State v. Gonzalez, 18070.

Citation302 Conn. 287,25 A.3d 648
Decision Date06 September 2011
Docket NumberNo. 18070.,18070.
CourtSupreme Court of Connecticut
PartiesSTATE of Connecticutv.Harry GONZALEZ.

302 Conn. 287
25 A.3d 648

STATE of Connecticut
v.
Harry GONZALEZ.

No. 18070.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Jan. 10, 2011.Decided Sept. 6, 2011.


[25 A.3d 651]

James B. Streeto, assistant public defender, with whom, on the brief, was Kent Drager, former senior assistant public defender, for the appellant (defendant).Rita M. Shair, senior assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were David I. Cohen, state's attorney, and, on the brief, Maureen Ornousky, senior assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).NORCOTT, PALMER, ZARELLA, McLACHLAN, EVELEIGH, HARPER and VERTEFEUILLE, Js.*EVELEIGH, J.

[302 Conn. 290] Following a jury trial, the defendant, Harry Gonzalez, was convicted of one count each of felony murder in violation of

[25 A.3d 652]

General Statutes § 53a–54c, robbery in the first degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a–133 and 53a–134 (a), and kidnapping in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a–92 (a)(2)(b). On appeal from the judgment of conviction,1 the defendant claims that: (1) the trial court conducted an inadequate investigation into alleged juror misconduct and improperly denied his motions to dismiss the entire panel of jurors or, alternatively, dismiss four individual jurors; (2) the trial court improperly denied in part his motion to suppress certain statements that he had made to the police; (3) his constitutional right against double jeopardy was violated by his convictions of and separate punishments for felony murder and first degree robbery; and (4) his first degree kidnapping conviction should be overturned because the trial court failed to instruct the jury in accordance with State v. Salamon, 287 Conn. 509, 949 A.2d 1092 (2008). We conclude that the trial court improperly denied in part the defendant's motion to suppress certain statements that he had made to the police.2 Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case to that court for a new trial. We also address the merits of the defendant's third claim because it is likely to arise on retrial, and conclude that the defendant's right against double jeopardy was not violated.

The following undisputed facts and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of this appeal. Pursuant to a warrant, on October 28, 2005, the defendant and [302 Conn. 291] Jennifer Kos (Jennifer) 3 were arrested for the murder of the victim, Joanne Trautwein, which had occurred on October 6, 2005. At the time of his arrest, the defendant was not provided warnings in accordance with Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).4 After arriving at the Stamford police department, the police escorted the defendant to an interview room in order to question him about the murder. There, Paul Guzda, a sergeant of the Stamford police department, and Timothy Dolan, an officer of that police department,5 were waiting with notepads and pencils for the defendant inside the interview room, which measured approximately twelve feet by eighteen feet and consisted of a central table, several chairs, a clock and a two-way mirror. The defendant initially refused to enter the room, directed an expletive toward Guzda, braced himself against the door, and had to be firmly told to sit down. The defendant was then handcuffed to a chair.

Guzda proceeded to tell the defendant that he would be booked on the pending charges, including felony murder, and that

[25 A.3d 653]

the police were giving him the opportunity to talk to them and to tell his side of the story. At trial, on cross-examination, Guzda testified that he typically used the phrase “opportunity to tell his side of the story” as a way “to open up” suspects in the hope that it would lead to a conversation. Guzda also [302 Conn. 292] testified that, at the time, he was not certain whether the defendant had been provided Miranda warnings, although Guzda's admitted goal in interviewing the defendant was to elicit statements concerning the murder. In response, the defendant stated that he wanted an attorney and that he did not want to say anything. Guzda then told the defendant to “sit there and ... you are going to be booked in a little while.” Thereafter, the officers never told the defendant that an attorney would be obtained for him, made no effort to secure counsel for the defendant and did not inform him that any other statements that he made could be used against him. The officers remained seated at the table in silence, looking at the defendant.

Approximately sixty seconds later, the defendant stated that he may have been many things, but that he was not a murderer. In response, Guzda testified that he told the defendant “look, we can't talk to you. I told [you] to be quiet, you asked for an attorney. And basically the conversation was over with because he asked for an attorney.” After another approximately sixty seconds had passed, the defendant reiterated that he was not a murderer, and that all he had wanted to do was to find some work and that was the reason that he and Jennifer had gone to Stamford. After this statement, Guzda stopped the defendant and “reminded him that he had asked for an attorney, so [the officers] can't talk to him since he asked for an attorney, [and Guzda explained] that it would have to be the [defendant's] choice to talk to [the officers] without an attorney.” At this point the defendant still had not been informed of his Miranda rights. Guzda then asked the defendant if he wanted to talk to the officers without an attorney, and the defendant assented. Thereafter, the defendant narrated his activity on the day of the murder. This narration included the defendant's statement that he previously had done some work on the [302 Conn. 293] victim's car, that he and Jennifer had gone to the victim's home that day, that the defendant had asked the victim if she needed any work done on her car, and that when the victim replied in the negative, the defendant and Jennifer had left together. At the conclusion of the narration, Guzda asked the defendant some questions and the interview ended. The entire interview lasted less than one-half hour.

Prior to the start of trial, the defendant filed a motion to suppress the statements that he had made during the police interview. In ruling on the motion to suppress, the issue before the trial court was whether the defendant had been subjected to interrogation when he made the contested statements. 6 In denying in part the defendant's motion to suppress, the trial court analyzed the officers' interview of the defendant as consisting of three distinct episodes and concluded that the officers had not interrogated the defendant during these periods.7 That court also concluded,

[25 A.3d 654]

however, that Guzda's clarifying questions following the defendant's narration constituted interrogation and, accordingly, suppressed the defendant's statements in response to those questions. Following a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of felony murder, robbery in the first degree and kidnapping in the first degree, and was sentenced to a total effective sentence of eighty years incarceration. This appeal followed. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.
[302 Conn. 294] I

The defendant claims that the trial court improperly denied in part his motion to suppress the statements that he made to Guzda and Dolan because he made those statements as a result of police interrogation while in custody and without having been informed of his Miranda rights. Specifically, the defendant claims that the trial court improperly concluded that he was not subjected to interrogation, where the defendant asserts that Guzda's statement that “[it] was the defendant's opportunity to tell his side of the story” was the “functional equivalent” of interrogation.8 At oral argument before this court, the state conceded, contrary to the argument in its brief, that Guzda's statement to the defendant was the functional equivalent of interrogation.9 We agree.

A

We begin by setting forth the applicable standard of review and governing legal principles. “It is well established that the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self incrimination. Miranda v. Arizona, [supra, 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602]. Two threshold conditions must be satisfied in order to invoke the warnings constitutionally required by Miranda: (1) the defendant must have been in custody; and (2) the defendant must have been subjected to police interrogation.... State v. Turner, 267 Conn. 414, 434, 838 A.2d 947, [302 Conn. 295] cert. denied, 543 U.S. 809, 125 S.Ct. 36, 160 L.Ed.2d 12 (2004)....

“A defendant in custody is subject to interrogation not only in the face of express questioning by police but also when subjected to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.... [ State v. Canales, 281 Conn. 572, 585, 916 A.2d 767 (2007) ], quoting Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980).” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Mullins, 288 Conn. 345, 361–62, 952 A.2d 784 (2008).

“[W]hether a defendant was subjected to interrogation ... involves a ...

[25 A.3d 655]

two step inquiry in which the court must determine first, the factual circumstances of the police conduct in question, and second, whether such conduct is normally attendant to arrest and custody or whether the police should know that it is reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.... Because this framework is analogous to the determination of whether a defendant is in custody, the ultimate determination, therefore, of whether a...

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