June 1st. At that time there was only one vacant room in the house, and that suitable for one person only. The Gowdys agreed to come to the Home on the proposed terms, and the accused, after putting them off with false excuses, telegraphed them immediately on the death of Andrews that the room was ready and urged them to come. A few weeks before Andrews died the accused borrowed $500 from him under a pledge of secrecy. After his death the accused denied having borrowed the money, and his savings bank book showing the withdrawal of this amount was in her possession.

On May 26, 1914, the accused purchased two ounces of arsenic at the local store, saying that she wanted it for rats, although at that time there were no rats about the premises. On May 29th Andrews ate a hearty supper, which was prepared and served by the accused, taking his food from individual dishes placed before him, as was the custom of the Home. About 9 o'clock he went to bed, and at 5 the next morning his roommate, Ramsey, was awakened by Andrews, who was vomiting. Ramsey called the accused and suggested that she send for a doctor. She went at once to Andrews' room, but did not summon any doctor until about 6 o'clock that evening. The physician diagnosed the case as an attack of acute indigestion, and did not then think that Andrews was dangerously ill. He was summoned again by the accused about 9 o'clock the same evening and found Andrews practically dead. Throughout the day the deceased was attended by the accused only. In answer to questions by the physician the accused stated that Andrews had suffered from gastric ulcers, that they had undoubtedly caused his death, and the death certificate so stated. The symptoms were, however, consistent with arsenic poisoning. As soon as the doctor left the accused sent for an undertaker, who removed the body to Hartford, where it arrived about 11 o'clock that same night. About 10 o'clock, when Andrews had been dead one hour, the accused called his sister in Hartford on the telephone and told her that Andrews was sick, that she was afraid he would not get well, but that it was not necessary for his relatives to come that night. When Andrews' sister came next morning she was told by the accused that Andrews had died shortly after 10 the night before. When asked the cause of his death, the accused replied that he had suffered with boils and abscesses for a long time and they must have struck to his stomach. In fact Andrews had never been troubled with boils or abscesses, and there was no indication of such a trouble in his appear ance alive or dead.

The motive of the accused was to escape from the continuing obligation under her life contract with Andrews, to avoid repaying the $500 loan, and to make room in the Home for Mr. and Mrs. Gowdy. Andrews' body was embalmed with a fluid containing no arsenic, and when exhumed two years after his death the body was in a state of good preservation. Arsenic in large quantities was found diffused through the organs of his body, and a larger quantity, many times a fatal dose, was found in crystal in his stomach. The principal expert for the state gave it as his opinion upon his direct examination that one dose of arsenic had been administered 10 or 12 hours before death and another very large dose a short time before death, which latter dose remained in his stomach after death, some of it in the form of undissolved crystals of arsenious acid.

The state was then allowed to prove against the objection and exception of the defense that three other persons died of arsenical poisoning in the Archer Home, one Gilligan on February 20, 1914, one Smith on April 9, 1914, and a Mrs. Gowdy on December 3, 1914, and in each case the state was allowed to introduce against the objection and exception of the defense circumstantial evidence tending to prove that in each of these cases the accused administered arsenic with malice aforethought, willfully, deliberately, with premeditation, and with a specific intent to kill.

Benedict M. Holden and Josiah H. Peck, both of Hartford, for appellant. Hugh M. Alcorn, State's Atty., of Hartford, for the State.

BEACH, J. (after stating the facts as above). The most important assignments of error, both in the admission of evidence and in charging the jury as to its effect, relate to the admission in the state's case in chief of evidence to prove that the accused committed three other murders by arsenic poisoning, two before and one after the date of the crime for which she was on trial.

The argument against admitting evidence of other similar but unconnected crimes is not that it has no probative value. As Wigmore said, "It is objectionable not because it has no appreciable probative value, but because it has too much;" meaning of course that its appeal is not confined to the intellect or to the precise issue. Such evidence, when offered in chief, violates the rule of policy which forbids the state initially to attack the character of the accused, and also the rule of policy that bad character may not be proved by particular acts. Wigmore, § 57. These two rules of policy are firmly established, and they mark one important difference between the Anglo-American criminal procedure and the French. On the other hand, evidence of crimes so connected with the principal crime by circumstance, motive, design, or innate peculiarity that the commission of the collateral crime tends directly to prove the commission of the principal crime, or the existence of any essential element of the principal crime, is admissible. The rules of policy have no application whatever to evidence of any crime which directly tends to prove that the accused is guilty of the specific offense for which she is on trial. The objection on the ground of policy applies exclusively to evidence of crimes which are logically unconnected with the principal crime; that is to say, to evidence the probative effect of which is indirect, in the sense that its direct application is exhausted in showing that the accused was possessed of a bad character or of a disposition to commit the particular crime of which she is accused, and thereby it furnishes a justification for a conviction rather than proof of guilt of the specific offense. The general rule upon the subject is well stated by Cushing, C. J., in State v. La Page, 57 N. H. 245, 24 Am. Rep. 69:

"I think we may state the law in the following propositions: (1) It is not permitted to the prosecution to attack the character of the prisoner, unless he first puts that in issue by offering evidence of his good character. (2) It is...

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51 cases
  • People v. Schader
    • United States
    • California Supreme Court
    • August 20, 1969
    ...rebut them at the outset with some damning piece of prejudice.' (Thompson v. The King, 1918 A.C. 221, 232; see also State v. Gilligan (1918) 92 Conn. 526, 532, 103 A. 649; McCormick, Evidence (1954 ed.) § 157, p. 331.)We point out below that while defendant's direct testimony did not consti......
  • State v. Nardini
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • July 13, 1982
    ...The state may, of course, attack the character of an accused once he has offered evidence of his good character. State v. Gilligan, 92 Conn. 526, 531, 103 A. 649 (1918); State v. Jerome, 33 Conn. 265, 269 (1866). We do not believe, however, that the limited biographical sketch given by the ......
  • State v. Ouellette
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • May 10, 1983
    ...long recognized the danger of prejudice against the defendant which may result from the admission of such evidence. State v. Gilligan, 92 Conn. 526, 530, 103 A. 649 [1918]. "As a general rule, evidence of guilt of other crimes is inadmissible to prove that a defendant is guilty of the crime......
  • State v. Marcello E.
    • United States
    • Connecticut Court of Appeals
    • October 18, 2022
    ...intent to cause serious physical injuries.At the outset, I note that our Supreme Court in the venerable decision of State v. Gilligan , 92 Conn. 526, 103 A. 649 (1918), held that evidence of similar but unconnected crimes must be excluded because it violates the rules of policy that forbids......
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1 books & journal articles
  • Uncharged - Misconduct Evidence and the Issue of Intent: Limiting the Need for Admissibility
    • United States
    • Connecticut Bar Association Connecticut Bar Journal No. 67, 1992
    • Invalid date
    ...21 Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475-76 (1948); United States v. Sampson, 9W F.2d 883, 886 (3d Cir. 1992); State v. Gilligan 2 92 Conn. 526, 530, 103 A. 649, 651 Q918); State v. Esposito, 192 Conn. 166 2 181, 471 A.2d 9492 957 (1984 Shea, J., dissenting); 1 A. JoHN H. WirmoRE, E......

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