State v. Golie

Decision Date02 May 2006
Docket NumberNo. 05-002.,05-002.
Citation2006 MT 91,134 P.3d 95
PartiesSTATE of Montana, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Kathleen Michele GOLIE, Defendant and Appellant.
CourtMontana Supreme Court

Christopher Daly, Attorney at Law, Missoula, for Appellant.

Hon. Mike McGrath, Attorney General; C. Mark Fowler, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Fred Van Valkenburg, Missoula County Attorney; Kirsten LaCroix, Deputy County Attorney, Missoula, for Respondent.

Chief Justice KARLA M. GRAY delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶ 1 Kathleen Michele Golie appeals from the judgment and sentence entered by the Fourth Judicial District Court, Missoula County, upon a jury verdict convicting her of the felony offense of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or drugs. We reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

¶ 2 The dispositive issue on appeal is whether the District Court abused its discretion by denying Golie's challenge of a prospective juror for cause.

BACKGROUND

¶ 3 The State of Montana charged Golie by information with the felony offense of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or drugs (DUI). The State also charged Golie with misdemeanor offenses to which she eventually pled guilty; the misdemeanors are not at issue here. The case proceeded to trial on the felony charge.

¶ 4 During jury voir dire, prospective juror John Lundt revealed the issue of DUI was a "sore subject" for him because, in 1969, he had been injured by a drunk driver who was never prosecuted. After subsequent questioning, defense counsel challenged him for cause and the District Court denied the challenge. Later, after additional statements by Lundt, defense counsel renewed the challenge for cause and the court again denied it.

¶ 5 Golie exercised one peremptory challenge to remove Lundt and exhausted all of her peremptory challenges. The jury was selected, the parties presented their cases, and the jury convicted Golie of DUI. The District Court subsequently entered judgment and sentence. Golie appeals. We set forth additional facts below.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 6 We review a trial court's denial of a challenge for cause to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion. State v. Marble, 2005 MT 208, ¶ 10, 328 Mont. 223, ¶ 10, 119 P.3d 88, ¶ 10 (citation omitted).

DISCUSSION

¶ 7 Did the District Court abuse its discretion in denying Golie's challenge to a prospective juror for cause?

¶ 8 Section 46-16-115(2), MCA, sets forth the bases for challenging potential jurors for cause in Montana criminal cases. One specified basis is that a juror has "a state of mind in reference to the case or to either of the parties that would prevent the juror from acting with entire impartiality and without prejudice to the substantial rights of either party." Section 46-16-115(2)(j), MCA. A challenge under § 46-16-115(2)(j), MCA, must be determined pursuant to both the statutory language and the totality of the circumstances presented. State v. Heath, 2004 MT 58, ¶ 16, 320 Mont. 211, ¶ 16, 89 P.3d 947, ¶ 16. If voir dire examination raises a serious question about a prospective juror's ability to be fair and impartial, dismissal for cause is favored. State v. Richeson, 2004 MT 113, ¶ 14, 321 Mont. 126, ¶ 14, 89 P.3d 958, ¶ 14 (citation omitted).

¶ 9 Golie argues Lundt demonstrated bias by his statements regarding his unresolved DUI-related experience. We agree.

¶ 10 We have acknowledged that a prospective juror's past experiences and characteristics may not necessarily affect his or her ability to remain impartial; however, we also have recognized a "`fundamental fact of human character'" is that people are "`prone to favor that side of a cause with which they identify themselves either economically, socially, or emotionally.'" See State v. Lamere, 2005 MT 118, ¶ 17, 327 Mont. 115, ¶ 17, 112 P.3d 1005, ¶ 17 (quoting State v. Chastain (1997), 285 Mont. 61, 64, 947 P.2d 57, 59-60, overruled on other grounds by State v. Herrman, 2003 MT 149, ¶ 33, 316 Mont. 198, ¶ 33, 70 P.3d 738, ¶ 33). In determining whether a serious question has arisen regarding a prospective juror's ability to be fair and impartial, we review his or her responses as a whole. See Heath, ¶ 18 (citation omitted).

¶ 11 Here, the prosecutor asked various prospective jurors whether they could think of a situation in which it would be "okay" to drive while under the influence and whether the DUI laws were too strict. The prospective jurors responded. Then, the following exchange occurred between the prosecutor and Lundt:

MS. LaCROIX: You've been kind of quiet.

JUROR LUNDT: This is kind of a sore subject for me. I would say I was injured by a drunk driver. My left arm was shattered. The person in question was a well-to-do son of an attorney who sent the young lad to Europe to avoid prosecution. It's kind of a sore subject for me.

MS. LaCROIX: Really. How long ago was that?

JUROR LUNDT: 1969.

MS. LaCROIX: And was the person ever brought to justice?

JUROR LUNDT: Never.

MS. LaCROIX: So — yeah, you have every reason to be angry.

JUROR LUNDT: (The juror nodded his head.)

MS. LaCROIX: Probably at everybody involved.

JUROR LUNDT: Both drunk drivers and attorneys. Not, you know, in a wholesale sense but I had issues with all those involved.

MS. LaCROIX: We get that a lot. I like to tell people when they're railing on attorneys, you know, I'm really not an attorney. I'm a prosecutor. We're a little bit different but —

THE COURT: I don't have an instruction on that so.

MS. LaCROIX:—I won't say what I'm thinking. Thank you for your candor. Would you be able to sit and listen to the — my officers testifying about what they saw Ms. Golie doing and could you be fair to — to the state and could you be fair to Ms. Golie?

JUROR LUNDT: Probably.

The prosecutor then questioned Lundt about his profession and family.

¶ 12 Later, Golie's counsel questioned Lundt as follows.

MS. BORG: Mr. Lundt, let me start by going back to your concerns here, the sore subject if you would. As Kathleen Golie's attorney, what I'm looking for today are people that can be unbiased and unprejudiced in this case, and this is a driving-while-impaired case. With your life experience, are you that guy? Are you unbiased and unprejudiced in this case?

JUROR LUNDT: Probably in this case.

MS. BORG: Okay. Now neither Ms. LaCroix nor I can change the fact that — that we're attorneys. We're stuck with that, but we need to be very clear here that Kathleen Golie is presumed innocent, and jurors can't bring with them anything that would skew that perception or bring a bias and a prejudice, and as I heard you talk about the sore subject my little red flags went up. How can you guarantee you have no biases or prejudices in this case?

JUROR LUNDT: I can't.

MS. BORG: Okay. If you were on trial for a DUI, would you want to be judged by a juror that felt like you?

JUROR LUNDT: Absolutely not.

MS. BORG: Okay. And can you put that in words for me? Why is that?

JUROR LUNDT: I would be concerned about residual feelings concerning the subject at hand.

MS. BORG: Okay. I don't want to put words in your mouth. The judge has to hear this from you, but are you telling me that in this case you can't guarantee no bias and no prejudice?

JUROR LUNDT: Can you restate that?

MS. BORG: Can you promise me you have no bias and prejudice in this case either for the state or against the defendant?

JUROR LUNDT: I have no bias against the state. I'm — I'm concerned about the State of Montana and its approach to this issue which I think has been sophomoric for years. I don't have a strong prejudice against attorneys in general. There are a few I'm not fond of for obvious reasons, but I don't paint the entire profession, toggle them all with the same brush. This is a subject that is of great concern to me. The person in question was not obviously driving the car that hit me; wasn't even born yet. It — it's just an emotional issue for me.

MS. BORG: I understand that, and I'm looking for jurors on behalf of Kathleen Golie that don't have that emotional issue or that emotional charge that they bring to the panel.

JUROR LUNDT: And you'd probably be better to select someone else.

MS. BORG: Well, I appreciate that, but I have to have you say that so that I can ask the judge to excuse you for cause.

JUROR LUNDT: What — what — what do you want me to say?

MS. BORG: I can't quite go there. I want you to tell me whether you can be unbiased and unprejudiced in this case.

JUROR LUNDT: I don't think I would be your best choice.

MS. BORG: Okay. Should you be excused for cause?

JUROR LUNDT: I don't know. What are the causes?

MS. BORG: Well, I'm trying to get you tell [sic] me that. I hear you say you can't guarantee that you wouldn't be biased or prejudiced in this case, right?

JUROR LUNDT: I think that this would be an emotionally charged issue for me in terms of being dishonest or — or prejudiced or — or ignoring evidence. I don't think that's the case at all. It's just a situation in which if I had not been involved in that type of — of an incident it would be much easier for me to participate and probably a lot easier for all of you folks also.

MS. BORG: I don't think anyone would — would want to leave you with the impression we think you would be dishonest or do anything inappropriate. What we're looking for is jurors don't come in with loaded emotional issues that might influence how they would deliberate this case.

Everybody's the perfect juror for some case, not everybody is the perfect juror for this case, and I'm hearing you say that you're not the right guy for this case?

JUROR LUNDT: I don't think I would be the best selection for this case.

MS. BORG: Okay. And I also hear you say that — that that might prejudice the defendant in this case.

JUROR LUNDT: I think it would make her nervous. Were I in her position listening to me I...

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