State v. Goguen
| Jurisdiction | Oregon |
| Court | Oregon Court of Appeals |
| Citation | 481 P.3d 1011,308 Or.App. 706 |
| Docket Number | A168295 |
| Parties | STATE of Oregon, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Charles Joseph GOGUEN, aka Charles Goguen, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Decision Date | 27 January 2021 |
Kyle Krohn, Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant. Also on the brief was Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate Section, Office of Public Defense Services.
Beth Andrews, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent. Also on the brief were Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, and Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General.
Before Armstrong, Presiding Judge, and Tookey, Judge, and Aoyagi, Judge.
Defendant appeals a judgment of conviction for unlawful possession of methamphetamine, ORS 475.894 (2015), amended by Or. Laws 2017, ch. 706, § 15; Ballot Measure 110 (2020).1 Before trial, defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of a purportedly unlawful seizure. After the trial court denied that motion, defendant entered a conditional guilty plea. On appeal, defendant assigns error to the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress, arguing that neither officer safety concerns nor reasonable suspicion of a crime justified his seizure.
For the reasons that follow, we conclude that neither officer safety nor reasonable suspicion of a crime justified defendant's seizure and, therefore, that the trial court erred when it denied defendant's motion to suppress. Accordingly, we reverse and remand.
"We review the denial of defendant's motion to suppress for legal error and, in doing so, ‘we are bound by the trial court's factual findings if there is any constitutionally sufficient evidence in the record to support them.’ " State v. Meeker , 293 Or. App. 82, 83, 427 P.3d 1114 (2018) (citing State v. Maciel-Figueroa , 361 Or. 163, 165-66, 389 P.3d 1121 (2017) ). We state the facts from the suppression hearing in accordance with that standard.
Medford Police Corporal Oller observed defendant's vehicle "kind of creeping in to a parking spot" in front of a Purple Parrot store around 10 p.m. Oller "observed the vehicle for approximately a minute," during which the "vehicle never turned off," and "[n]o one ever got out of the car." Oller had "past experiences in multiple Purple Parrots around the city" and knew it was "not uncommon" for people to use or buy drugs in such locations. Oller approached the passenger side of defendant's vehicle, shined his flashlight inside, and saw two men, who looked "startled." Oller "immediately recognized [defendant]" in the driver's seat. Oller had previously "arrested [defendant] for methamphetamines," "knew that he carried replica weapons," and had "heard on the street" that defendant carried weapons.
As Oller shined his flashlight, he saw defendant clutch "a white colored item," which defendant then "shoved" into a jacket pocket. Oller believed that the white object was "some sort of contraband" because "meth pipes are coated in white residue, bags of methamphetamine are white, bags of cocaine are white, [and] pills are white." Oller did not think that the object was a weapon, but "became concerned about weapons" when defendant's hand went into the pocket, because defendant had "been reported to carry weapons." Defendant's hand remained in his pocket for roughly three seconds until Oller told him to "[t]ake your hand out of your pocket." Defendant complied, but no longer had the white object in his hand. When defendant's hand came out of his pocket, Oller "honestly c[ould]n't remember" where defendant put his hands but "might have" instructed defendant to put his hands on the steering wheel.
After Oller instructed defendant to take his hand out of his pocket, he observed that the front seat passenger closely resembled a person whom Oller knew to have an active arrest warrant. Oller called to the passenger by that person's name, to which the passenger responded, "No, that's not me," and told Oller his name was Malback. Oller ran Malback's name and discovered that he "actually had a warrant for his arrest." When a backup officer arrived, Oller arrested Malback, searched his person, and discovered a container with heroin residue inside. At some point there-after, Malback told Oller that defendant "had about a half gram of methamphetamine." Based on that information, Oller seized defendant's jacket, obtained a search warrant, and discovered a pipe in the pocket, which tested positive for methamphetamine. Defendant was subsequently convicted for unlawful possession of methamphetamine, ORS 475.894 (2015).
Before trial defendant moved to suppress evidence obtained as a result of an unlawful seizure. In a letter opinion, the trial court denied defendant's motion, determining, among other things, that
On appeal, neither party disputes the trial court's determination that a seizure occurred when Oller told defendant to place his hands on the steering wheel. Rather, defendant argues that neither officer safety concerns nor reasonable suspicion of a crime justified that seizure. The state argues that the trial court properly denied defendant's motion to suppress, because defendant's seizure was justified by both officer safety concerns and reasonable suspicion of a crime.2
We begin our analysis by examining whether officer safety justified defendant's seizure. "In order to be lawful under Article I, section 9, a warrantless search or seizure must fall within one of the few established exceptions to the warrant requirement." Meeker , 293 Or. App. at 87, 427 P.3d 1114. One of those exceptions is the officer safety exception set forth in State v. Bates , 304 Or. 519, 524, 747 P.2d 991 (1987) :
" Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution does not forbid an officer to take reasonable steps to protect himself or others if, during the course of a lawful encounter with a citizen, the officer develops a reasonable suspicion, based upon specific and articulable facts, that the citizen might pose an immediate threat of serious physical injury to the officer or to others then present."
For the officer safety exception to apply, the state must prove "not only that the officer subjectively believed that the defendant posed a threat, but also that the officer's belief was objectively reasonable." Meeker , 293 Or. App. at 87, 427 P.3d 1114 (citing State v. Rodriguez-Perez , 262 Or. App. 206, 212-13, 325 P.3d 39 (2014) ).
In this case, neither party disputes that Oller was subjectively concerned for his safety. Rather, they dispute whether Oller's belief was objectively reasonable. "To be objectively reasonable, the officer's safety concerns must be based on facts specific to the particular person * * *." Rodriguez-Perez , 262 Or. App. at 213, 325 P.3d 39 (internal quotation marks omitted). Our task on review is to determine whether " ‘any of the circumstances confronted by the officer either individually or collectively justify a reasonable suspicion that the defendant posed an immediate threat to’ " Oller or others present.3 State v. Thomas , 276 Or. App. 334, 337, 367 P.3d 537 (2016) (quoting Bates , 304 Or. at 525, 747 P.2d 991 ).
We examine those facts individually and then collectively, and we conclude that they do not justify a reasonable suspicion that defendant posed an immediate threat of serious physical injury to Oller.
To begin with, the fact that Oller's encounter happened at night adds little to justify officer safety concerns. State v. Blackstone , 289 Or. App. 421, 433, 410 P.3d 354 (2017) ().
The fact that defendant was parked in the Purple Parrot parking lot is also entitled to little or no weight. Oller testified generically that he had "past experiences in multiple Purple Parrots around the city" and knew it was "not uncommon" for people to use or buy drugs in such locations. But Oller did not articulate specific facts particular to this location, as is required to support the officer safety exception. At any rate, though "confronting a suspect in a high-crime area can contribute to officer-safety concerns, such a location has never been regarded as sufficient to support the officer-safety exception unless there were also a significant number of other indicia of danger." State v. Jimenez , 263 Or. App. 150, 159, 326 P.3d 1222, aff'd , 357 Or. 417, 353 P.3d 1227 (2015). We do not see such indicia here.
Similarly, the fact that the passenger, Malback, had an active warrant did not justify seizing defendant for officer safety reasons. The record reflects that Oller identified the passenger after instructing defendant to put his hands on the wheel—i.e. , after deciding to seize defendant. Even if Malback's active warrant could justify officer safety concerns about defendant, it could not do so retroactively. See Bates , 304 Or. at 525, 747 P.2d 991 . Moreover, nothing in the record identifies the basis for Malback's warrant, much less that the warrant indicated that defendant...
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...his mere presence outside of a Purple Parrot establishment is of little significance when viewed on its own. See State v. Goguen , 308 Or. App. 706, 713, 481 P.3d 1011 (2021) (stating that the defendant's presence in a Purple Parrot parking lot—where the officer testified that "it was ‘not ......
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...warrantless search or seizure must fall within one of the few established exceptions to the warrant requirement." State v. Goguen , 308 Or. App. 706, 709, 481 P.3d 1011 (2021) (internal quotation marks omitted). In State v. Bates , 304 Or. 519, 524, 747 P.2d 991 (1987), the Supreme Court he......