State v. Godfrey
| Decision Date | 29 May 2015 |
| Docket Number | 109,086. |
| Citation | 350 P.3d 1068,301 Kan. 1041 |
| Parties | STATE of Kansas, Appellee, v. Kody S. GODFREY, Appellant. |
| Court | Kansas Supreme Court |
Randall L. Hodgkinson, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, argued the cause and was on the brief for appellant.
Jodi E. Litfin, assistant district attorney, argued the cause, and Chadwick J. Taylor, district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, were with her on the brief for appellee.
While fleeing from an attempted traffic stop, Godfrey struck and killed Jordan Dodgen. Ultimately Godfrey was charged with and pled guilty to first-degree felony murder and aggravated battery. The plea agreement contained a provision stating: “At the time of sentencing the Parties agree to recommend that the defendant serve his sentence at Larned State Hospital, with all sentences to run concurrently without any departures.”
At the first scheduled sentencing, Godfrey requested and received a continuance on the grounds that he intended to file a motion to withdraw his plea. However, no motion to withdraw the plea was ever filed. At the second sentencing hearing, the State asked the district court to recommend to the Department of Corrections that Godfrey receive a sentence placement at Larned State Hospital.
Godfrey's attorney then explained to the district court that there had been “a little bit of a disagreement” between the parties concerning the plea agreement. Originally, Godfrey believed the agreement called for him to be sent to Larned “in lieu of sentencing for a brief evaluation then to come back and be sentenced at a later time.” The State, however, believed it had committed to asking the district court to recommend a Larned placement to the Department of Corrections. This confusion led to the request for a continuance in order for Godfrey to consider and discuss his options with counsel, including the possibility of moving to withdraw his plea. Godfrey's counsel apologized for the inconvenience and described the confusion as “an error more on my part and a miscommunication between myself and [the State].”
Later, when confusion again surfaced regarding the precise nature of the plea agreement on the subject of Godfrey's placement at Larned, Godfrey's counsel again explained to the district court that Godfrey originally understood that the recommendation was for a Larned placement in lieu of sentencing pursuant to K.S.A. 22–3430. Counsel went on to say, “[Godfrey] understands that's not going to happen and that he wanted to proceed with the sentencing today after we discussed the various options.” And further, “we acknowledge that there was a disagreement among the parties” but that now Godfrey was “willing to go ahead with the plea.”
The district court acknowledged the statements of the parties clarifying the meaning of the plea agreement and pronounced Godfrey's sentence with the recommendation that
On appeal, Godfrey's only claim is that the State violated the plea agreement and thus violated his constitutional due process rights. Godfrey argues that the agreement was ambiguous and should have been interpreted to impose Godfrey's original understanding of the terms—i.e., that the State would ask the court to commit him to Larned in lieu of sentencing pursuant to K.S.A. 22–3430. But we decline to reach the merits of Godfrey's claim because he has failed to preserve it for appellate review.
Even absent a motion to withdraw a plea, we have considered such claims so long as a contemporaneous objection was lodged. See State v. Urista, 296 Kan. 576, 595, 293 P.3d 738 (2013) ; State v. Peterson, 296 Kan. 563, 565, 293 P.3d 730 (2013). But here, Godfrey neither filed a motion to withdraw his plea after the initial confusion, nor did he object to the State's recommendation at sentencing. In fact, Godfrey's counsel affirmatively accepted the State's interpretation of the plea agreement.
Without a contemporaneous objection, Godfrey's claim is being asserted for the first time on appeal and is subject to the general rule that alleged constitutional violations cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. See State v. Gomez, 290 Kan. 858, 862, 235 P.3d 1203 (2010). While we will not generally review constitutional claims raised for the first time on appeal, we do make exceptions:
State v. Dukes, 290 Kan. 485, 488, 231 P.3d 558 (2010).
But an exception must be invoked by the party asserting the claim for the first time on appeal. Kansas Supreme Court Rule 6.02(a)(5) (...
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State v. Genson, No. 121,014
...Williams , 298 Kan. 1075, 1085, 319 P.3d 528 (2014). Our Supreme Court requires strict enforcement of this rule. State v. Godfrey , 301 Kan. 1041, 1044, 350 P.3d 1068 (2015). Yet Genson does little to try to meet this standard—he merely recites the exceptions noted above and mentions his su......
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State v. Foster
...must agree that at least one of the court-recognized exceptions applies to justify considering the claim. See State v. Godfrey , 301 Kan. 1041, 1043, 350 P.3d 1068 (2015) (directing parties who wish to raise an issue for the first time on appeal to explain why the issue is properly before t......
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State v. Hillard
...a contemporaneous objection, constitutional issues cannot generally be raised for the first time on appeal. State v. Godfrey , 301 Kan. 1041, 1043, 350 P.3d 1068 (2015). We have recognized some exceptions to this general rule, including situations where consideration of an issue is necessar......
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State v. Dunn
...Ordinarily a party that wants to pursue an issue on appeal must have preserved that issue in the court below. See State v. Godfrey , 301 Kan. 1041, 1043, 350 P.3d 1068 (2015). But preservation is a prudential consideration, not an invariable rule. See State v. Beaman , 295 Kan. 853, 857, 28......