State v. Glidden

• Decision Date: 31 March 1887
• Citation: 55 Conn. 46,8 A. 890
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE v. GLIDDEN and others.

8 A. 890

55 Conn. 46

STATE

v. GLIDDEN and others.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

March, 1887.

J. W. Alling, for the State.

J. T. Platt, for Glidden.

CARPENTER, J. Information for a conspiracy. Demurrer to the information overruled. Plea, not guilty. Verdict, guilty. The defendants appealed.

The appeal raises a question as to the sufficiency of the information, and also some questions of evidence. Is an offense sufficiently charged in the information? There are six counts. The verdict was taken separately as to each defendant on each count. Three of the defendants were found guilty on all the counts, and one was found not guilty.

The first count in substance charges the object of the conspiracy to have been (1) to compel the Carrington Publishing Company, against its will, to discharge its workmen, and to employ such persons as the defendants and their associates should name; and (2) to injure and oppress the workmen then in the employ of said corporation, by depriving them of their said employment. That the means to be employed to accomplish said purposes were to demand the discharge of said workmen, and the employment of the defendants, etc., and, if such demand was not complied with within 48 hours, the defendants and their associates were to represent to, and threaten said corporation, that there were associated in combination with the defendants, the members, in said city, of divers secret and large labor unions, to the number of 1,000 persons, who could, by the fear and terror to be created by the secrecy and discipline of this said secret organization, and by the large number of the members thereof, and by the to-be threatened and concerted withdrawal of the patronage of the defendants and their associates, and by stopping and promoting the patronage of others, through threats and intimidations, and by other unlawful means, would so control the persons dealing with said corporation as to compel them, though against their will, to cease doing business with said corporation; and who could and would boycott the business of said corporation, and so would substantially injure and destroy its business, and prevent the same from being carried on, unless said corporation would discharge said workmen, and employ the defendants, etc. And, if said corporation did not yield to said demands, the defendants and their associates would, in like manner, represent to and threaten all persons dealing with said corporation; and that they could and would so control, boycott, and injure the business customers of such persons as through fear, etc., and by the to-be threatened and concerted withdrawal of the patronage of the defendants, etc and by stopping and preventing the patronage of others through threats and intimidations, and by other unlawful means, to compel such customers, though against their will, to cease doing business with the subscribers and others, patrons of said corporation; and that the defendants would not give up or abandon said proceeding to injure the business of said corporation until they had either destroyed and prevented said business from being carried on, or until said corporation should comply with their said demands, and should further pay to the defendants a large sum of money, viz., $500, to defray the expenses of the defendants and their said associates in so carrying out said conspiracy. It is then charged that such demand was made on the corporation, and was not complied with; that, therefore, the agreed representations and threats were made to said corporation; that, said corporation still refusing to yield, the agreed representations and threats were made to the subscribers and patrons of said corporation, etc.

The second count alleges the object of the conspiracy to have been to injure and oppress, and to reduce to beggary and want, certain employes of said corporation, naming them, and to deprive them of their said employment, and to prevent them from getting employment elsewhere, and to force said corporation, against its will, to discharge said persons, etc. The means of accomplishing said purposes are then set out, and are similar to those set out in the first count.

In the third count, the object, as alleged, was, by indirect means, to impoverish the Carrington Publishing Company, a corporation engaged in publishing a daily newspaper called "The Journal & Courier," a newspaper and advertising medium; and the means agreed upon was by lessening and destroying the circulation of said newspaper, and by inducing, by threats and persuasions, subscribers, advertisers, and others from further patronizing said newspaper, etc.

The fourth count is like the third, with the additional allegation that the defendants induced one person to discontinue his subscription to said newspaper, and attempted to induce sundry other persons from advertising therein, and that the corporation was greatly damaged.

The fifth count alleges that the defendants conspired together to impoverish one Alfred W. Gleason, to reduce him to want and beggary, and to hinder and deprive him from using and exercising his trade and business as a printer in the employ of said corporation, by inducing and causing, by threats and persuasions, said corporation to discharge said Gleason from its employ, and thereafter to refrain from employing him, etc.

The sixth count is like the fifth, except that two other persons are named with Gleason as the persons to be injured, etc.

We assume that it was the intention of the attorney to charge but one offense, as all the counts are manifestly based upon one and the same transaction. The first count seems to embrace the substance of all the others, so that we have no occasion further to consider the different counts separately.

We will next inquire what is a criminal conspiracy. We will not attempt to formulate in a single sentence a definition which will embrace every case of conspiracy which the law will regard as criminal. Such a definition will of necessity embrace, not only a great variety of subjects, but also many distinct and independent classes of subjects. We shall therefore have a better understanding of the matter if we consider each part of such a definition by itself, each part having reference to a class of objects or purposes which may form the subject of a criminal conspiracy.

In the first place, it seems to be generally conceded that, if two or more persons confederate and agree together to commit some crime or misdemeanor, such confederation or agreement is itself an offense. Here we are hardly on debatable ground, and here we will pause and apply this partial definition to this information. A statute passed in 1878 provides that "every person who shall threaten or use any means to intimidate any person to compel such person, against his will, to do or abstain from doing any act which such person has a legal right to do, or shall persistently follow such person in a disorderly manner, or injure or threaten to injure his property, with intent to intimidate him, shall, upon conviction, be liable to a fine not exceeding $100, or imprisonment in the county jail six months." This statute was unquestionably designed as a substitute for the act of 1877, which doubtless had its origin in the apprehension which prevailed throughout the country at the time of and soon after the trouble on the Pennsylvania Railroad, during which there was such an immense destruction of property at Pittsburgh. The operation of that act was limited to railroad, gas, and telegraph companies. The act of 1878 removed the limitation, and was designed to protect all persons, natural or artificial, employers or employes, in the management and control of their own business. It simply extended the remedy. We cannot, therefore, limit the act of 1878 to subjects embraced in the act of 1877 without doing violence to the manifest intention of the legislature.

Do the acts which it is alleged the defendants conspired to do fall within the prohibition of the act of 1878? They propose to threaten and use means (the boycott) to intimidate the Carrington Publishing Company to compel it, against its will, to abstain from doing an act (to keep in its employ the workmen of its own choice) which it had a legal right to do, and to do an act (employ the defendants, and such persons as they should name) which it had a legal right to abstain from doing. There can be but one answer to the question. The acts proposed are clearly prohibited by the statute.

We might perhaps stop here, but the arguments of the case took a much wider range; and the case itself will justify, and the times in which we live seem to require, a more extended examination of the subject. Conspiracies against the government, and conspiracies to hinder or obstruct the administration of justice, which are also regarded as criminal conspiracies, need not be considered in this case. It has often been said that a conspiracy to effect an unlawful purpose, or a lawful purpose by unlawful means, is an offense. But this is said to be a limitation, rather than a definition. It certainly lacks def-initeness. Many acts are said to be unlawful which would not be the subject of a criminal conspiracy. Other acts are unlawful because they are in violation of the criminal law, or of some penal statute. If the ends or the means are criminal in themselves, or contrary to some penal statute, the conspiracy is clearly an offense. Between these two extremes a great variety of cases may arise, many of which ought not to be regarded as criminal. Suppose two or more boys, for instance, agree to go upon another's land. The proposed act is or may be a trespass, and therefore unlawful. If they do not go, no harm is done. If they do go, they are or may be liable civilly, but no one would seriously contend that in either case they would be liable criminally, for the conspiracy. But suppose two or more conspire unjustly and wrongfully to deprive another of...