State v. Gould
| Citation | 241 Conn. 1,695 A.2d 1022 |
| Decision Date | 20 May 1997 |
| Docket Number | Nos. SC,s. SC |
| Parties | STATE of Connecticut v. George GOULD. STATE of Connecticut v. Ronald TAYLOR. 15268, SC 15269. |
| Court | Supreme Court of Connecticut |
Glenn W. Falk, Special Public Defender, with whom, on the brief, was Donald D. Dakers, Special Public Defender, for appellant in Docket No. 15268 (defendant in Docket No. 15268).
Jack W. Fischer, Assistant State's Attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Michael Dearington, State's Attorney, James G. Clark, Assistant State's Attorney, and Jason A. Schroder, Legal Intern, for appellee in Docket No. 15268 (state in Docket No. 15268).
Elizabeth M. Inkster, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant in Docket No. 15269 (defendant in Docket No. 15269).
Judith Rossi, Assistant State's Attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Michael Dearington, State's Attorney, and James G. Clark, Supervisory Assistant State's Attorney, for appellee in Docket No. 15269 (state in Docket No. 15269).
Before BERDON, NORCOTT, KATZ, PALMER and McDONALD, JJ.
After a joint trial before a jury, the defendants, Ronald Taylor and George Gould, were each convicted of felony murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54c, robbery in the first degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-134 (a)(2) and 53a-8, criminal attempt to commit robbery in the first degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-134 (a)(2), 53a-8 and 53a-49, and conspiracy to commit robbery in the first degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-48 (a) and 53a-134 (a)(2). 1 The defendants each have appealed from the respective judgments of the trial court, sentencing them to total effective sentences of eighty years imprisonment, 2 to this court pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199(b)(3).
The defendants both claim that the trial court improperly allowed the jury to replay the videotaped testimony of a state's witness in the jury room. In his appeal, Taylor also claims that: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions of attempted robbery in the first degree, robbery in the first degree and felony murder; (2) the trial court improperly limited his cross-examination of a witness; (3) the trial court improperly precluded evidence of that same witness' character for truthfulness and veracity; (4) the trial court improperly admitted misconduct evidence; and (5) his convictions of attempted robbery in the first degree and robbery in the first degree violate the prohibition against double jeopardy. We affirm the judgments of the trial court with the exception of our conclusion that Taylor's convictions of attempted robbery in the first degree and robbery in the first degree must be merged and the sentence for attempted robbery in the first degree vacated.
The jury reasonably could have found the following facts. On July 4, 1993, at approximately 5:35 a.m., the defendants entered La Casa Green, a retail store, on Grand Avenue in New Haven. The owner, Eugenio Vega had opened the store shortly after 5 a.m. and was the only person in the store. The defendants tied up Vega's hands with electrical cord, placed him in the store's cooler, and fatally shot him in the head. The defendants took money and jewelry from Vega's safe and searched through Vega's wallet.
The state's principal witness was Doreen Stiles. She testified that after she observed Gould enter the store, she hid in the alleyway next to the store. From her hiding place, Stiles heard the voices of three people arguing in the store, including Vega, who was screaming. She distinctly heard Vega and the defendants arguing about money and opening the safe. After a couple of minutes, Stiles heard a single gunshot. She then observed both of the defendants leave the store.
Taylor claims that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions of felony murder, robbery in the first degree and attempted robbery in the first degree. He argues that there was no evidence that either a robbery or an attempted robbery was committed at La Casa Green. Taylor asserts that it was not established what had been in the safe or that anything was missing from the safe, and that there was no evidence that anything was missing from Vega's person. Taylor asserts, therefore, that without evidence of a robbery or an attempted robbery, his convictions of those offenses as well as of felony murder must be reversed. We conclude that there was sufficient evidence to convict Taylor of each count.
We apply a two part test in analyzing a sufficiency of the evidence claim. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. James, 237 Conn. 390, 435-36, 678 A.2d 1338 (1996).
Susana Negron, the victim's daughter, testified that she did the bookkeeping for her father's store. At the beginning of each week, Negron would make deposits for her father of receipts totaling between $3000 and $10,000. The week before her father's murder, however, she did not make a deposit. Her father had instructed her not to make a deposit that week because he planned to use those receipts to make a downpayment on a building that he intended to purchase. Negron further testified that during December, 1992, before her father's murder, she had seen the contents of the floor safe in the back of La Casa Green, and that the safe contained jewelry, documents, papers, cash and coins. The jewelry included a "beautiful diamond earring" that Vega intended to leave for his wife, but Negron never saw the earring again after her father's death.
Officer Keith Wortz of the New Haven police department was the first officer to enter La Casa Green following the shooting. Wortz testified that after finding no one in the front of La Casa Green, he entered the back area of the store. There he saw an open floor safe with items on the floor outside of the safe and leaning on the open door. Wortz also saw a wallet on a box next to the safe. He then entered the cooler and found Vega's still warm body.
Detective Chris Grice of the New Haven police department then arrived at the store. Grice testified that he found the cash register keyed on with coins and bills inside. He stated that there did not appear to be any money missing from the cash register. In the back of the store, however, he observed bank statements and a paper band, of the type used to wrap money, on the floor. The safe was open and there were jewelry boxes inside, but there was no money or jewelry in the safe. Grice also found Vega's wallet, which did not contain any money, although Vega had $1800 in the front pocket of his trousers.
We conclude that from this evidence, considered with the testimony of Stiles that she saw Gould and Taylor leave the store, the jury reasonably could have found that Taylor was guilty of attempted robbery in the first degree, robbery in the first degree and felony murder. The jury was entitled to believe that the defendants entered the store with the intention of robbing the contents of Vega's safe. It was not necessary, as Taylor argues, that the defendants also had to take the money from the cash register and Vega's trouser pockets. It was reasonable for the jury to find that during this frenzied robbery and murder, the defendants were after the largest amount of cash and valuables, which would be found in the safe, and therefore, that the defendants did not take the time to search the cash register and Vega's trouser pockets. The jury also could have found that the defendants may have taken the time to check Vega's wallet before tying him up and shooting him.
Furthermore, it was reasonable for the jury to conclude that the defendants found valuable items in Vega's safe. While the contents of the safe may have changed since Negron had last seen them several months earlier, testimony sufficiently established that valuables, including jewelry, would have been in the safe, but were stolen by the defendants. Grice also testified that he found empty jewelry boxes and a money wrapper in the back of the store. Since Negron did not make the usual weekly deposit of receipts the week before these crimes, the jury could find that this money likely had been in the safe. The jury's verdict, finding that something was taken such as money and jewelry, was a reasonable inference by it.
Each of the defendants claims that the trial court abused its discretion and unduly...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Miller v. Barber, No. 455605 (CT 5/20/2005)
... ... In addition, the court took judicial notice of the opinions of the Appellate Court in State v. Miller, 59 Conn.App. 406, 757 A.2d 69 (2000), cert. denied, 255 Conn. 942, 769 A.2d 60 (2001), and State v. Jones, 60 Conn.App. 866, 761 A.2d 789 ... Joyce, 243 Conn. 282, 705 A.2d 181 (1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1077, 118 S.Ct. 1523, 140 L.Ed.2d 674 (1998); State v. Gould, 241 Conn. 1, 695 A.2d 1022 (1997); State v. Bova, 240 Conn. 210 690 A.2 1370 (1997); State v. Weaver, 8d Conn.App. 329, 857 A.2d 376, cert. denied, ... ...
-
State v. Grenier
... ... This court cannot substitute its own judgment for that of the jury if there is sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict ... State v. Mejia, [233 Conn. 215, 224, 658 A.2d 571 (1995) ] ... State v. James, 237 Conn. 390, 435-36, 678 A.2d 1338 (1996) ... State v. Gould, [241 Conn. 1, 6-7, 695 A.2d 1022 (1997)]. When conflicting testimony is presented, the jury may credit the testimony it finds believable. See State v. Person, 236 Conn. 342, 347, 673 A.2d 463 (1996) ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Edwards, 247 Conn. 318, 323, 721 A.2d 519 ... ...
-
In re Yasiel R.
... ... Specifically, I agree with the majority that the Appellate Court incorrectly construed the third prong of State v ... Golding , 213 Conn. 233, 239-40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989), to require an appellant to produce binding precedent directly on point in order to ... Santiago , supra, 245 Conn. 301; State v. Coleman , 242 Conn. 523, 534, 700 A.2d 14 (1997); State v. Gould , 241 Conn. 1, 9, 695 A.2d 1022 (1997); State v. Taylor , 239 Conn. 481, 504, 687 A.2d 489 (1996), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1121, 117 S. Ct. 2515, ... ...
-
State v. Schiappa
... ... See, e.g., State v. Coleman, supra, 542 (judicial explanation required for imposition of greater sentence after trial than after plea); State v. Gould, 241 Conn. 1, 15, 695 A.2d 1022 (1997) (videotaped deposition must be played in open court, not in jury room); State v. Brown, [235 Conn. 502, 528, 668 A.2d 1288 (1995)] (judicial inquiry on the record into allegations of juror misconduct); State v. Breton, 235 Conn. 206, 250, 663 A.2d ... ...