State v. Gonzalez
| Decision Date | 24 April 1989 |
| Citation | 556 A.2d 323,114 N.J. 592 |
| Parties | STATE of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Manuel E. GONZALEZ, Defendant-Respondent. |
| Court | New Jersey Supreme Court |
James J. Gerrow, Jr., Deputy First Asst. Prosecutor, for plaintiff-appellant (Stephen G. Raymond, Burlington County Prosecutor, attorney; James J. Gerrow and Deborah A. Siegrist, Asst. Prosecutor, on the brief).
Jerome A. Sweeney, for defendant-respondent (Sweeney & Yetman, Mount Holly, attorneys).
Carol M. Henderson, Deputy Atty. Gen., for amicus curiae Atty. Gen. of New Jersey (Peter N. Perretti, Jr., Atty. Gen., attorney).
Emerson L. Darnell submitted a brief on behalf of amicus curiae American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey (Emerson L. Darnell, attorney; Robert L. Sloan, Mount Holly, on the letter brief).
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
This appeal is from a judgment declaring invalid the current procedure employed by law enforcement personnel in issuing tickets for traffic violations. The Law Division held that for a ticket to be valid a judge, judicial clerk, or deputy clerk must, after the officer has given the driver a ticket, make an independent determination of probable cause. We hold that no such probable cause finding is required for a complaint charging the commission of a traffic offense.
Although we hold that the conviction under review is not subject to any attack based on the absence of this procedure, and vacate the order below dismissing the complaint, we nonetheless remand the matter to the municipal court for a new trial, as it is undisputed that defendant received inadequate advice of his right to counsel.
Defendant, Manuel Gonzalez, was stopped on March 25, 1988, by Patrolman Dale Baranoski of the Westampton Township Police Department for speeding. After asking defendant to step out of his vehicle and patting him down, Officer Baranoski discovered marijuana in the defendant's pocket. The officer issued defendant a summons, which was part of a uniform traffic ticket, citing defendant for the possession of a controlled dangerous substance in a motor vehicle contrary to N.J.S.A. 39:4-49.1, speeding, and also for driving without insurance, since the defendant had failed to produce the proper documentation. The complaint, also part of the uniform traffic ticket, was completed and signed by Officer Baranoski, and routinely filed with the Westampton Municipal Court. No hearing on probable cause was held.
The defendant, appearing pro se, pled guilty to the speeding and insurance charges, but pled not guilty to the marijuana charge. He was tried in municipal court and found guilty of the possession of .06 grams of marijuana in a motor vehicle. As provided under N.J.S.A. 39:4-49.1, the municipal court imposed a fine of $50 and suspended the defendant's driver's license for two years.
Having retained an attorney, Mr. Gonzalez appealed to the Superior Court where he was entitled to a trial de novo on the record. R. 3:23-8. The trial court, in an opinion issued March 7, 1989, determined that the complaint should be dismissed, because of the absence of a "neutral, impartial" determination of probable cause. It further held that because the defendant had not been represented by counsel below, and because of the potential magnitude of the issue, the defendant's failure to raise the issue at his initial trial did not preclude him from raising it on appeal.
On March 14, 1989, the trial court issued an order staying all Burlington County appeals, either of traffic offense convictions or from interlocutory orders, in which the defendants raised the probable cause issue, and further staying those pending proceedings in municipal courts in which defendants sought dismissal based on that issue. In light of the potential disruption that decision could create in the processing of traffic violations, we certified the case for direct appeal on our own motion, and issued a further order staying the judgment and order below. Under our order, all traffic and other municipal cases were to be prosecuted and appealed under the procedures in place prior to the trial court's decision, with the exception that license revocations and jail sentences imposed in cases covered by the initial order would remain stayed.
When a police officer stops a motorist for a traffic offense, the officer may immediately issue a summons, which is part of a uniform traffic ticket, and subsequently file the complaint. This procedure is authorized under Rule 7:3-1, which governs process in the municipal courts:
If the Administrative Director of the Courts has ... prescribed the form of complaint and summons for non-indictable offenses, a law enforcement officer may make, sign and issue such complaint and summons, serving the summons upon the defendant and thereafter, without unnecessary delay, filing the complaint with the court named therein.... [R. 7:3-1(b).]
Rule 7:6-1 specifically applies these procedures to traffic violations:
The complaint may be made and signed by a law enforcement officer, or by any other person, but the summons shall be signed and issued only by such officer, or the judge, clerk or deputy clerk of the court in which the complaint is, or is to be filed. R. 7:3 relating to warrants and summons in respect of nonindictable offenses generally, shall be applicable to cases involving a traffic offense, except as otherwise herein provided. [R. 7:6-1(b), see also N.J.S.A. 39:5-25 (allowing law enforcement personnel to issue summons instead of making arrest for motor vehicle violations).]
Under Rule 1:32-3, the Administrative Director of the Courts, subject to this Court's approval, determines the authorized form for uniform traffic tickets for use by the municipal court judges, who are responsible for the dissemination and recordkeeping of the tickets.
Each ticket is a four-part carbon form, containing the complaint, two recordkeeping copies, and the summons, which is given to the violator at the scene. The same information, including the name, address, and other information about the violator, a description of the vehicle, a description of the violation, the police officer's signature, and the date of the violator's required court appearance, is called for and imprints on all four parts of the form. On the complaint part, the officer's signature appears below the statement: "The undersigned further states that he has just and reasonable grounds to believe that the person named above committed the offense(s) herein set forth [contrary] 1 to law." On the summons, a carbon copy of the same signature appears under the statement: "You are notified that the undersigned will file a complaint in this court charging you with the offense set forth above." No oath or verification is required.
Neither the Rules cited above nor the ticket itself requires or contemplates a probable cause hearing. Indeed, the detailed instructions that the Administrative Office of the Courts has sent to municipal courts along with its most recent ticket specimen, that cover printing, police protocol, information required on the officer's copy of the ticket, and recordkeeping, make no mention of such a hearing. See Memorandum of July 1985 from the Administrative Office of the Courts to the Judges of the Municipal Courts.
These Rules, as implemented in accordance with their terms by the Administrative Office of the Courts, make it clear, therefore, that the procedure used here was proper. A problem arises, however, from the reference made in Rule 7:3-1 to Rules governing indictable offenses stating that "[t]he provisions of R. 3:2 (complaint), R. 3:3 (), R. 3:4-1 () and R. 3:4-2 () are applicable to municipal courts in respect of all non-indictable offenses, except as follows." Among these incorporated provisions is Rule 3:3-1(a) requiring a judge, clerk, or deputy clerk to determine probable cause before issuing a summons or warrant. The exceptions that follow, however, include the provision allowing law enforcement officers to issue summonses and file complaints that are part of an approved form. R. 7:3-1(b).
Because this exception does not explicitly eliminate the probable cause requirement, the trial court read the Rule to continue to require it. It is clear from the Rules themselves, however, and from the purposes behind them that a requirement of probable cause hearings for traffic offenses should not be implied.
The trial court did not suggest, nor does the defendant, that a probable cause hearing must be held before a traffic summons may issue. Rather, what is contemplated is a required validation of the summons after it has already been issued. The Rules governing indictable offenses, however, referred to in Rule 7:3-1, which the court below would make applicable to traffic offenses as well as to municipal offenses generally, are primarily concerned with the validity of the summons before it is issued.
Rule 3:2 provides, in the case of indictable offenses and those non-indictable offenses to which it may apply, that
[t]he complaint shall be a written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged made upon oath before a judge or other person empowered by law to take complaints. Whenever practicable a copy thereof shall be served on the defendant at the time of service of the summons or execution of the warrant. The clerk or deputy clerk shall accept for filing any complaint made by any person.
It is only on the subsequent issuance of a summons or warrant that a probable cause determination is required:
A summons or arrest warrant shall be issued by a judge of a court having jurisdiction in the municipality in which the offense is alleged to have been committed or in which the defendant may be found, or by the clerk or a deputy clerk of that court, only if it appears to...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Patel
...and therefore defies a harmless error analysis. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 148-49, 126 S.Ct. 2557 ; see also State v. Gonzalez, 114 N.J. 592, 608, 556 A.2d 323 (1989) (holding on direct appeal that the defendant's "conviction must be reversed ... because the defendant was not adequately ad......
-
State v. Kenison
...Madsen, who was then released. The holdings in Ross and Salzman were recently summarized by the Supreme Court in State v. Gonzalez, 114 N.J. 592, 601, 556 A.2d 323 (1989), where it held that the trial court in Gonzalez erroneously determined that a uniform traffic summons was invalid becaus......
-
State v. Hill
...the 1988 court year over three-and-a-half million traffic complaints were filed for parking violations alone). See State v. Gonzalez, 114 N.J. 592, 606, 556 A.2d 323 (1989). And although the officer's effort to ascertain the identity of the vehicle's owner may have been a commendable exerci......
-
State of NJ v. Imperiale
...of justice are implicated pre-trial in private prosecutions, regardless of the maximum penalty she faces. See State v. Gonzalez, 114 N.J. 592, 604, 556 A.2d 323 (1989) (where court held that criminal traffic violations do not require probable cause determination, court went on to recognize:......