State v. Goodman

Decision Date09 February 1970
Docket NumberNo. 1,No. 54613,54613,1
Citation449 S.W.2d 656
PartiesSTATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Carroll Eugene GOODMAN and Ronald James Phillips, Appellants
CourtMissouri Supreme Court

John C. Danforth, Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, Charles A. Blackmar, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.

Robert G. Duncan, Pierce, Duncan & Hill, and Michael Drape, Kansas City, for appellants.

REX TITUS, Special Judge.

A jury found Carroll Eugene Goodman and Ronald James Phillips guilty of burglarizing and stealing from the Gassman Hardware Store in Lathrop, Missouri. Following denial of their post-trial motions and in accordance with the verdicts, each defendant was sentenced to a term of seven years for burglary and an additional consecutive term of three years for stealing. Through their pretrial motion to suppress and continuing complaints defendants, have well preserved their objections to the involved searches and seizures which produced from their persons the evidence which linked them to the subject felonies. The defendants will be discharged.

Suspicions of the night telephone operator in Lathrop (a city of 1,000 population) were aroused at 2:25 a.m. August 16, 1968, when 'the voice of the boy or man' she did not recognize initiated a call from the Gassman store to Kansas City. The operator contacted Mr. Gassman at his home concerning the propriety of the call and he 'asked her if at all possible to keep them on the line, (but) when they answered in Kansas City * * * the fellow * * * on the Gassman (store) line hung up.' When Gassman, the county sheriff and a highway patrolman inspected the store premises at about 2:45 a.m. they found it uninhabited; the backdoor had been forcibly opened, and a torn dollar bill and 'between eighteen to twenty-five dollars' in 'nickels, dimes, quarters (and) pennies' had been removed from the cash register. No one had been seen entering or leaving the store. The sheriff possessed no inkling of the identity of the person who made the telephone call and had 'no way to tell how many' people were involved. In his own words, 'I didn't know who I was looking for.' The sheriff told a newspaper deliveryman that 'if you see anybody or anything unusual (to) let me know,' and instructed the city marshal of Lathrop that 'if he saw any strangers to bring them (in) regardless of who they were.'

At about 3:15 a.m. the newspaper carrier saw two people 'normally walking' on the berm of a public highway at a point four miles south of Lathrop. He did not know 'whether they were male or female' and said they were not 'breaking any laws,' but reported this sighting, nevertheless, to the city marshal. Clad in mufti sans any badge of office, the marshal drove to the highway in an unmarked automobile accompanied by an acquaintance and three handguns 'to see if (the strangers) might possibly have had something to do with * * * the burglary.' Four miles outside of Lathrop the marshal overtook 'the two boys' who turned out to be the defendants. The marshal had never seen either of them before. 'They weren't breaking any laws (and) weren't carrying anything' that the marshal could see. When the marshal 'asked if they wanted a ride * * * they opened the (car) door * * * and Mr. Phillips * * * started to get in (but) backed up and said they were just going to the house up the road. I asked him who lived there * * * and he couldn't tell me.' Neither the marshal nor his companion had identified themselves, and Phillips' explanation for backing out of the car was that he saw that the driver 'had a pistol in his hand (and) I didn't know whether he was going to rob us or what.' In any event, the marshal and his associate alighted from the automobile with guns in hand and thus held the defendants captive while the marshal 'frisked them and found the change (but no weapons) in their pockets and got them in the car and got right to town.' Upon arriving in Lathrop, the marshal told the sheriff 'out in the street' that 'he had already discovered (the defendants) had coins in their possession.' The sheriff told the defendants 'they were under arrest for investigation of burglary of the hardware store,' took them 'over to City Hall,' and directed them to empty their pockets, which they did. Thereafter the sheriff 'read the Moranda (sic) warning to them.' Defendant Goodman's left hip pocket contained a silk stocking which held a 'dollar and thirty-four cents worth of pennies.' Defendant Phillips' pockets contained two torn dollar bills, a two centavo piece which Gassman said 'I'm not for sure' was missing from the store, and 242 pennies, nickels, dimes and quarters.

A peace officer (State v. Caffey, Mo., 436 S.W.2d 1, 2(1)) or a private citizen (State v. Keeny, Mo., 431 S.W.2d 95, 97(3)) possessed of knowledge that a recent felony had been committed, may arrest without a warrant anyone he has reasonable grounds to believe has committed the offense. Montgomery v. United States, 8 Cir., 403 F.2d 605, 608(1), 609(6); 5 Am.Jur.2d, Arrest, § 25, pp. 715--716, and § 34, p. 726. However, an arrest may not be used as a pretext to search for evidence (State v. Moody, Mo., 443 S.W.2d 802, 804(2)) and neither the subsequent discovery of incriminating evidence nor an ultimate conviction may be relied upon to uphold the validity of an arrest. State v. Seymour, Mo., 438 S.W.2d 161, 162--163(2); State v. Young, Mo., 425 S.W.2d 177, 182(4). The search of one's person is justified only if it is incident to a lawful arrest (State v. Harris, Mo. (banc), 321 S.W.2d 468, 470(1)), and in deciding whether the involved arrests and attendant searches were authorized, we must consider the constitutional issues in the light of the fundamental protections of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, as applied in the opinions of the Supreme Court of the United States (Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 481, 85 S.Ct. 506, 13 L.Ed.2d 431, 434(3), rehearing denied, 380 U.S. 926, 85 S.Ct. 879, 13 L.Ed.2d 813) which hold, inter alia, that the inestimable right against unreasonable searches and seizures belongs as much to the citizen on the street as to the homeowner closeted in his study to dispose of his secret affairs. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8--9, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 898(1).

The sheriff and the city marshal had knowledge that a felony had been committed at the Cassman store, so we initially proceed upon the assumption that the search of each defendant wes within permissible limits provided it was incident to a lawful arrest. 'The constitutional validity of the search in this case, then, must depend upon the constitutional validity of the (defendants') arrest. Whether that arrest was constitutionally valid depends in turn upon whether, at the moment the arrest was made, the officers had probable cause to make it--whether at that moment the facts and circumstances within their knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the (defendants) had committed or was committing (the) offense. * * * 'The rule of probable cause is a practical, nontechnical conception affording the best compromise that has been found for accommodation * * * often opposing interests. Requiring more would unduly hamper law enforcement. To allow less would be to leave law- abiding citizens at the mercy of the officers' whim or caprice. " Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91, 85 S.Ct. 223, 225--226, 13 L.Ed.2d 142, 145(1, 2). The factual issue of probable cause must be resolved from the particular facts and circumstances in each case, bearing in mind that the requirement of probable cause can never be satisfied with a bare suspicion of guilt. Schook v. United States, 8 Cir., 337 F.2d 563, 564--565(1--2); Pigg v. United States, 8 Cir., 337 F.2d 302, 305(1).

Save for knowing that 'the voice of the boy or man' had placed a telephone call from the hardware store, no one involved with the arrest of Goodman and Phillips was endowed with any information as to the identity or description of the person or persons who had entered the establishment at the time the defendants were sighted and accosted upon the roadway. The sheriff 'didn't know who (he) was looking for,' and the only reason the city marshal undertook the excursion on the nebulous reportings relayed by the newspaper carrier was upon the direction of the sheriff to bring in any strangers and 'to see if (the strangers) might possibly have something to do with * * * the burglary.' When observed, the defendants were 'normally walking' on the highway shoulder, 'they...

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  • State v. Blair, 66352
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Missouri
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    ...for evidence. United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 52 S.Ct. 420, 76 L.Ed. 877 (1932); Taglavore, 291 F.2d at 265; State v. Goodman, 449 S.W.2d 656 (Mo.1970); State v. Howell, 543 S.W.2d 836, 838 (Mo.App.1976). Compare Taglavore, 291 F.2d at 265 ("[T]he search must be incident to the ar......
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