State v. Gould, 6184

• Decision Date: 11 May 1935
• Docket Number: 6184
• Citation: 55 Idaho 588,44 P.2d 1114
• Parties: STATE, Respondent, v. GUY E. GOULD, Appellant
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

44 P.2d 1114

55 Idaho 588

STATE, Respondent, v. GUY E. GOULD, Appellant

No. 6184

Supreme Court of Idaho

May 11, 1935

CRIMINAL LAW - STATUTORY RAPE-EVIDENCE-INSANITY-BURDEN OF PROOF - INSTRUCTIONS-APPEAL-QUESTIONS PRESENTED-LIMITATIONS.

1. Failure to instruct jury that one who has lost power to control his actions because of mental disease is not criminally responsible for act which is solely product of such disease, though he knows right from wrong, held not error, in absence of evidence that defendant was at time of crime charged or ever had been afflicted with any mental disease.

2. Instructions on question of defendant's mental capacity in trial for statutory rape held favorable to him, and hence not ground for reversal of conviction, though gratuitous in absence of any evidence of his insanity.

3. Supreme Court will not consider question of defendant's insanity on appeal from judgment of conviction, where record shows no evidence of his insanity in court below.

4. Defense of insanity in criminal case is ineffectual until backed by evidence, and no burden of disproving it is imposed on state until defendant submits substantial proof sufficient to raise reasonable doubt, on such question.

5. Refusal to instruct jury that burden was on state to prove that defendant was capable of forming criminal intent held not error, in absence of any evidence tending to show defendant's insanity at time of offense charged.

6. Instruction to acquit defendant of statutory rape, if he was laboring under such defective reason at time of act charged as not to know nature and quality thereof or did not know that it was wrong, held not erroneous as assuming his guilt in view of instruction as to presumption of innocence reasonable doubt and considerations of all instructions which clearly left all fact questions to jury.

APPEAL from the District Court of the Ninth Judicial District for Fremont County. Hon. C. J. Taylor, Judge.

Appeal from judgment of conviction of the crime of rape. Affirmed.

Affirmed.

W. A. Ricks, for Appellant.

Where one is on trial for rape, and the state proves such crime under circumstances that would constitute rape if such crime was committed by a sane person, then if the crime is admitted and insanity is interposed as a defense, such defense cannot avail unless it appears from the evidence, first, that at the time of the crime the defendant was under such a defect of reason from disease of the mind as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or, second, if he did know it, that he did not know that he was doing what was wrong; or, third, if he knew the nature and quality of the act, and knew that it was wrong, that he was under such duress of mental disease as to be incapable of choosing between right and wrong as to the act done, and unable, because of the disease, to resist the doing of the wrong act, which act was the result solely of mental disease. (Bell v. State, 120 Ark. 530, 180 S.W. 186; People v. Schmidt, 216 N.Y. 324, 119 N.E. 945, Ann. Cas. 1916A, 978, L. R. A. 1916D, 519; State v. Brown, 36 Utah 46, 102 P. 641, 24 L. R. A., N. S., 545; State v. Shuff, 9 Idaho 115, 72 P. 664.)

Bert H. Miller, Attorney General, and Ariel L. Crowley, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.

The limitation contained in the conclusion of Instructions 4, 10 and 11, requiring the jury to find that the defendant had at the time of the crime "sufficient mental capacity to understand the nature and consequences of his act," is a correct legal proposition and a proper test of sanity in this state. (State v. Wetter, 11 Idaho 433, 83 P. 341; State v. St. Clair, 6 Idaho 109, 53 P. 1; State v. Tharp, 48 Idaho 636, 284 P. 201; State v. Fleming, 17 Idaho 471, 106 P. 305.)

HOLDEN, J. Budge, Morgan and Ailshie, JJ., concur. Givens, C. J., sat at the hearing, but took no part in the decision.

OPINION

HOLDEN, J.

Appellant was convicted of the crime of statutory rape, and appeals.

It is not contended that the evidence is insufficient to prove that appellant, a man twenty-six years of age, actually had sexual intercourse with the prosecutrix, a female child thirteen years of age, at the time and place and as charged in the information. That the appellant actually had sexual intercourse with the prosecutrix is tacitly admitted, but it is contended that "the appellant's evidence tended to show that he was a moron, and that his mind was so diseased and disordered to such an extent that he was not accountable under the law. His evidence further tended to show that he could neither read nor write, and that his intelligence was of the lowest order."

Dr. H. B. Rigby, appellant's alienist, testified concerning the mental capacity of the appellant, as follows:

"Q. Doctor, do you think the defendant had sufficient mental capacity to appreciate the act? Do you not? He knew what he was doing? If he did, in fact, as a matter of fact, perpetrate the crime of rape, do you think he knew what he was doing?

"A. Well, I think he did.

"Q. And you think also that if, as a matter of fact, the defendant did commit the crime of rape, he knew it was wrong to do so?

"A. Well, I think he has enough intelligence to appreciate that.

"Q. And if I understand your testimony correctly, it is this: That this man is neither an idiot, a lunatic, or an insane person?

"A. I think he rates above either an idiot or an imbecile. And that his classification, if you are going to put him in that classification, you wouldn't hardly call him an imbecile or an idiot, but I think he is in the moron group."

Appellant's sister testified:

"Q. Do you know whether or not he (appellant) went to school?

"A. Yes; he went to school to about the sixth grade, I imagine.

"Q. Do you know why he quit?

"A. Well, he got too big to go, and of course the kids made fun of him, and he couldn't learn.

. . . .

"Q. You think that he is as smart as his neighbors, or smarter than his neighbors?

"A. He is just as smart.

. . . .

"Q. Do you think your brother knows the difference between right and wrong?

"A. Yes sir.

"Q. Do you think he has sufficient intelligence to know that it is wrong to rape?

"A. I do.

"Q. Do you think he has sufficient intelligence to know that it is wrong to steal?

"A. I do.

"Q. Do you think he has sufficient intelligence to appreciate the consequences of a criminal act if it was committed by him?

"A. Oh, I think he does.

"Q. You think he would know that he would be punished for it?

"A. I do."

Appellant's brother testified:

"Q. Do the neighbors out in East Wilford pick on the defendant?

"A. Yes, sir; quite a lot.

"Q. Why do they do that, do you know?

"A. Well, they just think they are smart.

"Q. Now, are you like your sister? You think that he is as smart as they are, don't you?

"A. Yes sir.

"Q. You think that he is just as smart as they are?

"A. Yes sir."

Appellant's father testified:

"Q. Did he ever run your threshing machine?

"A. He run the engine.

"Q. For how long was he running the engine?

"A. Oh, it must have been five or six years.

"Q. Now, as a matter of fact, it takes an average person, does it not--speaking from the standpoint of intelligence, and so forth--to operate a threshing machine?

"A. Well, in a way it does. Still, there is not so much to a steam engine, you know."

. . . .

"Q. Do you believe, Mr. Gould, that the defendant would know that to go out at night, in the night time--assuming that that is the case--and attack a girl would be wrong?

"A. Well, he might, and he might not.

"Q. Well, now what is your opinion?

"A. Well, he isn't very smart that way, oh, no."

And the appellant himself testified:

"Q. You knew it would be wrong to do that with a girl that age?

"A. Yes sir.

"Q. And that is the reason you wouldn't do it, isn't it?

"A. Yes sir.

"Q. Of course. You knew if you did something like that, and you got caught, something might happen to you, didn't you?

"A. Yes sir.

"Q. And you know that is the fact now?

"A. Yes sir.

. . . .

"Q. Now, you wouldn't do that with a girl of that age, because you know that would be wrong?

"A. Yes sir.

"Q. And that you would be punished for it if you were caught?

"A. Yes sir."

Upon the question of the mental capacity of appellant, the court instructed the jury as follows:

"You are instructed that under the laws of this state a female child under the age of eighteen years is incapable of giving legal consent to an act of sexual intercourse, so that every act of carnal connection with such a child by one not her husband will constitute the crime of rape, whether with or without the consent of such child; and, in this case, if you believe from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant had sexual intercourse with the prosecuting witness, on or about the 3rd day of March, 1934, as alleged in the information, and that at the time she was under the age of eighteen years, and not the wife of the defendant, then the defendant is guilty of rape, and you should so find. Unless you have a reasonable doubt that he had, at the time, sufficient mental capacity to understand the nature and consequences of his acts."--Instruction No. 4.

"You are instructed that if you should find that the defendant did not, as alleged, have and accomplish an act of sexual intercourse with and upon the person of the prosecutrix, by actual penetration, that is, if you believe that actual penetration has not been shown beyond a reasonable doubt, but should believe beyond a reasonable doubt, from the evidence, that the defendant did, in this county, at or about the time alleged in the information, make an assault upon the prosecutrix (naming her) with the intent to commit the crime of rape, you will, in that event, find ...