State v. Good

• Decision Date: 28 March 2002
• Docket Number: No. 99-050.,99-050.
• Parties: STATE of Montana, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Danny Carl GOOD, Defendant and Appellant.
• Court: Montana Supreme Court

43 P.3d 948

2002 MT 59

309 Mont. 113

STATE of Montana, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Danny Carl GOOD, Defendant and Appellant.

No. 99-050.

Supreme Court of Montana.

Submitted on Briefs April 5, 2001.

Decided March 28, 2002.

Margaret Borg and Leslie Ocks, Public Defenders Office, Missoula, Montana, For Appellant.

Honorable Mike McGrath, Attorney General; Mark W. Mattioli, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana, Fred Van Valkenburg, County Attorney; Kirsten LaCroix, Deputy County Attorney, Missoula, Montana, For Respondent.

Justice W. WILLIAM LEAPHART delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶ 1 Danny Carl Good (Good) appeals from the Fourth Judicial District Court's denial of his motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds and his conviction of sexual abuse of children. We affirm in part, reverse in part and remand for a new trial.

¶ 2 The following issues are presented on appeal:

¶ 3 (1) Was Good denied his right to speedy trial?

¶ 4 (2) Is Good entitled to a new trial due to the District Court's denial of three of Good's challenges for cause during voir dire?

¶ 5 (3) Did the District Court err when it allowed the prosecution to suggest on cross-examination that Good had committed acts of stalking, lying and assault?

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶ 6 On August 13, 1997, the State of Montana filed a complaint in Missoula County Justice Court charging Good with felony sexual abuse of children and three counts of felony sexual assault. On September 24, 1997, an Information was filed in District Court charging the same four counts. The District Court arraigned Good, and he entered a plea of not guilty on October 8, 1997. Good was released on his own recognizance.

¶ 7 The court set the omnibus hearing for October 29, 1997. On this date, the parties submitted an Omnibus Hearing Memorandum (omnibus memorandum) in which Good stated he intended to file a motion to suppress and seven other pretrial motions by December 15, 1997. The State indicated it would respond to Good's motions by January 15, 1998. The court vacated the omnibus hearing, approved the omnibus memorandum and stated the matter would be set for trial following the court's rulings on Good's pretrial motions. It set a status conference for March 4, 1998.

¶ 8 On December 15, 1997, Good requested two additional weeks—or until December 30, 1997—to file his pretrial motions. Regardless of this request, Good timely filed a document entitled "Defendant's Combined Motions & Brief" on December 15, 1997. The attached certificate of service stated that the motions were hand-delivered to the Missoula County Attorney's Office on this date. Included were five motions in limine and a request for a list of the State's witnesses. However, Good did not file a motion to suppress or any of the other pretrial motions he indicated he would file in the omnibus memorandum.

¶ 9 At the March 4, 1998, status conference, the court was advised that Good had filed his motions on December 15, 1997, but that the State had not located the motions in their file. The court granted the State's request for ten additional days to respond to Good's motions in limine and set a second status conference for April 8, 1998. On this date, the State responded to Good's motions, Good moved for a trial setting, and the court set the matter for trial on June 23, 1998.

¶ 10 On June 17, 1998, the court granted the State's unopposed motion to continue the trial until June 30, 1998. Subsequently, due to the District Court judge's impending surgery, the court continued the trial until August 10, 1998, on its own unopposed motion.

¶ 11 Good filed a motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds on August 3, 1998. Good's motion was heard, opposed and denied immediately prior to the commencement of trial on August 10, 1998.

¶ 12 At the outset of Good's trial, his counsel conducted voir dire of the jury panel. When Good's counsel discussed the presumption of innocence, a prospective juror, Laurie Gregory, expressed that she would have difficulty believing that the teenage victim would make up a story about sexual abuse. Based on this response, Good challenged her for cause. The State and the District Court attempted to rehabilitate Gregory, yet Gregory persisted in her initial response. At this point, the District Court gave a lengthy "civics speech" regarding the presumption of innocence. When finished, the District Court asked Gregory if she "quarreled" with his speech, and she responded, "no." The District Court then denied Good's challenge for cause. In addition, the District Court denied Good's challenge for cause directed at prospective juror Ann Acheson after she expressed that she felt similar to Gregory. Good removed Gregory and Acheson with two of his six peremptory challenges, and he exhausted all four of his other challenges on other prospective jurors.

¶ 13 When discussing a defendant's Fifth Amendment right to remain silent during voir dire, Good's counsel also challenged for cause a prospective juror, whose name is unknown, when she stated that she would find it hard to understand why a defendant would not want to testify in his own defense and it would bias her opinion. After the District Court attempted to explain the right to remain silent and asked the juror if she could follow the law, the juror replied, "uh-huh." The District Court then denied Good's challenge for cause.

¶ 14 During the trial, Good called two witnesses who essentially testified that Good acted appropriately with young girls, that he was extremely professional at work, and that he was prudish and never made sexually inappropriate statements. During the State's cross-examination of one witness, it asked whether his opinion would change if he knew that Good had stalked his daughter, lied to a process server and engaged in assaultive behavior to a group of young girls. The State questioned the other witness as to whether her opinion of Good would change if she knew he had stalked his daughter.

¶ 15 Following the trial, the jury found Good guilty of sexual abuse of children. However, the court declared a mistrial on the three sexual assault counts because the jury could not reach a verdict on these counts.

¶ 16 After his conviction, Good's case was before this Court on appeal, and we ordered the speedy trial issue remanded to the District Court for reconsideration in light of City of Billings v. Bruce, 1998 MT 186, 290 Mont. 148, 965 P.2d 866. After briefing, evidentiary hearings and oral arguments, the District Court held that Good's constitutional right to a speedy trial was not violated by the 362 days of delay in this case.

¶ 17 Good now appeals the second denial of his motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds, the court's denial of his challenges for cause during voir dire and the court's handling of the State's cross-examination of two of Good's witnesses.

DISCUSSION

¶ 18 (1) Was Good denied his right to speedy trial?

¶ 19 Good contends that the District Court incorrectly concluded that he was not denied a speedy trial. Whether a defendant has been denied a speedy trial is a question of constitutional law. We review a district court's conclusions of law to determine whether its interpretation of the law is correct. State v. Highpine, 2000 MT 368, ¶ 13, 303 Mont. 422, ¶ 13, 15 P.3d 938, ¶ 13 (citation omitted).

¶ 20 Both the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article II, Section 24, of the Montana Constitution, guarantee a criminal defendant's right to a speedy trial. Highpine, ¶ 14. In reviewing a claim that a defendant has been denied a speedy trial, we consider and balance each of the following four factors: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the defendant's assertion of his right; and (4) the prejudice to the defendant. Barker v. Wingo (1972), 407 U.S. 514, 530-33, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 2192-93, 33 L.Ed.2d 101, 117-18, as applied in Bruce, ¶ 19. Since no single factor is decisive, courts must engage in a difficult and sensitive balancing process. Barker, 407 U.S. at 533, 92 S.Ct. at 2193, 33 L.Ed.2d at 118.

Length of Delay

¶ 21 We first consider the length of delay from the time charges were filed until Good's trial date. When the delay is 200 days or longer, further speedy trial analysis is necessary. Bruce, ¶ 55. In this case, the parties agreed that there were 362 days of delay and, as a result, the court engaged in further speedy trial analysis.

Reason for Delay

¶ 22 We next consider the reason for the delay and attribute the delay to the parties. If the court attributes 275 days or more to the State, the State bears the burden to establish that the defendant has not been prejudiced by the delay. Bruce, ¶ 56. If the State satisfies its burden and shows that the defendant was not prejudiced by the delay, the burden then shifts to the defendant to demonstrate prejudice. State v. Hardaway, 1998 MT 224, ¶ 23, 290 Mont. 516, ¶ 23, 966 P.2d 125, ¶ 23. "[T]he [State] bears the burden of prosecution, and a defendant is under no obligation to ensure diligent prosecution of the case against him or to help the [State] avoid dismissal for failure to timely prosecute him." State v. Kipp, 1999 MT 197, ¶ 10, 295 Mont. 399, ¶ 10, 984 P.2d 733, ¶ 10 (quoting Bruce, ¶ 63). Delay caused directly by the State as well as delay which is institutional in nature is attributable to the State, although institutional delay is accorded less weight. Highpine, ¶ 16.

¶ 23 Of the 362 days of delay, the District Court attributed 236 days of delay to the State and 126 days to Good. The court held Good responsible for the delay between the time he stated he would file a motion to suppress on October 29, 1997, and the status conference on March 4, 1998. The court concluded that Good's failure to file the motion to suppress resulted in the court waiting to set a trial date. At the Bruce hearing, the court declared that in the future it would change its policy regarding pretrial...