State v. Goldfarb

• Decision Date: 20 January 1971
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. Alexander A. GOLDFARB, Administrator (ESTATE of Stanley OSTRICH).

Page 818

278 A.2d 818

160 Conn. 320

STATE of Connecticut v. Alexander A. GOLDFARB, Administrator (ESTATE of Stanley OSTRICH).

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Jan. 20, 1971.

Bernard F. McGovern, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom, on the brief, were Robert K. Killian, Atty. Gen., and F. Michael Ahern, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellant (plaintiff).

J. Read Murphy, Hartford, with whom was John E. Silliman, Hartford, for appellee (defendant).

Before ALCORN, C.J., and HOUSE, THIM, RYAN and SHAPIRO, JJ.

ALCORN, Chief Justice.

The state has appealed from a judgment rendered upon the overruling of its demurrer to the defendant's special defense. The only issue, therefore, is whether the pleading demurred to, the allegations of which are assumed to be true for the purposes of this appeal, sets forth a good defense to the state's action. Cashman v. Meriden Hospital, 117 Conn. 585, 586, 169 A. 915. The complaint sought the recovery of damages against the decedent's estate upon a claim which was not presented within the time limited by order of the Probate Court pursuant to the provisions of General Statutes § 45-205 and which was disallowed by the defendant administrator.

The complaint alleges, in substance, the following. The defendant is the duly appointed administrator of the estate of the decedent, Stanley Ostrich. From October 23, 1953, until his death on April 8, 1964, the decedent was a resident of the Veterans Home and Hospital at the expense of the state. The hospital is a state institution and, pursuant to General Statutes § 27-108, as amended, the veterans home and hospital commission had determined that the decedent's estate was able to pay for his support, which amounted to $24,779.04. The state had received from federal sources $7933.12 for the partial support of the decedent leaving a balance of $16,845.92. On March 21, 1968, the state, pursuant to General Statutes § 27-108, presented a claim for $16,845.92 to the defendant administrator which the latter disallowed on March 25, 1968.

The defendant filed a special defense in which he alleged, in substance, that, on November 30, 1967, the Probate Court ordered a three-month limitation for the presentation of claims against the estate; that, on March 18, 1968, he had made return to the court that no claims had been presented within the three-month period; that thereafter, on March 21, 1968, the veterans home and hospital commission had, through the attorney general, purported to present a claim for $16,845.92; and that this claim was not presented in timely fashion, and is barred by statute and by the limitation of the period fixed by the court for the presentation of claims.

The state demurred on the ground that it is not subject to the 'Statute of Limitations', referring to the three-month limitation ordered by the Probate Court, without its consent, which consent was not alleged in the special defense.

The case thus presents a question which we have not heretofore had to decide, namely, whether the Connecticut nonclaim statute, § 45-205, is applicable to the claim asserted against the estate of this decedent by the state, proceeding, in this instance and for the reasons stated, by its agency, the veterans home and hospital commission.

Section 45-205 as amended, effective October 1, 1967 (Public Acts 1967, No. 558, §§ 49, 56), the material part of which is quoted in the footnote, ¹ provides, in substance, that the court of probate may limit to three months the period within which claims against a solvent estate may be presented to the executor or administrator, and that any creditor who fails to exhibit his claim within the period so limited shall be barred of his demand against the estate.

The single claim made in this appeal is that the statute does not bar the state from pursuing the claim made in the present case even though the claim was not presented to the defendant within the three months limited by the Probate Court. The purport of the special defense is that the state's failure to present its claim within the time limited by the Probate Court is a complete bar to the cause of action stated in the complaint. The state attacks the defense on the ground that it is not, without its consent, subject to the 'Statute of Limitations' which the defendant relies on. It would avoid § 45-205, which it asserts to be a statute of limitation, on the ground of sovereign immunity. It is conceded that all circumstances calling for the imposition of the bar of the statute exist if, in fact, the state is bound by it in the prosecution of the present action.

'It may be stated we think as a universal rule in the construction of statutes limiting rights, that they are not to be construed to embrace the government or sovereignty unless by express terms or necessary implication such appears to have been the clear intention of the legislature, and the rights of the government are not to be impaired by a statute unless its terms are clear and explicit, and admit of no other construction.' State v. Shelton, 47 Conn. 400, 404; State v. City of Hartford, 50 Conn. 89, 90. 'The state holds the immunities in this respect belonging by the English common law to the King.' State v. Kilburn, 81 Conn. 9, 11, 69 A. 1028, 1029. What then is the effect of § 45-205 in the light of this principle?

Courts in other jurisdictions have differed on the question whether a nonclaim statute is applicable to a claim by the state against the estate of a decedent. See note, 34 A.L.R.2d 1003, 1005, 1011. A number of jurisdictions which have passed upon claims similar to that in issue here have held the nonclaim statute to be applicable to the state. Estate of Randall v. Colorado State Hospital, 166 Colo. 1, 441 P.2d 153; Bahr v. Zahm, 219 Ind. 297, 37 N.E.2d 942; In re Peers' Estate, 234 Iowa 403, 12 N.W.2d 894; In re Dockham Estate, 108 N.H. 80, 227 A.2d 774; State v. Evans, 143 Wash. 449, 255 P. 1035; see also Donnally v. Montgomery County Welfare Board, 200 Md. 534, 92 A.2d 354; State v. Estate of Crocker, 38 Ala.App. 306, 83 So.2d 261. Decisions to the contrary are Territory v. Makaaa, 43 Hawaii 237, and In re Will of Bogert, 64 N.M. 438, 329 P.2d 1023. Other contrary decisions, which turn either on tax claims and the provisions of tax statutes, such as In re Estate of Adams, 224 Wis. 237, 272 N.W. 19, Ray v. State, 123 Colo. 144, 226 P.2d 804, and Liebhardt v. Department of Revenue, 123 Colo. 369, 229 P.2d 655, or on the ground that the state's claim did not arise out of contract and therefore was not governed by the provisions of the applicable nonclaim statute such as State ex rel. Conway v. Glenn, 60 Ariz. 22, 131 P.2d 363, and County of Los Angeles v. Security First National Bank, 84 Cal.App.2d 575, 191 P.2d 78, are not guides to our present problem. Our examination of the cases from other jurisdictions, however, leads us to the belief that the weight of authority in other jurisdictions is that nonclaim statutes are generally applicable to claims made by the state. Nevertheless, our concern is with the effect of our own statute, § 45-205, on the claim made here.

It is settled law that § 45-205 is not a statute of limitation but, instead, imposes a condition precedent to a legal recovery against a solvent estate. Grant v. Grant, 63 Conn. 530, 546, 29 A. 15. In an action on a claim, the due presentation of the claim is a necessary allegation in the complaint and, lacking such allegation, the complaint is demurrable. Duvall v. Birden, 124 Conn. 43, 48-49, 198 A. 255; Lewisohn v. Stoddard, 78 Conn. 575, 595, 63 A. 621; Grant v. Grant, supra; 2 Locke & Kohn, Conn. Probate Practice § 520; see Freda v. Smith, 142 Conn. 126, 132, 111 A.2d 679; Costello v. Costello, 134 Conn. 536, 538, 59 A.2d 520. The purpose of ...