State v. Goodman

• Decision Date: 06 October 2016
• Docket Number: NO. 34,282,34,282
• Citation: 389 P.3d 311
• Parties: STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Terence GOODMAN, Defendant–Appellant.
• Court: Court of Appeals of New Mexico

389 P.3d 311

STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff–Appellee,

v.Terence GOODMAN, Defendant–Appellant.

NO. 34,282

Court of Appeals of New Mexico.

Filing Date: October 6, 2016

Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, Elizabeth Ashton, Assistant Attorney General, Albuquerque, NM for Appellee.

The Law Office of Ryan J. Villa, Ryan J. Villa, Albuquerque, NM for Appellant.

OPINION

KENNEDY, Judge.

{1} In this casewe determine that a five- to fifteen-second delay in proceeding from a red light turned green does not constitute obstructing traffic as a matter of law in violation of a City of Albuquerque Ordinance entitled "Vehicles, Pedestrians Not to Obstruct Streets."Albuquerque, N.M., Rev. Ordinancesch. 8, art. I, § 8–2–1–33(1974)(the Ordinance).Consequently, we also hold that the officer who stopped Defendant solely for a violation of the Ordinance based on that transitory delay was operating under an unreasonable mistake of law, and lacked reasonable suspicion for the stop.All evidence obtained as a result of the improper stop should have been suppressed.The district court having ruled otherwise, we reverse.

I.BACKGROUND

{2} While traveling southbound on Second Street in downtown Albuquerque at approximately two o'clock in the morning, Officer Mark Landavazo pulled up behind Defendant at a red light.The light was red when Officer Landavazo arrived, and there were no other cars at the intersection or on the adjoining streets.The street on which the two vehicles were traveling was three lanes wide: one northbound lane, one southbound lane, and one turning lane allowing traffic from either direction to turn left.When the light turned green, from five to fifteen seconds passed before Defendant began driving forward.As soon as Defendant started driving through the intersection, Officer Landavazo initiated his emergency lights.Defendant pulled over immediately.The delay between the light turning green and Defendant's departure was the sole basis on which Officer Landavazo stopped Defendant.Defendant was ticketed for obstructing traffic.No other alleged traffic violation occurred.Officer Landavazo stated that he stopped Defendant because he believed that Defendant's delay impeded the flow of traffic, contrary to the Ordinance, which prohibits obstructing traffic.

{3}Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of the stop.Defendant argued that Officer Landavazo did not have reasonable suspicion to stop Defendant.¹The metropolitan court concluded that Officer Landavazo had reasonable suspicion to conduct his stop of Defendant and denied Defendant's motion.Defendant pled guilty, reserving his right to appeal the denial of his suppression motion.The district court affirmed in a memorandum opinion.Defendant now appeals the district court's decision to affirm the metropolitan court's denial of his motion to suppress.

II.DISCUSSION

{4} There is no legal touchstone, nor any evidentiary basis in this case for what constitutes an obstruction, or how long one has to be stationary in a street to be one.Arguments presented by Defendant in this appeal unconvincingly suggest that all three lanes of Second Street must be obstructed to be a violation under the definition of a "public way," while the State argues that there is no minimum delay in proceeding from a newly-green traffic light that is incapable of being investigated as a violation.We ascribe to neither position.The State cites to NMSA 1978, Section 66–7–105(A)(1978) to demonstrate that vehicular traffic facing a green light "may proceed straight through or turn right or left," but nowhere is there a time limit for doing so.We recognize that our Supreme Court requires that an ordinance must be specific enough to afford fair notice of what is prohibited to potential violators, Harris Books, Inc. v. City of Santa Fe , 1982–NMSC–078, ¶ 9, 98 N.M. 235, 647 P.2d 868, and that we have previously held that when an ordinance fails to create minimum guidelines for the reasonable police officer, charged with enforcement of the statute to a point that encourages subjective and ad hoc application, a statute cannot stand.State v. Jacquez , 2009–NMCA–124, ¶ 6, 147 N.M. 313, 222 P.3d 685.The State raises the Ordinance's ambiguity on appeal, but fails to demonstrate that the issue was raised below; we accordingly do not consider the argument.SeeCent. Sec. & Alarm Co. v. Mehler , 1996–NMCA–060, ¶ 25, 121 N.M. 840, 918 P.2d 1340.In an attempt to follow as linear a path as possible, we first address whether reasonable suspicion existed to initiate the stop.After an analysis of the Ordinance, we conclude that Officer Landavazo had no reasonable suspicion to stop Defendant.In all, statutory analysis of the Ordinance drives this case.

{5} The denial of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of fact and law.State v. Almanzar , 2014–NMSC–001, ¶ 9, 316 P.3d 183.Thus, the appellate court reviews the facts for substantial evidence, deferring to the lower court's findings regarding the evidence presented.State v. Leyva , 2011–NMSC–009, ¶ 30, 149 N.M. 435, 250 P.3d 861.We review the application of law to the facts de novo.Almanzar , 2014–NMSC–001, ¶ 9, 316 P.3d 183.We are not bound by a lower court's ruling that is predicated on a mistake of law.Boone v. State , 1986–NMSC–100, ¶ 10, 105 N.M. 223, 731 P.2d 366.

{6} The stop of a vehicle for the purpose of investigating a traffic violation is an investigative seizure and must be justified at its inception.Leyva , 2011–NMSC–009, ¶ 10, 149 N.M. 435, 250 P.3d 861.Justification consists of an officer having reasonable, articulable suspicion that a particular individual is breaking or has broken the law.SeeState v. Jason L. , 2000–NMSC–018, ¶ 20, 129 N.M. 119, 2 P.3d 856(setting forth standard for reasonable suspicion);see also State v. Duran , 2005N–MSC–034, ¶ 23, 138 N.M. 414, 120 P.3d 836(stating that New Mexico courts apply reasonable suspicion analysis for investigatory stops to traffic stops), overruled on other grounds byLeyva , 2011–NMSC–009, 149 N.M. 435, 250 P.3d 861.This includes reasonable suspicion that a traffic law has been violated.State v. Prince , 2004–NMCA–127, ¶ 9, 136 N.M. 521, 101 P.3d 332.

{7} The Ordinance provides the following:

It shall be unlawful for any person either to operate or to stand a vehicle on any public way in such a manner as to obstruct the free use of such public way, or to place himself, to place or direct another or to place or direct the placement of any material, object, or vehicle on any public way in such a manner as to obstruct the free use of such public way.The term "public way" shall include an intersection.This section shall not be interpreted to prohibit the lawful parking of vehicles, trailers, and the like.

Albuquerque, N.M., Rev. Ordinances§ 8–2–1–33.We note that there is no requirement of intentionally obstructing a public way, or any element of scienter at all in the Ordinance.Albuquerque, N.M., Rev. Ordinances§ 8–2–1–33.A "public way" is defined as "[t]he entire width between the property lines of every way publicly maintained when any part thereof is open to the use of the public for purposes of vehicular travel[.]"Albuquerque, N.M., Rev. Ordinancesch. 8, art. I, § 8–1–1–2(B)(1974, amended 2014).The "public way" includes the "unused right of way[.]"Id.

A.Officer Landavazo Had No Reasonable Suspicion That Defendant Obstructed Free Use of the Public Way Contrary to the Ordinance

{8}Defendant argues that the traffic stop was not supported by reasonable suspicion because Officer Landavazo made a mistake of law when he believed Defendant's actions constituted a violation of the Ordinance.Specifically, Defendant contends that the Ordinance, when read in conjunction with the definition of "public way," requires that the entire public way be utterly impassable.Thus, because portions of the unused right of way—the opposite northbound lane and southbound left-turn lane—were not both obstructed, Defendant argues that the Ordinance could not have been violated.The State, on the other hand, argues that Defendant's vehicle prohibited Officer Landavazo from proceeding forward through the intersection in the southbound lane, and thus, regardless of the temporal or spatial extent of the obstruction, the Ordinance was violated.

{9} Our determination of whether Officer Landavazo made a mistake of law in initiating a traffic stop, based on the belief that Defendant had committed a violation of the Ordinance, begins with an analysis of the Ordinance itself.SeeState v. Scharff , 2012–NMCA–087, ¶ 11, 284 P.3d 447(determining whether a deputy made a mistake of law beginning with analysis of the section of the Motor Vehicle Code).Both the State and Defendant agree that Defendant did not immediately move forward when the traffic signal changed from red to green.

State v. Olivas , 2011–NMCA–030, ¶ 8, 149 N.M. 498, 252 P.3d 722(viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the decision below).It is also undisputed that Officer Landavazo initiated the stop immediately once Defendant began driving through the intersection and had no other reason for the stop than the delay in starting from a dead stop once the light turned green.Our task is to determine whether this delay is within the ambit of the type of conduct that the Ordinance is aimed at preventing.SeeState v. Hall , 2013–NMSC–001, ¶ 9, 294 P.3d 1235(deciphering legislative intent by examining "the object the [L]egislature sought to accomplish and the wrong it sought to remedy"(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

{10}We interpret an ordinance in the same manner as we would a statute.SeeLantz v. Santa Fe Extraterritorial Zoning Auth. , 2004–NMCA–090, ¶ 7, 136 N.M. 74, 94 P.3d 817;see alsoAlmanzar , 2014–NMSC–001, ¶ 9, 316 P.3d 183(applying a de novo standard of review).We aim, above all, to give effect to the intent of the Legislature, or, in this...