State v. Gonzalez, 12884
| Decision Date | 29 December 1987 |
| Docket Number | No. 12884,12884 |
| Citation | 535 A.2d 345,205 Conn. 673 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | STATE of Connecticut v. Ruben GONZALEZ. |
Francis T. Mandanici, Sp. Public Defender, for appellant (defendant).
Michael E. O'Hare, Asst. State's Atty., with whom, on the brief, was Kevin P. McMahon, Asst. State's Atty., for appellee (state).
Before PETERS, C.J., and ARTHUR H. HEALEY, CALLAHAN, GLASS and HULL, JJ.
The principal issue on this appeal is whether the trial court adequately explored the defendant's competency to stand trial after it was informed, in the middle of trial, that the defendant had attempted suicide and had been prescribed the antipsychotic drug Haldol. A jury of six found the defendant, Ruben Gonzalez, guilty of one count of attempted robbery in the first degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-49(a)(2) and 53a-134(a)(2), 1 three counts of kidnapping in the first degree with a firearm in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-92a and 53a-92(a)(2)(B), 2 and three counts of attempted assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-49(a)(2) and 53a-59(a)(1). 3 The defendant appeals from the ensuing judgment sentencing him to thirty years of imprisonment. We find no error.
The jury could reasonably have found the following facts: At 7:15 in the morning of March 3, 1984, Paul Serrantino, an employee of the First National Supermarket in Hartford, opened the back door of the store to allow a vendor to enter. Close on the vendor's heels was a man, subsequently identified as the defendant, wearing a ski mask and brandishing a revolver. The defendant informed Serrantino that "[t]his is a robbery" and ordered Serrantino to shut and lock the door and to call the manager to the backroom. Upon the arrival of the assistant manager, Wendell Labbe, and the manager, Joseph Scully, the defendant ordered them to open the safe, which was located in the office at the front of the store. In the meantime, the defendant forced all the other employees to gather in the backroom and then had them walk toward the front of the store and kneel in the aisle. While Scully opened the safe, the defendant intermittently pointed his gun at the employees and at the occupants of the office. When the safe was open, the defendant, while holding the revolver to Scully's head, examined its contents and discovered a locked drop-box in which most of the store's money had been deposited. After being informed that the only key to the box was in the possession of an armored car service, the defendant, noticing the screws in the hinge of the box, requested a screwdriver and ordered Scully to use it to open the box. When Scully's attempts failed, the defendant grabbed the screwdriver from him and, leaning into the safe, attempted to pry open the box with it. At this moment, Labbe pressed the silent alarm button and, with a club that had been hanging on the wall of the office, struck the defendant on the side of the head. The defendant began to fall but then rose up and pointed his gun directly at Labbe. A scuffle between the three men ensued during which the defendant pointed his revolver at Scully's face and screamed that he was going to kill Scully. Although the defendant squeezed the trigger of the gun several times, the gun did not fire because Labbe's thumb interfered with the functioning of the hammer. Hearing the noise from the struggle, the other employees came to the assistance of Scully and Labbe. They struck the defendant until they succeeded in wresting the revolver from his hand. The police subsequently arrived, arrested the defendant, and took him to a hospital for treatment of the injuries he had suffered as a result of the struggle. On the basis of this evidence, the jury convicted the defendant of all of the crimes with which he had been charged.
On appeal the defendant raises four claims of error. He argues that the trial court erred in: (1) failing to allow the defendant to discharge his attorney; (2) adjudging the defendant competent; (3) expelling the defendant from the courtroom; and (4) charging the jury on circumstantial evidence. We find no error.
In order to consider the defendant's first three claims, it is necessary, at the outset, to review the events that took place at trial.
The defendant was arraigned on March 27, 1984. On September 6, 1984, the trial court, pursuant to General Statutes § 54-56d(c), 4 ordered the court's Diagnostic Clinic to examine the defendant to determine his competency to stand trial. At the competency hearing held a few days thereafter, Dr. John F. Fitzgerald, chief psychiatric social worker of the hospital section of the Hartford Correctional Center, testified that the defendant had been examined by a three member team, who had concluded unanimously that the defendant was not competent to stand trial. According to Dr. Fitzgerald, the diagnostic team had considered the possibility that the defendant was malingering, but had concluded that he was suffering from a depressive disorder that resulted in his inability to understand the legal proceedings against him and to cooperate with counsel in his own defense. The report filed by the diagnostic team emphasized the defendant's confusion and disorientation and noted that the defendant was on "major psychotropic medication indicating that other persons who have an opportunity to see him and spend considerably more time with him view him as suffering from a mental condition." Dr. Fitzgerald further testified that there was a "substantial probability" that the defendant could be restored to competency in the structured setting of a state hospital. On the basis of this testimony and the report, the court found the defendant incompetent to stand trial and, pursuant to General Statutes § 54-56d(h) and (i), 5 committed him temporarily to Norwich State Hospital.
Four months later, the trial court held a second competency hearing. At that hearing, Dr. Hans Langhammer, a psychiatrist on the staff of Norwich State Hospital, testified that he had examined the defendant on three separate occasions, consulted the defendant's hospital records, discussed his case with the diagnostic team, and concluded that the defendant was not mentally ill and was competent to stand trial. According to Dr. Langhammer, the defendant seemed to have "all the possible psychotic diagnoses which exist" and consequently had none of them. The defendant did not receive antipsychotic medication while at Norwich State Hospital. In a letter that Dr. Langhammer had earlier submitted to the trial court, he stated that the results of the psychological evaluation that he had performed on the defendant could not rule out either malingering or psychosis. With regard to the inconclusive test results, the letter noted that On the basis of this evidence, the trial court found the defendant competent to stand trial. The defendant did not object to this ruling.
From the beginning of the trial, the defendant persisted in engaging in bizarre and disruptive behavior. Before the first jury panel was brought into court, the defendant stood up and announced that his attorney was responsible for his being in jail, that he did not understand why he was there, that he did not want his attorney and that no one could do anything to him because he was God. The court, after warning him that if he did not sit down the trial would proceed without him, ordered the jury panel to be brought in. As the jury panel was exiting the courtroom after opening statements by counsel, the defendant exclaimed that he was innocent and that this attorney had gotten him locked up. When the court suggested that he confer with counsel before making other statements before the jury, the defendant responded, As the court attempted to explain to the defendant that if his disruptive conduct continued, the court would have to take measures to control him, the defendant repeatedly protested his innocence, demanded that he be left alone and insisted on his right to speak out.
The defendant's most extended outburst occurred the next day. Before having the jury panel brought in, the court again cautioned the defendant regarding his conduct. The defendant responded, When the court attempted to explain to the defendant that he would either be bound and gagged, held in contempt, or removed from the courtroom if he persisted, the defendant became more and more angry, insisting that he did not want to see his lawyer or anyone else, asking whether the court was going to kill him, and exclaiming that he was God. Eventually the defendant became so out of control that he threw his coat at the judge. The coat was intercepted by the clerk. After a recess, the court gave defense counsel an opportunity to confer with the defendant and had the defendant brought back into the courtroom. When the court attempted to resume the proceedings, the defendant continued to engage in disruptive behavior including repeatedly threatening to throw his shoes at the court. The court finally ordered the defendant handcuffed and had him removed from the courtroom.
In deciding what measures to take in response to the defendant's conduct, the court considered holding the defendant in contempt, having him bound and gagged, or excluding him from the courtroom. The court rejected contempt proceedings as inappropriate under the circumstances and concluded that binding and gagging the defendant would be...
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