State v. Goodrich

• Court: Idaho Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: McQUADE; BAKES
• Citation: State v. Goodrich, 97 Idaho 472, 546 P.2d 1180 (Idaho 1976)
• Decision Date: 03 March 1976
• Docket Number: No. 11722,11722
• Parties: STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Jean GOODRICH, a/k/a Jeannie Goodrich, Defendant-Appellant.

Page 1180

546 P.2d 1180

97 Idaho 472

STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Jean GOODRICH, a/k/a Jeannie Goodrich, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 11722.

Supreme Court of Idaho.

March 3, 1976.

Thomas C. Frost of Green, Frost & Cantrill, Boise, Michael F. Heyrend, Salt Lake City, Utah, for defendant-appellant.

Wayne L. Kidwell, Atty. Gen., Lynn E. Thomas, Deputy Atty. Gen., Boise, for plaintiff-respondent.

McQUADE, Chief Justice.

Defendant-appellant Jean Goodrich, (hereinafter appellant), was charged with murder in the second degree (I.C. § 18-4003) arising out of the fatal shooting of her ex-husband Brent Goodrich. The shooting occurred during the early morning hours of October 17, 1973, at approximately 12:30 a. m. at appellant's home in the city of Pocatello. A jury found appellant guilty as charged, and a judgment of conviction was entered. Appellant's motions to dismiss and for a new trial were denied. She was sentenced by the trial judge to life imprisonment at hard labor, after a pre-sentence investigation was ordered and received, and after a mitigation hearing was held. Appellant appeals from the judgment which was entered, and from the denial of her motions to dismiss and for a new trial. We reverse the judgment of conviction, and remand for further proceedings in conformity with this opinion.

The facts of this shooting incident have their origin in October of 1963, when appellant first met the deceased. At that time appellant was divorced and had three children from a previous marriage. Appellant married the deceased in June of 1964. In 1966, the deceased adopted appellant's three children. Appellant and the deceased were divorced in 1969.

The record discloses that appellant and the deceased lived together on and off for some time after the divorce decree was entered. In December of 1970, appellant and the deceased remarried. The second marriage lasted until February of 1973, when the parties were divorced for a second time.

There is a dispute in the record as to the nature of the relationship that existed between appellant and the deceased. Appellant's version is that although her relationship with the deceased was not without its strain and friction, there were deep bonds of love and affection between the two. The state introduced witnesses who contradicted this, and who testified that appellant was obsessed with the idea of killing the deceased-either out of jealousy over his relationship with another woman or from desire to gain the proceeds on insurance policies that he carried.

In August of 1973, appellant married Blaine Bolles. From the accounts of both parties, the relationship was stormy from the outset. Appellant testified that Bolles repeatedly threatened her as well as the deceased with physical violence, struck her on numerous occasions, and that as a result of his behavior she was in terrible fear of him. She further testified that Bolles' actions caused her to call the police in late August of 1973 to remove him from her house on Sublette Avenue in the city of Pocatello which Bolles had moved into at the time of the marriage. Bolles disputed much of appellant's testimony. He agreed that there had been difficulty between appellant and himself during their marriage, but testified that he had never threatened the life of appellant, and on only one occasion 'to blow off a little bit of steam' had he threatened to kill the deceased. He did admit to slapping appellant and placing his hands around her neck on one occasion, but stated he did this when he discovered her in the arms of another man while sitting in a car in a parking lot. Appellant and Bolles separated on August 30, 1973, and were divorced on September 27, 1973.

The record discloses that appellant spoke to the chief of detectives of the police department for the city of Pocatello sometime in the middle of September, 1973, (during the time she was separated from Bolles, but prior to the time of her divorce from him), inquiring about the possibility of obtaining a gun for her own protection against Bolles. A few weeks after this talk, and apparently with the approval of the deceased, appellant obtained a .25 caliber semi-automatic pistol, and a box of shells. On or about October 6, 1973, the deceased moved in with appellant and her three children in her new residence at 600 Highland Drive in the city of Pocatello. He continued to reside with appellant and her children up until the time of the fatal shooting.

The fatal shooting occurred in the early morning hours of October 17, 1973. After retiring for the evening at about 10:30 p. m. on the night of October 16th, appellant testified that she was awakened by what she described as a loud ponding noise in the pipes. After reaching over and finding that the deceased was not in bed beside her, she became frightened. According to her own account, she picked up the gun (which it was her habit to place beside her bed), and without thinking to take her glasses (which she wore all the time to correct a nearsighted condition), arose and proceeded down the hallway to the dining room from where she believed the sound to be coming. She testified that she did not turn on any lights as she proceeded because she was too frightened to think to do so. She then related that she saw a figure standing there, who, in her terrified state she believed to be Bolles. At that moment she shot the deceased several times. At that time the deceased was clad only in undershorts and was apparently drinking a glass of water.

Within moments of the shooting, the children awoke to find their mother (appellant) screaming and hysterical. An ambulance was summoned, and the police were called. The deceased was taken to a nearby hospital, where he died a few days later. Appellant was charged with the commission of murder in the second degree.

Appellant raises several issues on appeal. One issue involves the admissibility of certain testimony which appellant contends was improperly allowed into evidence over her repeated objection. We agree with this argument, and reverse and remand for a new trial on this ground.

The testimony in issue was elicited by the prosecuting attorney from Mrs. Reva Hill, a female acquaintance whom the deceased began dating on a regular basis in July of 1973, while he was divorced from appellant. The contested testimony consisted of statements allegedly made by the deceased to Mrs. Hill concerning appellant. Although appellant voiced numerous objections on hearsay and other grounds, Mrs. Hill was allowed to relate the following as told to her by the deceased:

1) that appellant shot at the deceased with a shotgun on a prior occasion, (which the record discloses occurred five and one-half years before the fatal shooting incident in question);

2) that appellant had threatened to kill the deceased and Mrs. Hill, as well as herself, after appellant had a fight with the deceased on September 10, 1973;

3) that appellant attacked a woman with whom the deceased was dancing at a party in August of 1973;

4) that appellant caused a fight at a bar which resulted in the deceased and a friend getting badly beaten.

This testimony ¹ was allowed into evidence by the trial judge, without a limiting or cautionary instruction to the jury, on the ground that it came within the holding of State v. Radabaugh. ² A review of the holding of that case convinces us that the trial judge was in error in permitting this testimony into evidence without a limiting instruction.

In Radabaugh, this Court was asked to determine whether the following two statements made by the deceased to a third party about the defendant were properly admitted into evidence by the trial judge:

1) 'I'm scared to death of him (defendant) not so bad when he's drinking beer, but when he's drinking whiskey he's crazier than a tick.'

2) '. . . he (defendant) might as well get his stuff and go back to skid row where he came from, because she was closing the hotel and moving to Texas with her son.'

The Court found the first statement to be a declaration offered to show the state of mind of the declarant, i. e., the deceased victim, and ruled it admissible since

'(e)vidence tending to show the mental state of the victim and ill-feeling or hostility between decedent and defendant is admissible.' ³

Thus the Court concluded that no error was committed in allowing the first statement into evidence, because the testimony was probative of the attitudes and feelings, i. e., fear of the victim-declarant towards the defendant, and any improper use of the declaration by the members of the jury was avoided by the tendering of a limiting instruction by the trial judge. ⁴

The Court next addressed itself to the admissibility of the second statement, and commented:

'(T)he second statement was offered to show motive on the part of Radabaugh (defendant) and is properly admissible since Radabaugh admitted that he had been notified that the hotel was to be closed and that the two ladies were moving back to Texas. When it is proved that 'D' (murder victim) made a statement to 'X' (the defendant-appellant, Radabaugh), with the purpose of showing circumstantially, the probable state of mind of 'X' (the defendant-appellant, Radabaugh), such as notice, knowledge or motive or to show information which 'X' had as bearing on the subsequent conduct of 'X' (defendant-appellant Radabaugh), the evidence is not subject to attack as hearsay. McCormick, Evidence, § 228, p. 464 (1954)' ⁵ (emphasis in original)

Since the Radabaugh jury was again notified of the limited purpose for which they were to consider this testimony, the second statement was also deemed to have been correctly admitted into evidence.

The state argues that the statements made by Brent Goodrich, the deceased, to Mrs. Hill and related by her at trial, fall within the categories of admissible declarations outlined in Radabaugh, because they reflect a state of mind of the declarantvictim...