State v. Goodson
| Decision Date | 31 March 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. 2 CA-CR 2014-0019,2 CA-CR 2014-0019 |
| Parties | THE STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee, v. JAMES TOMMY GOODSON, JR., Appellant. |
| Court | Arizona Court of Appeals |
THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
See Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 111(c)(1); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.24.
Appeal from the superior Court in Pima County
The Honorable Deborah Bernini, Judge
AFFIRMED
Mark Brnovich, Arizona Attorney General
Joseph T. Maziarz, Section Chief Counsel, Phoenix
By Kathryn A. Damstra, Assistant Attorney General, Tucson
Counsel for Appellee
Lori J. Lefferts, Pima County Public Defender
By Michael J. Miller, Assistant Public Defender, Tucson
Counsel for Appellant
Judge Espinosa authored the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Miller and Chief Judge Eckerstrom concurred.
¶1 After a jury trial, James Goodson was convicted of possession of a deadly weapon by a prohibited possessor, a class four felony. The trial court found Goodson had one historical prior conviction and sentenced him to a presumptive prison term of 4.5 years. On appeal, Goodson contends the court erred in instructing the jury and challenges several of its evidentiary rulings. For the following reasons, we affirm.
¶2 We view the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the jury's verdict and resolve all inferences against Goodson. See State v. Lizardi, 234 Ariz. 501, ¶ 2, 323 P.3d 1152, 1153 (App. 2014). In September 2011, police officers Steven Pupkoff and Leticia Laplander responded to a 9-1-1 call reporting a disturbance at an apartment complex involving "[s]ome people . . . making gestures like they had a handgun." At the complex, residents directed the officers to Goodson, who was standing in the parking lot next to his vehicle.
¶3 When contacted by the officers, Goodson indicated he had been threatened by one or more residents who gestured to him as though shooting him. He said he then called 9-1-1 and got a shotgun from his apartment, which he had put in the trunk of his car. After locating the weapon and placing it in his police vehicle, Officer Pupkoff initiated a background check on Goodson who then volunteered he had a prior conviction, but "already completed [it]" and therefore had a right to have a gun. The officers confirmed Goodson's prior felony conviction and eventually arrested him for possession of a deadly weapon by a prohibited possessor.
¶4 Goodson was indicted on one count of possession of a deadly weapon by a prohibited possessor pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-3102, and the state alleged a previous conviction of "forgery, theft of means of transportation and/or by controlling stolen property." Following a Rule 11 examination, Goodson was found competent to stand trial.
¶5 At trial, a police sergeant testified Goodson had telephoned him the day after his arrest, asking for the return of the shotgun, but also mentioning he was not permitted to have a gun. In contrast, Goodson testified he did not tell the officer he was a prohibited possessor, but rather had asked for the gun to be released to his family because he could not pick it up himself, having been charged with a crime. He also stated that after his first conviction, he had contacted various governmental agencies about reacquiring his right to have a firearm.1 He further claimed police had released him with his gun after a previous encounter, leading him to believe his right to possess a weapon had been restored and he "was clear to have a firearm."
¶6 The trial court instructed the jury on the charged offense stating, "A person commits possession of a deadly weapon by a prohibited possessor by knowingly possessing a deadly weapon and such person is a prohibited possessor." It also provided the jury with similarly worded written instructions. The jury found Goodson guilty as charged, and he was sentenced as noted above. We have jurisdiction over his appeal pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1), 13-4031, and 13-4033(A)(1).
¶7 Goodson first argues the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury it had to find he knew he was a prohibited possessor in order to be guilty of possession of a deadly weapon by a prohibited possessor. See A.R.S. § 13-3102(A)(4). We review de novo whether jury instructions properly state the law. State v. Johnson, 212 Ariz. 425, ¶ 15, 133 P.3d 735, 741 (2006). We consider the adequacy of jury instructions in their entirety to determine if they accurately reflect the law, State v. Hoskins, 199 Ariz. 127, ¶ 75, 14 P.3d 997, 1015 (2000), and if as a whole they are "'substantially free from error,'" we will affirm the conviction, State v. Cox, 217 Ariz. 353, ¶ 15, 174 P.3d 265, 268 (2007), quoting State v. Norgard, 103 Ariz. 381, 383, 442 P.2d 544, 546 (1968). When a defendant has failed to object at trial, we review only for fundamental error. State v. Henderson, 210 Ariz. 561, ¶ 19, 115 P.3d 601, 607 (2005). Because he did not object to the instruction,2 Goodson bears the burden of establishing the trial court erred, the error was fundamental, and it caused him prejudice. See id. ¶ 22.
¶8 Section 13-3102(A) provides: A "[p]rohibited possessor" is "any person . . . [w]ho has been convicted within or without this state of a felony . . . and whose civil right to possess or carry a gun or firearm has not been restored." A.R.S. § 13-3101(A)(7)(b). Goodson acknowledges having lost his right to possess a gun after his earlier conviction and admits to having possessed a gun during the incident at issue here. He contends, however, he had believed his rights had been restored.
¶9 As the state points out, under § 13-3102(A)(4), it was required to prove Goodson possessed the weapon knowingly, and knew it was a deadly weapon. It was not required, however, to prove Goodson knew he was a prohibited possessor. See State v. Harmon, 25 Ariz. App. 137, 139, 541 P.2d 600, 602 (1975) (); see also State v. Tyler, 149 Ariz. 312, 316, 718 P.2d 214, 218 (App. 1986) (). As we previously have observed, a prohibited possessor offense is essentially one of status. State v. Mangum, 214 Ariz. 165, ¶ 16, 150 P.3d 252, 256-57 (App. 2007) ().
¶10 Further, considered in the context of Goodson's argument, ignorance or a mistaken belief as to a matter of fact relieves a person of criminal liability only when "[i]t negates the culpable mental state required for commission of the offense." A.R.S. § 13-204(A)(1). "Ignorance or mistake as to a matter of law does not relieve a person of criminal responsibility." A.R.S. § 13-204(B). Goodson's claim that he believed his gun rights had been restored involved an error of law. See State v. Olvera, 191 Ariz. 75, 77, 952 P.2d 313, 315 (App. 1997) (); Harmon, 25 Ariz. App. at 139, 541 P.2d at 602 (). Accordingly, the trial court committed no error, much less fundamental error, by not instructing the jury it had to find Goodson knew he was a prohibited possessor before finding him guilty.
¶11 Goodson next contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress statements he had made to officers before being advised of his Miranda3 rights. We review the denial of amotion to suppress evidence for an abuse of discretion. State v. Peterson, 228 Ariz. 405, ¶ 6, 267 P.3d 1197, 1199 (App. 2011). In our review, we look only to the evidence presented at the hearing and view it in the light most favorable to sustaining the court's ruling, State v. Hausner, 230 Ariz. 60, ¶ 23, 280 P.3d 604, 614 (2012), deferring to the court's determination of facts and witness credibility but reviewing de novo its legal conclusions, State v. Gonzalez-Gutierrez, 187 Ariz. 116, 118, 927 P.2d 776, 778 (1996).
¶12 At the suppression hearing, Officers Pupkoff and Laplander testified that, upon arriving at the apartment complex, several residents had told them Goodson pointed a shotgun at two men. After speaking with the men and finding them unconcerned and "uncooperative," the officers approached Goodson, who was in the parking lot, standing beside his vehicle. Pupkoff testified he "started conversing" with Goodson, getting "some biographical information" and "asking him what happened."4 Goodson informed the officers he was the 9-1-1 caller, identified himself, and handed them his wallet. He said he had felt threatened by an individual at the complex and had responded by getting his shotgun from his apartment and putting it in the trunk of his car.
¶13 Officer Pupkoff testified he had then asked to see the shotgun, and Goodson gave him the keys to his vehicle. Pupkoff found the shotgun in the trunk and inspected it, noting aloud that it was unloaded. Goodson then offered that the shotgun shells were in his pocket and he displayed them. Pupkoff testified he "secure[d the gun] in [his] car temporarily" and initiated a background check on Goodson. While waiting for the results, Goodson volunteered he had spent two years in prison for auto theft. When asked if Goodson was in custody during the encounter, Pupkoff testified, "No . . . He was just standing there," and "I was talking to him." He continued, "And at the end of the day if he...
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