State v. Goodwin, 22574.

• Decision Date: 02 June 2004
• Docket Number: No. 22574.,22574.
• Citation: 2004 SD 75,681 N.W.2d 847
• Parties: STATE of South Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. James GOODWIN, Defendant and Appellant.
• Court: South Dakota Supreme Court

681 N.W.2d 847

2004 SD 75

STATE of South Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. James GOODWIN, Defendant and Appellant.

No. 22574.

Supreme Court of South Dakota.

Considered on Briefs August 25, 2003.

Reassigned December 1, 2003.

Decided June 2, 2004.

Lawrence E. Long, Attorney General, Ann C. Meyer, Assistant Attorney General, Pierre, South Dakota, Attorneys for plaintiff and appellee.

Terry Pechota of Viken, Viken, Pechota, Leach & Dewell, Rapid City, South Dakota, Attorneys for defendant and appellant.

MEIERHENRY, Justice (on reassignment).

[¶ 1.] James Goodwin was charged with aggravated assault under SDCL 22-18-1.1(4).¹ At his arraignment, he entered a plea of not guilty. Subsequently, Goodwin changed his plea to guilty in accordance with a plea agreement with the State. After sentencing, Goodwin filed a motion to withdraw his plea claiming that his plea was not voluntary. The trial court denied Goodwin's motion. Goodwin appeals. We reverse.

FACTS

[¶ 2.] Although some of the details are in dispute, the events leading up to the charged offense started when Patrick James (James), Jessica Yeoman, Joshua Feickert and others were at a party near a shopping mall in Rapid City, South Dakota. A verbal altercation ensued between Feickert and James, after which Feickert left the party. Yeoman gave Feickert a ride to the shopping mall to make a phone call. Yeoman returned to the party and told James where she had left Feickert. Yeoman and James returned to the mall. Goodwin who had just arrived at the party followed them. At the mall, James approached Feickert hitting him twice in the face with his fist. The two continued to fight until Feickert was on the ground. The testimony indicated that James continued to hit and kick Feickert as he lay on the ground. Defendant Goodwin who had not been in the fight up to this point approached the fallen Feickert and kicked him in the face. Feickert was taken to the hospital where it was determined his jaw was broken in two places. Goodwin and James were both charged for the incident. The charges against James were eventually dismissed.

[¶ 3.] At his arraignment, 19-year-old Goodwin was advised of his rights and responded affirmatively when asked if he understood his rights. Over the following weeks, Goodwin's counsel negotiated a plea agreement with the State. At the Change of Plea Hearing, eighty-nine days after the arraignment, Goodwin pleaded guilty to the charge of aggravated assault. The judge accepted the plea and subsequently sentenced Goodwin to five years in the South Dakota Penitentiary and ordered him to pay full restitution of approximately $55,000.

ISSUE

Whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying Goodwin's motion to withdraw his guilty plea to correct a manifest injustice.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[¶ 4.] The decision to allow a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea is a matter solely within the discretion of the trial court and is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. State v. Wahle, 521 N.W.2d 134, 136-37 (S.D.1994). We have said that the trial court's discretion to allow withdrawal of a guilty plea prior to "sentencing should be exercised liberally in favor of withdrawal." Id. at 137. However, a stricter standard should be applied when a defendant requests to withdraw a guilty plea after a sentence has been imposed. Withdrawal of a plea after sentencing may be granted "to correct manifest injustice." SDCL 23A-27-11. The statute provides:

A motion to withdraw a plea of guilty... may be made only before sentence is imposed or imposition of sentence is suspended; but to correct manifest injustice a court after sentence may set aside a judgment of conviction and permit the defendant to withdraw his plea.

Id. (emphasis added). The stricter standard for withdrawing a plea after sentencing is "`to prevent a defendant from testing the weight of potential punishment, and then withdrawing the plea if he finds the sentence unexpectedly severe.'" State v. Lohnes, 344 N.W.2d 686, 688 (S.D.1984) (quoting United States v. McKoy, 645 F.2d 1037, 1040 n. 3 (C.A.D.C. 1981)). However, if a defendant enters a plea "without full knowledge of the consequences and involuntarily" the trial court's discretion should favor withdrawal of the guilty plea. Wahle, 521 N.W.2d at 137. Additionally a direct appeal is afforded more intense scrutiny than if the challenge is by a collateral habeas corpus action. State v. Moeller, 511 N.W.2d 803, 809 (S.D.1994). As we said in Moeller:

Upon a direct appeal from a conviction the defendant must be given all presumptions and protections possible under our constitution. However, when the proceeding before the court is in the nature of a collateral attack, as in a habeas corpus action or a challenge to the validity of predicate convictions, it becomes subject to less intense scrutiny upon review.

Id. (emphasis added in part). Since Goodwin challenges the voluntariness of his guilty plea by direct appeal, we must give him "all the presumptions and protections possible under our constitution." Id.

DECISION

[¶ 5.] Goodwin claims the trial court should have allowed him to withdraw his guilty plea (1) because his plea was not voluntary and (2) because he entered his plea without knowing the consequences.

[¶ 6.] In determining voluntariness of a guilty plea, we have repeatedly stated "that a plea of guilty cannot stand unless the record in some manner indicates a free and intelligent waiver of the three constitutional rights mentioned in Boykin—self-incrimination, confrontation and jury trial—and an understanding of the nature and consequences of the plea." Nachtigall v. Erickson, 85 S.D. 122, 128, 178 N.W.2d 198, 201 (1970); State v. Holmes, 270 N.W.2d 51, 53 (S.D.1978); Lodermeier v. State, 273 N.W.2d 163, 165 (S.D.1978). Specifically, in Boykin v. Alabama, the United States Supreme Court held that a defendant must know and understand his "privilege against compulsory self-incrimination"; his "right to trial by jury"; and his "right to confront [his] accusers." 395 U.S. 238, 243, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 1712, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969). Further, the defendant must know and understand that entering a plea of guilty constitutes a waiver of these rights. Id. at 243-44, 89 S.Ct. 1709. As the United States Supreme Court stated in Parke v. Raley, "It is beyond dispute that a guilty plea must be both knowing and voluntary." 506 U.S. 20, 28, 113 S.Ct. 517, 523, 121 L.Ed.2d 391, 404.

[¶ 7.] SDCL 23A-7-4 (Rule 11(c)) establishes a procedure for the judge to follow to ensure that a guilty plea is knowing and voluntary. Rule 11(c) is fairly straightforward on what the trial court should do. The statute clearly states, "Before accepting a plea of guilty ... a court must address the defendant personally in open court ... and inform him of, and determine that he understands." SDCL 23A-7-4 (emphasis added). The statute provides:

Before accepting a plea of guilty or nolo contendere a court must address the defendant personally in open court, subject to the exception stated in § 23A-7-5, and inform him of, and determine that he understands, the following:

(1) The nature of the charge to which the plea is offered, the mandatory minimum penalty provided by law, if any, and the maximum possible penalty provided by law;

(2) If the defendant is not represented by an attorney, that he has the right to be represented by an attorney at every stage of the proceedings against him and, if necessary, one will be appointed to represent him;

(3) That he has the right to plead not guilty or to persist in that plea if it has already been made, and that he has the right to assistance of counsel, the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses against him, and the right not to be compelled to incriminate himself;

(4) That if he pleads guilty or nolo contendere there will not be a further trial of any kind, so that by pleading guilty or nolo contendere he waives the right to a trial, the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses against him, and the right not to be compelled to incriminate himself; and

(5) That if he pleads guilty or nolo contendere, the court may ask him questions about the offense to which he has pleaded, and if he answers these questions under oath, on the record, and in the presence of counsel, his answers may later be used against him in a prosecution for perjury.

Id.

[¶ 8.] When Goodwin was arraigned on October 25, 2001, the judge thoroughly explained the charges, penalties and rights. Eighty-nine days after the arraignment on January 22, 2002, Goodwin changed his plea to guilty. When Goodwin appeared before the judge to change his plea to guilty, the trial court abbreviated the proceeding significantly. The trial court's entire colloquy at the plea hearing transpired as follows:

THE COURT: This is the case of State v. James Goodwin. This is the time set for a plea. What is the plea going to be to?

DEFENSE COUNSEL: To one count in the Information of aggravated assault.

THE COURT: Is that your understanding?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Is there a plea agreement, other than what you stated?

STATE'S ATTORNEY: The Defendant will plead guilty to one count of aggravated assault. The Defendant will be responsible for all the costs of the prosecution and his share of restitution at the time of sentencing. State will accept the recommendations set forth in the presentence, and otherwise will remain silent. As far as the amount of incarceration, penitentiary time would be our recommendation, but we would leave the actual amount of time up to the Judge. The State will recommend penitentiary, but no specific amount. State will oppose a suspended imposition.

THE COURT: Is that your understanding of the agreement, Mr. Goodwin?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: I will ask you then, to the charge of aggravated assault, what is your plea, guilty or not guilty?

THE DEFENDANT: Guilty.

THE COURT: Has anyone threatened, coerced or promised you anything,

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