State v. Gneiting
| Decision Date | 15 July 2020 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 46781 |
| Citation | 468 P.3d 263,167 Idaho 133 |
| Court | Idaho Supreme Court |
| Parties | STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Nicole Lyn GNEITING, Defendant-Appellant. |
Eric Don Fredericksen, State Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for Appellant. Sally J. Cooley argued.
Lawrence G. Wasden, Idaho Attorney General, Boise, for Respondent. John C. McKinney argued.
Nicole Lyn Gneiting appeals her conviction for possession of major contraband within a correctional facility under Idaho Code section 18-2510(3). Gneiting was convicted by a Bonneville County jury after a four-day trial. On appeal, Gneiting argues that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that she knowingly possessed contraband within a correctional facility because she did not enter the county jail voluntarily.
Early in the morning on January 20, 2018, Idaho Falls Police Officer Kevin Goms was working the graveyard shift when he responded to a potential burglary in progress at a nearby motel. As he pulled up to the motel's parking lot, Officer Goms noticed a man standing near the front of a vehicle with its alarm going off. He also noticed a woman, who was later identified as Gneiting, in the back seat of the car. Officer Goms and another officer, Officer Blaine Reed, who arrived at around the same time, approached the vehicle and began speaking with the man.
Shortly after the first two officers arrived, a third officer, Officer Jamie Nunnelly, arrived on the scene and began speaking with Gneiting. According to Officer Nunnelly, Gneiting informed her that she owned the car in question and that she was not staying in the motel but had been visiting a friend who was staying there. As she was speaking to Gneiting, Officer Nunnelly noticed a cylindrical object inside Gneiting's pants and asked her to remove it. Gneiting pulled the object, which was a flashlight, out of her pants.
With Gneiting's permission, Officer Nunnelly patted Gneiting down and felt a "hard, bulgy object" on the inside of her upper thigh. Gneiting claimed the object was a sanitary napkin or "pad" and that she was menstruating and was uncomfortable. Gneiting began adjusting her pants and Officer Nunnelly instructed her to stop. Gneiting did not stop "messing with her pants" and began yelling at the man talking to one of the other officers. Because she would not stop adjusting her pants and yelling at the man, Officer Nunnelly put Gneiting in handcuffs and placed her in the back of her patrol car.
The man eventually gave the officers a key to one of the motel rooms. The officers went to the motel room and spoke with a woman who was renting the room, as well as the room next door, and arrested her on an outstanding warrant and for providing false information to law enforcement.
The motel owner asked the officers to remove the personal items from both rooms since the woman was being arrested. The officers searched both rooms and found a purse containing two bags of what they believed to be marijuana, a pipe, a number of Xanax and Adderall pills, and Gneiting's debit card, among several other items. After advising Gneiting of her rights and asking her about the contents of the purse, Officer Nunnelly placed her under arrest for possession of marijuana, possession of paraphernalia, and possession of a controlled substance (the prescription medications). Strongly believing that Gneiting had illegal contraband on her person, Officer Nunnelly asked Gneiting multiple times whether she had anything illegal on her and warned her that if she took illegal items into the jail, she would receive an additional charge. Each time she was warned, Gneiting denied having anything illegal on her person.
Upon arriving at the county jail, Officer Nunnelly handed Gneiting over to the sergeant on duty and informed the sergeant that she had felt an object in Gneiting's pants and believed it to be narcotics. The sergeant asked Gneiting if she had anything illegal on her and Gneiting said that she did not. After several unsuccessful attempts to get Gneiting to willingly submit to a strip search, the sergeant called for the assistance of another female officer and together they strip searched Gneiting, retrieving a white paper envelope from between her legs. The envelope contained three plastic bags that were later determined to contain a combined total of 31.41 grams of methamphetamine.
The State charged Gneiting with felony possession of a controlled substance (Adderall), felony trafficking in methamphetamine (more than 28 grams but less than 200 grams), felony possession of certain articles (major contraband) within a correctional facility, misdemeanor possession of marijuana, misdemeanor possession of a controlled substance (Xanax), and misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia. After a four-day trial, the jury convicted Gneiting of trafficking in methamphetamine, possession of certain articles within a correctional facility, possession of a controlled substance (Xanax), and possession of drug paraphernalia.1 The district court sentenced Gneiting to a 13-year term of imprisonment with three years fixed for trafficking in methamphetamine and a two-year term with one year fixed for possession of certain articles within a correctional facility, to run consecutively to the 13-year term. She was sentenced to 30 days’ confinement on the two misdemeanor counts, to run concurrently with the 13-year term. After Gneiting filed a motion requesting leniency, the district court partially granted the motion, reducing the fixed portion of her sentence from four years to three-and-a-half years.
Gneiting timely appealed from the district court's judgment of conviction.
Was there substantial evidence upon which a rational trier of fact could convict Gneiting of possessing, or attempting to possess, major contraband within a correctional facility?
A judgment of conviction entered upon a jury verdict will be upheld by this Court so long as there exists "substantial evidence upon which a rational trier of fact could conclude that the prosecution proved all essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Kralovec, 161 Idaho 569, 572, 388 P.3d 583, 586 (2017) (quoting State v. Severson , 147 Idaho 694, 712, 215 P.3d 414, 432 (2009) ). "Evidence is substantial if a ‘reasonable trier of fact would accept it and rely upon it in determining whether a disputed point of fact has been proven.’ " Severson , 147 Idaho at 712, 215 P.3d at 432 (quoting State v. Mitchell , 130 Idaho 134, 135, 937 P.2d 960, 961 (Ct. App. 1997) ). On appeal of a judgment of conviction, this Court "view[s] the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution in determining whether substantial evidence exists." Id. (quoting State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 286, 77 P.3d 956, 975 (2003) ). This Court "will not substitute [its] own judgment for that of the jury on matters such as the credibility of witnesses, the weight to be given to certain evidence, and ‘the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence.’ " Id. Thus, "substantial evidence may exist even when the evidence presented is solely circumstantial or when there is conflicting evidence." Id.
The interpretation of a statute is a question of law, which this Court reviews de novo. State v. Schulz , 151 Idaho 863, 865, 264 P.3d 970, 972 (2011).
A. There was substantial evidence upon which a rational trier of fact could convict Gneiting of possessing, or attempting to possess, major contraband within a correctional facility.
Gneiting argues that the State failed to present substantial evidence upon which a rational trier of fact could have convicted her of possessing major contraband within a correctional facility. Specifically, Gneiting contends that there is a voluntariness component inherent to the actus reus of every crime, and that she did not voluntarily possess methamphetamine in the county jail when she was brought there against her will. The State argues that it presented substantial evidence at trial, sufficient to show that Gneiting voluntarily introduced contraband into a correctional facility when she was informed that bringing contraband into the jail would result in an additional charge and was given multiple opportunities to turn over the contraband before being taken to jail. In other words, the State argues that Gneiting's voluntary act of maintaining possession of the methamphetamine, despite being afforded several opportunities to turn it over to police officers before being involuntarily transported to jail, was sufficient to satisfy the requirement that Gneiting's conduct be voluntary.
Idaho Code section 18-2510(3) provides in its entirety that:
I.C. § 18-2510(3). Gneiting was convicted under subsection (c) of this statute for possessing, or attempting to possess, major contraband (methamphetamine) within a correctional facility.2
Although voluntariness is not an express statutory element of the offense, Idaho Code section 18-114 provides that, "[i]n every crime or public offense there must exist a union, or joint operation, of act and intent ...." I.C. § 18-114. This Court explained in State v. Taylor that "intent is a necessary ingredient of every crime ... in the sense that the act must have been committed by the defendant...
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