State v. Goldman

• Decision Date: 12 November 1900
• Citation: State v. Goldman, 65 N.J.L. 394, 47 A. 641 (N.J. 1900)
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court
• Parties: THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, DEFENDANT IN ERROR, v. IKE GOLDMAN, PLAINTIFF IN ERROR

47 A. 641

65 N.J.L. 394

STATE

v. GOLDMAN.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

Nov. 12, 1900.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Error to court of quarter sessions, Mercer county.

Ike Goldman was convicted of receiving stolen goods, and brings error.Reversed.

Argued June term, 1900, before the CHIEF JUSTICE and GUMMERE, LUDLOW, and FORT, JJ.

Beasley & Walker, for plaintiff in error.

William J. Crossley, for the State.

FORT, J.This writ of error in this case brings up the conviction of the defendant in the quarter sessions of Mercer county upon an indictment charging him with receiving stolen goods, knowing them to have been stolen.

The first error assigned is on the refusal of the court, when the state rested, to direct the jury to acquit the defendant on the ground that the evidence of the thieves was uncorroborated.If a thief may be said to be an accomplice of the person who receives from him stolen goods, knowing them to have been stolen, still that fact alone will not justify the court in directing a verdict of acquittal against the receiver, even when the evidence of the receiver's guilt might be solely that of the thief.It is held in this state that conviction for crime, under proper cautionary instructions from the court, may be sustained when only the evidence of the accomplice is relied upon.State v. Hyer, 39 N. J. Law, 598, 601;1 Greenl. Ev. (15th Ed.) § 380.Evidence of the thief, supported by corroborating facts, always has been held to justify a conviction for receiving.Com. v. Savory, 10 Cush. 535.In this case there were facts and circumstances, if not direct testimony, to corroborate the thieves.There was no error in the refusal to direct a verdict of acquittal.

Nor was there any error in the charge of the court that the guilty knowledge of the defendant might be proven by testimony of the thieves, if supported by corroborating facts.Com. v. Savory, supra.Nor in the charge of the court that the purchase of the goods very much under their value was an element upon the question of guilty knowledge.Rose.Cr. Ev. p. 875;1 Hale, P. C. 619.

The third, fifth, and sixth assignments of error are no more than comments or expressions of opinion by the court, and could not have been understood by the jury in any other light than merely directing their attention to matters which were proper for their consideration, and hence are not assignable as error.Engle v. State, 50 N. J. Law, 272, 13 Atl. 604.

The seventh assignment alleges that the grand jury was organized in the sessions, and the indictment returned into the oyer and terminer.It appears that on the opening of the Mercer county circuit court on the second Tuesday of May, 1899, the justice of the supreme court being absent, the grand jury were sworn in the quarter sessions, and that subsequently, when said justice was present, the grand jury returned the indictment into court.That it was returned into the oyer and terminer can only be inferred from the caption of the indictment as returned, and the fact that a rule was entered on the 26th day of May, 1899, directing that the indictment be handed down to the sessions for trial, while the record that "the bills herewith presented are true bills," as signed by the foreman, was entered in the quarter sessions minutes.The error in the indictment is only a clerical one in the caption thereof.The justice of the supreme court and judge of the common pleas hold the sessions, as well as the oyer, and there is nothing in the record to show that they did not receive the grand jury in the sessions, except the caption, as above stated.The rule handing down was unnecessary and of no force.If the question raised on the motion in arrest of judgment had been presented on a motion to quash, the court could have ordered the caption of the indictment amended by substituting "Quarter Sessions" for "Oyer and Terminer."Our statute is quite ample for such a purpose.By the forty-fourth section of the criminal procedure act of 1898(Laws 1898, p. 881) it is provided: "Every objection to any indictment, for any defect of form or substance apparent on the face thereof, shall be taken by demurrer or motion to quash such indictment, before the jury shall be sworn, and not afterwards; and every court before which any such objection shall be taken for any such defect, or before whom any person may be tried, may, if it be thought necessary, cause the indictment to be forthwith amended in any particular by some officer of ...