State v. Gonzalez-Coria
| Decision Date | 23 March 2022 |
| Docket Number | A172502 (Control), A172501 |
| Parties | STATE of Oregon, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Vanessa GONZALEZ-CORIA, aka Vanessa Gonzalez, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Oregon Court of Appeals |
Matthew Blythe, Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant. Also on the briefs was Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate Section, Office of Public Defense Services.
Jonathan N. Schildt, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent. Also on the brief were Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, and Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General.
Before Tookey, Presiding Judge, and Aoyagi, Judge, and Armstrong, Senior Judge.
Before her trial on an alleged probation violation and four new charges, defendant moved to suppress incriminating evidence that the police found in the house that defendant shared with her boyfriend, J. Invoking the "disagreeing tenants" exception to the "common authority" rule, defendant argued that she had denied consent to search the house and that her denial trumped her boyfriend's consent. The trial court denied the motion. Defendant was subsequently convicted on the four new charges, and her probation was revoked. On appeal, defendant raises a single assignment of error, challenging the denial of her motion to suppress. For the following reasons, we affirm.
We review the denial of a motion to suppress for errors of law. State v. Ehly , 317 Or. 66, 75, 854 P.2d 421 (1993). We are bound by the trial court's findings of facts if supported by constitutionally sufficient evidence. Id. In the absence of express findings, we presume that the court made implicit findings consistent with its ultimate ruling. Id. We state the facts in accordance with the standard of review.
In 2016, defendant was convicted of cocaine delivery and child neglect. She was sentenced to 60 months of formal probation.
In August 2018, the police received a tip that J was a "significant heroin drug trafficker." The police received additional information in that vein in January and February 2019. During their investigation, the police gathered information connecting defendant to J and thought that defendant was "maybe" living at J's house on Starr Court. The investigating officer informed defendant's probation officer that he had seen defendant "frequenting" J's house. When questioned by her probation officer, defendant denied living there and denied knowing J. She maintained that she was living with her mother, C, on Shores Drive, as she had previously reported.
On June 13, 2019, various law enforcement officers were surveilling the Starr Court house. At one point, they saw defendant's mother, C, carrying a small paper bag believed to contain drug proceeds. As officers approached C, J emerged from the house with a rolling suitcase. Immigration agents handcuffed J and placed him in a vehicle, while other officers put C in a patrol car. C said that there were children in the house. An officer knocked on the front door, and no one answered, but he heard rustling. While that was happening, defendant walked out from behind the house, across the side yard, and into the driveway. Two officers detained defendant on suspicion that she was violating her probation by residing at the Starr Court address without informing her probation officer, by being involved in drug trafficking, by "associating with a known drug trafficker," and by being "deceitful in answering questions."
An officer put defendant in a patrol car. Two officers asked defendant for her consent to search the house. She replied, "I can't, I don't—I don't live here." Both J and C also told the officers that defendant did not live at the house.
The officers requested J's consent to search the house to "make sure the kids are okay and to look for drugs." J gave consent. It is undisputed that J had authority to consent, as he rented the house and lived there. The children opened a door, and officers began searching the house, while C spoke with the children. Officers found a digital scale, rubber gloves, and boxes of resealable baggies in plain view in the kitchen. However, upon seeing evidence that defendant and her children were living in the house—specifically, a lot of women's clothing and children's toys—they stopped the search. An officer went to speak to defendant. He told defendant that he believed that she was living at the house and requested her consent to search it. Defendant continued to deny that she lived at the house. Nevertheless, the officers obtained a warrant before resuming the search. In the warranted search, they found cash, heroin, photographs, drug ledgers, counterfeit currency, and evidence of money transfers.
The court subsequently ordered defendant to show cause why her probation should not be revoked. Defendant also was charged with four new crimes: delivery of heroin as a commercial drug offense, ORS 475.850 ; unlawful possession of heroin, ORS 475.894 (2017), amended by Or. Laws 2021, ch. 2, § 14; Or. Laws 2021, ch. 591, § 36; and two counts of first-degree child neglect, ORS 163.547. Before trial, defendant moved to suppress the evidence from the house. The trial court denied the motion. Defendant was convicted on the four new charges, and her probation was revoked. In this consolidated appeal, defendant challenges the denial of her motion to suppress, seeking reversal both of her convictions and of the probation revocation.
Defendant contends that the trial court erred by denying her motion to suppress. She argues that the search of the Starr Court house violated her rights under Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution and the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. In particular, defendant invokes the "disagreeing tenants" exception to the common-authority rule, as recognized under the Fourth Amendment, to argue that her denial of consent to search the house trumped J's consent to search the house, such that no evidence from the house could be used against her. Defendant argues that we should adopt the disagreeing-tenants exception for purposes of Article I, section 9, and that, in any event, the search violated the Fourth Amendment.
We normally consider state constitutional questions before federal constitutional questions. State v. Caster , 236 Or. App. 214, 225 n. 4, 234 P.3d 1087, rev. den. , 349 Or. 479, 246 P.3d 744 (2010). Here, however, we begin with the Fourth Amendment, because the disagreeing-tenants exception is settled under the Fourth Amendment, whereas it remains an open issue under Article I, section 9. Moreover, because we ultimately agree with the state that the disagreeing-tenants exception does not help defendant in this case—such that adopting or rejecting an exception for purposes of Article I, section 9, would not affect the disposition—this case is not the appropriate vehicle to conclusively decide that open issue. See State v. A. S. , 296 Or. App. 722, 735 n. 8, 443 P.3d 618, rev. den. , 365 Or. 502, 451 P.3d 986 (2019) ().
Under the Fourth Amendment, a warrantless search is per se unreasonable unless it fits into an established exception to the warrant requirement. California v. Acevedo , 500 U.S. 565, 580, 111 S. Ct. 1982, 114 L. Ed. 2d 619 (1991). Consent is an established exception to the warrant requirement. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte , 412 U.S. 218, 228, 231-32, 93 S. Ct. 2041, 36 L. Ed. 2d 854 (1973). If a person consents to a search of a place, and the requesting officer reasonably believes that the person has authority to consent, the exception applies, even if the person actually lacks authority. Illinois v. Rodriguez , 497 U.S. 177, 185-86, 110 S. Ct. 2793, 111 L. Ed. 2d 148 (1990). That is, the Fourth Amendment standard is apparent authority, not actual authority. See id. The reasonableness of the officer's belief regarding authority is judged objectively: "[W]ould the facts available to the officer at the moment warrant a [person] of reasonable caution in the belief that the consenting party had authority over the premises?" Id. at 188, 110 S.Ct. 2793 ().
When two or more people share "common authority" over a place, any one of them normally may consent to a search by the police. United States v. Matlock , 415 U.S. 164, 171, 94 S. Ct. 988, 39 L. Ed. 2d 242 (1974). "[A]ny of the co-inhabitants has the right to permit the inspection in his own right," and "the others have assumed the risk that one of their number might permit the common area to be searched." Id. at 171 n. 7, 94 S.Ct. 988 ().
There is a "narrow exception" to the common-authority rule, however, known as the "disagreeing tenants" exception. Fernandez v. California , 571 U.S. 292, 294, 134 S. Ct. 1126, 188 L. Ed. 2d 25 (2014). When two people who share common authority over a place are both present, and one expressly refuses consent to search, the consent of the other is trumped. Georgia v. Randolph , 547 U.S. 103, 106, 126 S. Ct. 1515, 164 L. Ed. 2d 208 (2006). Like the rule itself, the exception is grounded in social norms: "The constant element in assessing Fourth Amendment reasonableness in the consent cases, then, is the great significance given to widely shared social expectations ***." Id. at 111, 126 S.Ct. 1515. Socially, ...
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