State v. Golden's Concrete Co., 96SC568
Decision Date | 18 May 1998 |
Docket Number | No. 96SC568,96SC568 |
Citation | 962 P.2d 919 |
Parties | 98 CJ C.A.R. 2412, 98 CJ C.A.R. 3735 STATE of Colorado; Gale Norton, in her official capacity as Attorney General of the State of Colorado; Department of Revenue of the State of Colorado; Renny Fagan, in his official capacity as Executive Director, Department of Revenue; Dee Hartman, in his official capacity as Director, Division of Motor Vehicles, Department of Revenue; Larry D. Huls, in his official capacity as Assistant Director, Motor Vehicle Division, Department of Revenue; Jean Gouin, in her official capacity as Program Administrator, Motor Vehicle Division, Department of Revenue; and Jaki Berry, in her official capacity as Administrative Officer, Motor Carrier Services, Motor Vehicle Division, Department of Revenue, Petitioners, v. GOLDEN'S CONCRETE COMPANY; Golden Gravel Company; Golden Construction Company; and United Companies of Mesa County, Inc., Respondents. |
Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
Gale A. Norton, Attorney General, Martha Phillips Allbright, Chief Deputy Attorney, General Richard A. Westfall, Solicitor General, Paul Farley, Deputy Attorney General, David Kaye, First Assistant Attorney General, Mark W. Gerganoff, Assistant Attorney General, State Services Section Denver, for Petitioners.
King & Isaacson, Scott E. Isaacson, Salt Lake City, Utah, Hutchison Neider Ward & King, Richard Hutchison, Murray, Utah, for Respondents.
The petitioners--the State of Colorado, the Department of Revenue, and various individuals in their official capacities (collectively, "the Department")--appeal the court of appeals' decision reversing the district court's dismissal of a complaint filed by the respondents, Golden's Concrete Company ("Golden's"), 1 for lack of jurisdiction due to the failure to exhaust administrative remedies. See Golden's Concrete Company v. State, 937 P.2d 789, 792 (Colo.App.1996). The Department also appeals the court of appeals' determination that the Department is not entitled to attorney fees pursuant to section 13-17-201, 5 C.R.S. (1997). See id. at 794.
With respect to all but one claim for relief in the amended complaint ("the state law claims"), we reverse the court of appeals on the jurisdictional issue and hold that the district court properly dismissed the complaint since Golden's failed to exhaust its administrative remedies. With respect to the one remaining claim, a civil rights claim brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, we reverse the court of appeals and hold that dismissal of this claim is also appropriate, but for a different reason. The doctrine of comity bars a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 under these facts. We hold that 42 U.S.C. § 1988 preempts Colorado's attorney fees statute, section 13-17-201, with respect to the award of attorney fees to a prevailing defendant on a section 1983 claim. The district court did not apply the appropriate standard when it denied the Department's motion seeking attorneys fees as a result of the dismissal of the section 1983 claim. We return this case to the court of appeals with directions to remand it to the district court for dismissal and for a determination of whether the Department is entitled to an award of attorney fees as the prevailing defendant in a section 1983 claim under the standards set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
The Colorado Department of Revenue assesses an annual registration fee upon all commercial motor vehicles in Colorado. See § 42-3-134(13), 11 C.R.S. (1997). In 1989, the General Assembly changed the Department's registration scheme, resulting in increased registration fees. 2 Although the change became effective on January 1, 1990, the Department was unable to convert its billing system to implement the new fee schedule for all carriers. As a temporary measure, the Department charged interstate carriers the new higher registration fees, but charged intrastate carriers the lower 1989 fees until it was able to identify and calculate the new fees for the intrastate carriers. After the Department made the new calculations for the intrastate carriers, it billed them for the amounts owed. This process, known as "backbilling," began in 1992.
That year, the Department backbilled Golden's through several letters requesting additional registration fees. The letters did not describe the procedures for disputing the bills, but did provide a telephone number to call with any questions. Golden's refused to pay these bills. The Department responded by assessing penalties and interest and by refusing to issue 1993 licenses to Golden's until it paid the disputed fees.
On January 21, 1993, Golden's filed suit against the Department in Denver District Court. The amended complaint requested class certification and asserted that the Department's backbilling violated due process protections embodied in the Colorado Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), 3 equal protection, 4 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 5 and ex post facto principles. 6 Golden's also requested attorney fees and costs under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. 7 Golden's paid the contested registration fees after it sought but was denied a preliminary injunction directing the Department to accept the 1993 application for registration renewal.
The Department filed a motion to dismiss under C.R.C.P. 12(b) for lack of jurisdiction, arguing that Golden's failed to exhaust its administrative remedies. The Department also requested attorney fees and costs under section 13-17-201, 5 C.R.S. (1997), and alternatively under sections 13-17-101 to -106, 5 C.R.S. (1997). 8 Golden's countered that it was not required to exhaust its administrative remedies because of various exceptions to the exhaustion doctrine.
On October 13, 1994, 9 the district court granted the Department's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction on the grounds that Golden's failed to exhaust its administrative remedies. However, the district court denied the Department's motion for attorney fees and costs, stating that attorney fees were not appropriate since Golden's proceeded in district court with a "good-faith belief" that the district court possessed jurisdiction over its claims. 10
Meanwhile, on June 13, 1994, the Department issued a final order in an administrative proceeding concerning backbilled registration fees filed by another intrastate motor carrier, Chenoweth Construction Company. In that order, the executive director of the Department ruled that its backbilling procedures as applied to Chenoweth were consistent with statutory and constitutional due process.
On January 17, 1995, Golden's appealed the district court's dismissal of its complaint to the court of appeals. The court of appeals reversed the district court's dismissal and remanded the case to the district court with directions to consider the merits of the claims. The court of appeals held that Golden's was not required to exhaust its administrative remedies before filing its complaint because the complaint only raised questions of law that did not require agency expertise. The court of appeals also ruled that further appeal to the Department would have been futile based on the Department's recent final determination involving the identical due process issue and the same challenge to the propriety of backbilling involved in the present case. The court of appeals affirmed the district court's order denying attorney fees based on its disposition of the dismissal issue in favor of Golden's. We granted certiorari to review the court of appeals' decision. 11
We begin with a discussion of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. This doctrine serves as a threshold to judicial review that requires parties in a civil action to pursue available statutory administrative remedies before filing suit in district court. See Hoffman v. Colorado State Bd. of Assessment Appeals, 683 P.2d 783, 785 (Colo.1984); Moschetti v. Liquor Licensing Auth., 176 Colo. 281, 285, 490 P.2d 299, 301 (1971); Denver-Laramie-Walden Truck Line, Inc. v. Denver-Fort Collins Freight Serv., Inc., 156 Colo. 366, 370, 399 P.2d 242, 243 (1965). If the parties fail to satisfy the exhaustion requirement, the district court is without jurisdiction to hear the action. See Horrell v. Department of Admin., 861 P.2d 1194, 1197 (Colo.1993).
A principal objective of the doctrine of administrative remedies is to prevent piecemeal application of judicial relief and to conserve judicial resources. See id. The doctrine also enables the agency to make initial determinations on matters within its expertise and to compile a record that is adequate for judicial review. See Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 765, 95 S.Ct. 2457, 45 L.Ed.2d 522 (1975). Finally, the doctrine affords an agency the opportunity to correct its own errors, thus minimizing the risk of judicial intervention in the administrative process and preserving the agency's autonomy. See Collopy v. Wildlife Comm'n, 625 P.2d 994, 1006 (Colo.1981).
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is subject to limited exceptions. For instance, a court may determine that exhaustion is unnecessary "when the matter in controversy raises questions of law rather than issues committed to administrative discretion and expertise." Id. Another exception applies when it is "clear beyond a reasonable doubt" that further administrative review by the agency would be futile because the agency will not provide the relief requested. Colorado v. Veterans Admin., 430 F.Supp. 551, 558 (D.Colo.1977); see also Kuhn v. Department of Revenue, 817 P.2d 101, 104 (Colo.1991) ( ). In class actions, the unnamed class members need not exhaust administrative...
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