State v. Goodwin, 18735
| Decision Date | 08 December 1967 |
| Docket Number | No. 18735,18735 |
| Citation | 158 S.E.2d 195,250 S.C. 403 |
| Parties | The STATE, Respondent, v. James William GOODWIN, Appellant. |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
John Bolt Culbertson, Greenville, for appellant.
H. F. Partee, Asst. Sol., Greenville, for respondent.
In March, 1965, at first dark, the defendant, James Goodwin, and one Joe Gibson were the sole occupants of an automobile traveling on a secondary highway in Greenville County. As they approached the home of one George Mitchell, the automobile left the highway and fatally injured a young woman who was standing near an automobile parked in Mitchell's yard. This automobile then struck the parked automobile, turned over twice and came to rest against a tree. The defendant was convicted of involuntary manslaughter and appeals to this court on exceptions which raise four questions.
The defendant charges that the court erred in overruling his motion for a directed verdict upon the ground that the evidence was insufficient to establish that he was the driver of the automobile. There is no merit here. The defendant and Gibson each testified that the other was driving. This alone was sufficient to require submission of the issue to the jury. State v. Fleming, 243 S.C. 265, 274, 133 S.E.2d 800, 806; West's South Carolina Digest, Criminal Law, k753(1).
At the trial, the defendant contended that Solicitor Thomason was disqualified from conducting the prosecution because Mr. Thomason's law firm had been retained by one R. C. Sweat, the driver of the parked automobile, in a civil action brought by Gibson against Sweat and Goodwin to recover for injuries sustained by him in the collision. Apparently, Sweat was joined as a defendant upon the allegation that the glare of bright lights from his parked car was a contributory cause of the collision. The court properly ruled that the solicitor was not disqualified. However Mr. Thomason voluntarily withdrew and turned the prosecution over to his assistant. The second ground of appeal is from the court's refusal of defendant's motion to strike certain testimony as to defendant's bad reputation upon the ground that such testimony was the product of participation by Mr. Thomason. 1 This ground of appeal is without merit both because Mr. Thomason was not disqualified, and thus was eligible to participate, and because no semblance of prejudice to the defendant has been shown.
The defendant next claims error in the refusal of his motion for a new trial on the ground that an important witness for the State, Highway Patrolman Ellis, had a conversation with a juror during the course of the trial. At most, the record shows that during a recess in the trial a juror approached the...
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People v. Superior Court (Greer), S.F. 23505
...38, 335 A.2d 364 (participation of prosecutor improper but not grounds for reversal absent showing of prejudice); State v. Goodwin (1967) 250 S.C. 403, 158 S.E.2d 195 (prosecutor voluntarily withdrew); see also People v. Farnsley (1973) 53 Ill.2d 537, 293 N.E.2d 600 (minimal participation a......
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Farber v. Douglas, 16886
...v. Jones, 200 Wash. 241, 93 P.2d 326 (1939). But see Commonwealth v. Dunlap, 233 Pa.Super. 38, 335 A.2d 364 (1975); State v. Goodwin, 250 S.C. 403, 158 S.E.2d 195 (1967)." A strong analogy exists with federal cases that have applied Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 6......
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Sinclair v. State, 591
...155 P.2d 988, 990 (1945) (probation hearing reversed). But see Garton v. State, 454 S.W.2d 522, 526 (Mo.App.1970); State v. Goodwin, 250 S.C. 403, 158 S.E.2d 195, 196 (1967); State v. Rosengard, 47 N.J. 180, 219 A.2d 857, 858 (1966); State v. Melerine, 236 La. 881, 109 So.2d 454, 457-60 and......
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Sinclair v. State, 83
...v. Jones, 200 Wash. 241, 93 P.2d 326 (1939). But see Commonwealth v. Dunlap, 233 Pa.Super. 38, 335 A.2d 364 (1975); State v. Goodwin, 25 S.C. 403, 158 S.E.2d 195 (1967). See in addition cases in which courts have disapproved of an attorney, who after representing an individual, subsequently......